美国高管薪酬法律制度对我国的借鉴
发布时间:2018-04-26 19:23
本文选题:高管薪酬 + 公司治理 ; 参考:《华东政法大学》2011年硕士论文
【摘要】:本论文针对美国高管所获薪酬“虚高虚涨”、“脱离业绩”、“背离价值”的失控状态,旨在反思制度背后广泛性、系统性的问题根源,并期望以此为鉴,为中国的薪酬制度及公司治理提供参考路径。 全文共计3万字,主体部分分为四大部分。 第一部分,重在现状与危机,即高管薪酬相关问题的提出。本部分旨在描述现状与发现问题,因此先以一系列切实数据勾勒了全文研究对象——美国高管薪酬的现状。从中可以看到它自20世纪90年代持续的牛市开始飞速增长、拉开差距的现实。再通过与公司业绩数据、金融危机背景等的对应比较,发现高管薪酬与经营者业绩并不匹配,出现公司倒闭等经营恶果时只能股东和经营者买单等不合理现象,而通过对美国国际集团(AIG)案例的解析,更可以发现美国高管薪酬“无功受禄”的失控趋势。 第二部分,重在批判与维护,即高管薪酬制度的基本理论分析。本部分意图阐明,高管薪酬制度虽备受质疑,但亦有着强大的维护者。他们通过薪酬合同扎实的理论根基、演变的制度革新来证明,尽管高管薪酬制度有种种瑕疵,但它依然不失为一种良善制度,且有着不断改进的趋势。同时他们笃信的核心理论认为,任何看似“天价”的报酬都是通过市场力量经由董事会与高管进行公平议价后得出,是程序正当、实体合理的安排。这一长期以来颠扑不破的通行观点也是下文重点的反思与批驳之处。 第三部分,重在反思与症结,即美国高管薪酬制度问题的内因分析。本部分亦是本文的核心,首先将薪酬制度的支持理归纳为六点,其次进行了逐一的质疑与批驳,并特别指出,通行观点所坚信不疑的“董事与高管进行公平议价”事实上已经沦落为“董高相护”,成为高管薪酬失控的根源。再次,本部分还对“董高相护”现象的原因,进行了多角度、跨学科的分析。 第四部分,重在借鉴与反思:即中国高管薪酬制度的进路分析。对美国这一典型公司制度的研究不仅是为理论的探索,更是为我国相关制度提供反思与借鉴。因此本部分从我国的特殊国情出发,嫁接由美国高管薪酬制度反思中所得出的思路,继而提出了包括完善信息披露、强调市场绩效评估、引入董事情感制约、增强董事会独立性、改革诉讼问责机制等改革思路。
[Abstract]:This paper aims to reflect on the root causes of the widespread and systematic problems behind the system, aiming at the runaway state of the American executives' compensation, such as "fictitious rise", "disengagement from performance" and "deviation from value", and looks forward to learning from it. For China's compensation system and corporate governance to provide a reference path. The full text amounts to 30,000 words, the main part is divided into four parts. The first part, focuses on the current situation and crisis, that is, executive compensation related issues. The purpose of this part is to describe the current situation and problems, so a series of practical data is used to outline the current situation of executive compensation in the United States. It can be seen from the 90 s sustained bull market began to grow rapidly, the gap between the reality. Through the corresponding comparison with corporate performance data, financial crisis background and so on, it is found that executive compensation does not match the performance of managers, and only shareholders and operators can pay the bill when the company goes bankrupt and so on. And through the analysis of AIG case, we can find out that executive compensation in the United States is out of control. The second part focuses on the criticism and maintenance, that is, the basic theoretical analysis of executive compensation system. This part is intended to clarify that although the executive compensation system has been questioned, there are also strong defenders. Through the solid theoretical foundation of the compensation contract and the evolution of the system innovation, they prove that although the executive compensation system has all sorts of flaws, it is still a kind of good system, and has a trend of continuous improvement. At the same time, their core theory is that any seemingly "sky-high" reward is obtained through market forces after fair bargaining with executives through the board of directors, and is a due process and substantial arrangement. This long-standing point of view is also the focus of the following reflection and criticism. The third part focuses on reflection and crux, that is, the internal cause analysis of executive compensation system in the United States. This part is also the core of this paper. Firstly, the supporting principles of the pay system are summed up into six points. Secondly, the author questions and criticizes them one by one, and points out in particular that, The popular belief that "directors and executives negotiate fairly" has in fact been reduced to "Dong Gao's protection", which has become the root of executive compensation runaway. Thirdly, this part also carries on the multi-angle, cross-disciplinary analysis to the phenomenon of Dong Gao. The fourth part focuses on reference and reflection: the analysis of executive compensation system in China. The research on the typical corporate system of America is not only for the exploration of theory, but also for the reflection and reference of relevant systems in our country. Therefore, this part starts from the special situation of our country, grafts from the American executive compensation system introspection, then puts forward the idea, including perfecting the information disclosure, emphasizing the market performance appraisal, introducing the director emotion restriction. Strengthen the independence of the board of directors, reform litigation accountability mechanism and other reform ideas.
【学位授予单位】:华东政法大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2011
【分类号】:D922.291.91;D971.2
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