逻辑能否应用于规范——凯尔森晚期规范逻辑理论的反思

发布时间：2018-12-20 10:34

【摘要】：凯尔森的纯粹法学理论的发展脉络可以分为三个阶段:早期,凯尔森毫不迟疑地认为逻辑可以应用于规范;中期,面临"约根森困境",凯尔森对"法律规范"与"描述意义上的法律规则"进行了界分,提出基于后者的变通的规范逻辑方案;晚期,凯尔森的观点发生重大转向,他彻底否定规范逻辑建立的可能性,认为逻辑推断法则与矛盾律均不可应用于规范。通过对凯尔森就学者跨越"约根森困境"的四种进路所做的批判和得出的结论进行再反思,发现凯尔森晚期的规范逻辑理论存在着不圆融及歧误,包括规范性质界定不明、规范问题与逻辑问题之间偷换概念、本体论探讨与规范逻辑否定之间存在抵牾、从道义逻辑理论的角度看逻辑与规范并非完全无涉,以此对凯尔森晚期的规范逻辑理论进行回应并商榷。
[Abstract]:The development of Kelsen's pure theory of law can be divided into three stages: in the early days Kelsen did not hesitate to think that logic could be applied to norms; In the middle of this period, in the face of "Jorgenson's dilemma", Kelsen divided the "legal norms" and "descriptive legal rules", and put forward a logical scheme of norms based on the latter. In the late period, Kelsen's viewpoint changed greatly, and he completely denied the possibility of establishing normative logic, and thought that the rules of logical inference and the law of contradiction could not be applied to norms. Through the rethinking of Kelsen's criticism of the four approaches of scholars crossing the "Jorgenson's predicament" and the conclusion reached, it is found that the normative logic theory of Kelsen's late period is incoherent and ambiguous, including the definition of normative nature is not clear. There is a contradiction between ontological discussion and normative logic negation. From the perspective of the theory of deontic logic, logic and norm are not completely irrelevant. In this way, we respond to Kelsen's late normative logic theory and discuss it.
【作者单位】：哈尔滨工程大学人文社会科学学院法学系;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金一般项目(13BFX008) 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(HEUCF171304)
【分类号】：D90-051

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