我国机构投资者参与公司治理问题研究

发布时间：2018-03-04 15:22

本文选题：机构投资者　切入点：公司治理　出处：《吉林大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：早在20世纪70年代，以美国为首的管理学和经济学家们就开始了关于“机构投资者参与公司治理”的相关研究，在理论和实证方面都积累了大量的文献资料。但是这些研究是在管理学和经济学的语境中进行展开的，侧重于研究机构投资者的参与公司治理的动机和行为特性，用管理学和经济学的理论对其进行阐述。近年来，法律规制的因素作为组织行为的关键决定要素之一，逐渐引起理论界和学术界的兴趣。美国机构投资者的发展过程中，就体现了对具体法律规制渠道的制度安排。国内最近的研究成果主要散见于少数的一些论著和文章中，也大多是前瞻性或选取某一个方面进行分析，而没有放在体系化的框架之下。鉴于此，笔者尝试对机构投资者与公司治理内在的机理和交互作用进行一个较为系统的梳理和阐述。机构投资者的兴起，为公司治理机制的发展提供了新契机，无论是在价值理念还是在制度设计上，公司治理结构势必发生一场革命性的变革。在本文结构上共分为四个部分。首先，对机构投资者的定义和主要类别，以及公司治理的概念进行了界定，以框定论文探讨的基本范畴。公司法基本理论学说和公司治理理论的几大难题是本文展开的基础，同时还介绍了西方学者对于机构投资者参与公司治理的动机理论和行为理论。学者认为，不同类型的机构投资者参与公司治理的动机有所不同，影响因素包括是否存在利益冲突、机构投资者持股时间和持股比例等。而当机构投资者对管理者的治理或公司绩效不满时，一般有两类行为选择趋势，一是“股东消极主义”，即沉默和放弃（即“用脚投票”）；二是“股东积极主义”（即“用手投票”）。随后，以公司治理和机构投资者两部分基本理论为逻辑起点，对机构投资者参与公司治理对“代理成本”问题、股权结构理论悖论、和股东至上理论与利益相关者理论论战三大公司法难题的理论价值进行了探讨。实力雄厚的机构投资者的引入，对降低外部股东和管理者之间的“代理成本”，在股权结构中制衡大股东、保护小股东的利益，以及保护其他利益相关者的利益上，发挥了强大的制度优势。机构投资者的加入不仅对公司治理格局的变革发挥了巨大的作用力，甚至提供了诸多公司结构理论上可供探讨的课题。通过分析机构投资者的理论贡献，，发现了诸多的问题。如何完善我国的机构投资者的角色，使之潜在的理论价值得以凸显，就需要我们对我国机构投资者参与公司治理现状进行进一步深入的分析，以此进一步提出使我国机构投资者发挥股东积极主义的相应的解决对策。对机构投资者参与公司治理的国际现状和趋势的分析，以美、德、日三国为例，介绍了美国机构投资者参与公司治理的渠道和德日两国机构投资者股东积极主义的兴起过程。伴随着全球金融市场一体化的进程，形成了德日公司的治理模式和传统英美公司的治理模式逐步向“机构投资者治理”为主导的、用手投票的机构治理模式转变的发展趋势。紧接着对我国机构投资者发展历程、现状和参与公司治理过程中的不足之处进行了介绍和分析，由于中国的资本市场环境以及相关政策法规的缺失，我国机构投资者参与公司治理过程中还处于比较弱势的地位，他们关注更多的是对自身利益的保护，故而“消极股东主义”现象普遍存在，“搭便车”的心理、甚至市场投机行为、非法炒作行为屡见不鲜。最后，基于以上对机构投资者参与公司治理的理论、国际比较法分析的结论和对我国现状的介绍，提出了我国机构投资者发挥股东积极主义解决对策。本部分通过对契约式基金与商事信托、风险投资与有限合伙两类组织形式优势的分析，以及机构投资者作为受托人的信义义务的建立，对机构投资者的理论完善提出了本文的见解；并以场外交易市场和QFII制度的发展为视角，探讨机构投资者在我国资本市场的成长潜力，最后对完善委托代理投票制度和多种非正式参与渠道等相关配套法律制度提出了本文的建议。
[Abstract]:In early 1970s, the US led management and economists began to research on the institutional investors to participate in corporate governance, in the theoretical and empirical aspects have accumulated a large amount of literature. But these studies are carried out in management and economics context, and the motivation of participating in corporate governance the research focuses on the behavior of institutional investors, the paper uses the theory of management and economics. In recent years, the legal regulation of the key factors of organizational behavior decision as one of the elements, gradually aroused the theoretical and academic interest. The process of the development of institutional investors in the United States, it reflects the specific arrangements for the legal regulation of channel the system. Recent research scattered in a few books and articles, are forward-looking or select one aspect of, Instead of putting it under the framework of systematization, in view of this, the author tries to systematize and elaborate the internal mechanism and interaction between institutional investors and corporate governance.
The rise of institutional investors, provides a new opportunity for the development of the corporate governance mechanism, both in values or the system design, the structure of corporate governance is bound to a revolutionary change. In this paper the structure is divided into four parts. Firstly, the definition of institutional investors and the main categories, as well as the concept of corporate governance defines the basic category, to frame the discussion of this thesis.
Several major problems in company law basic theory and the theory of corporate governance is the foundation of this thesis, it also introduces the theory of western scholars for motivation theory and behavior of institutional investors to participate in corporate governance. Scholars believe that different types of institutional investors have different motives in corporate governance, the factors including whether there is a conflict of interest, institutional investors the holding time and stake. When institutional investors are dissatisfied with the management of governance or corporate performance, there are two kinds of choices, one is "shareholder pessimism", namely the silence and give up (i.e. "vote by foot"); the two is "Shareholder Activism" (i.e. "vote by hand"). Subsequently, the corporate governance and institutional investors in the two part of the basic theory as the logical starting point of institutional investors participate in the corporate governance of the "agency cost" problem, ownership structure theory The paradox of value and shareholder supremacy theory and stakeholder theory, the three law controversy problem. Introduce the strength of institutional investors, to reduce the external shareholders and managers between the "agency cost", in the ownership structure balance of shareholders, protect the interests of small shareholders, and protect the interests of other the interests of stakeholders, played a strong institutional advantage. Adding not only institutional investors on corporate governance patterns play a huge force, and provides for the study of many corporate structure theory.
Through theoretical analysis the contribution of institutional investors, found many problems. How to improve the role of institutional investors in our country, the theoretical value of the potential to be highlighted, we need further in-depth analysis of China's institutional investors participating in the current situation of corporate governance, in order to further put forward that China's institutional investors play shareholder activism the corresponding countermeasures.
Analysis of international situation and the trend of institutional investors to participate in corporate governance in the United States, Germany, Japan as an example, introduces the development process of American institutional investors channel to participate in corporate governance in Germany and Japan and institutional shareholders activism. Along with the global financial market integration process, the formation of the governance mode in German and Japanese companies and the traditional Anglo American corporate governance mode to "institutional investors governance" as the leading, with the changing trends of voting mechanism hand governance model. Then the development process of China's institutional investors, introduces and analyzes the current situation and deficiencies in corporate governance in the process, due to the lack of capital market environment and Chinese the relevant policies and regulations, institutional investors participate in the corporate governance process is still in a relatively weak position, they are more concerned about their own interests The phenomenon of "negative shareholder doctrine" is common, and "hitchhiking" psychology, even market speculation, illegal speculation is common.
Finally, the institutional investors to participate in corporate governance based on the theory of international comparison analysis method and conclusion of the current situation of our country, put forward China's institutional investors play shareholder activism countermeasures. Through this part of the contractual fund and commercial trust, analysis of risk investment and limited partnership organization form two kinds of advantage. The establishment of institutional investors and as a trustee of the fiduciary duty, the theory of institutional investors perfect put forward this view; and with the development of the OTC market and the QFII system from the perspective of the discussion of institutional investors in China's capital market growth potential, finally this paper puts forward suggestions on perfecting the proxy voting system and a variety of informal channels of participation and other related legal system.

【学位授予单位】：吉林大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：D922.291.91

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