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我国公司经理人法律制度研究

发布时间:2018-03-15 20:08

  本文选题:公司经理人 切入点:约束机制 出处:《中央民族大学》2010年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文


【摘要】: 公司制度在促进资源合理配置、加快整个市场经济的发展等方面都发挥着无可比拟的作用,而这一作用的发挥在很大程度上依赖于公司管理的专业化,资本所有者将其资本投入公司,交给拥有专业管理知识和技能的经理人,使得公司中物的资本和人的资本能够得到合理的配置,发挥其各自优势。经理人的重要性日益凸显,与此同时,经理人制度的种种弊端也不断显现。公司经理人与公司股东之间是一种代理关系,两者之间必然存在代理成本,一方面公司经理人不仅关心公司利益,而且更为关心自身利益,这与股东存在差异;另一方面,两者信息不对称,股东特别是中小股东,一般很难获得公司的经营信息,从而不能有效的监督经理的行为,经理人就常常利用其掌握的公司机会,滥用经理权为自己谋取利益。因此,本文正是围绕上述问题,从经理人的激励和约束两个方面构建公司经理人法律制度。 全文共分为三章,再加上引言和结论。 引言部分主要是联系公司经理人实践中存在的问题,指出公司经理人法律研究的必要性,从公司经理人约束和激励构建公司经理人法律制度。 本文第一章为公司经理人制度的理论基础。首先通过对比研究国内外有关公司经理人含义的不同界定,指出公司经理人为公司的使用人,指受公司雇佣管理公司事务,具有内部营业管理权限以及对外在诉讼上及诉讼外的商业代理权限,为公司签名的人。公司经理人的范围包括公司CEO、总经理、总裁、被授予经理权的副总经理、经理、以及被授予经理权的公司其他高级管理人员,如公司的分支机构、经营机构主要负责人。接着分析了公司经理人和股东会、董事会的关系,指出了经理人和股东会、董事会的权责划分。再次,从经理权的概念、性质和产生方式三个方面写了公司经理权的基本理论。指出经理权是指公司经理人在公司内部的营业管理权以及对外在诉讼上和诉讼外的商业代理权,我国《公司法》采取折中方式,规定了经理权的权限范围。 本文第二章为公司经理人制度的发展历程及经验借鉴。第一节从国外和国内两个角度阐述了公司经理人制度的发展历程。第二节国外公司经理人激励和约束机制的经验和评析。通过对英美法系和大陆法系有关公司经理人激励和约束不同经验的阐述和评析,提出在构建我国公司经理人法律制度时,应着重做好以下几方面的工作:第一,在考虑我国在相关方面的具体国情的同时,也要借鉴国外的相关经验;第二,具体的应包括公司经理人相关信息披露制度、股东监督制度、公司经理人激励制度及公司经理人责任制度等方面。 本文第三章为完善我国公司经理人制度的思考。第一节为我国目前公司经理人制度存在的问题及原因分析,指出我国目前公司经理人存在怠于行使权力和滥用权力的问题,然后分析了产生上述问题的原因,包括:代理理论的缺陷;经理人相关制度的不健全;国有企业传统领导体制的弊端。第二节健全经理人的聘任制度,包括经理人的担任资格、聘任程序两个方面。第三节权力、义务和责任制度,权力制度主要写了经理权的权限范围、授予方式和经理人越权行为的效力。义务制度主要写了经理人的勤勉义务和忠实义务。责任制度主要从公司经理人对公司的民事责任和对第三人的民事责任两个方面进行阐述。第四节健全监督机制,包括股东会、董事会和监事会三方面的监督。第五节健全公司经理人激励机制,公司经理人的激励机制包括年薪制度、股票期权制度和责任保险制度。第六节健全公司经理人公司制度,主要是公司经理人任免的公示、经理权行使情况的公示和公司经理人激励机制的公示。第七节健全公司经理人市场机制,指出健全经理人市场机制,就是要将经理人这一人力资本要素投入市场,充分利用市场的竞争机制和优胜劣汰机制,促进经理人资源优化配置,从而一方面有利于促进经理人自身的忧患意识,进而促使其不断提高自身素质,以便不被激烈的市场竞争所淘汰。
[Abstract]:The company system in promoting the rational allocation of resources, accelerate the development of the whole market economy plays the role of There is nothing comparable to this role, which depends largely on the company management, capital owners will give the company capital investment, with professional management knowledge and skills of the managers, the company in the capital and human capital can be allocated reasonably, play their respective advantages. The importance of managers has become increasingly prominent, at the same time, the drawbacks of manager system also continue to appear between managers and shareholders of the company. The company is an agency relationship, there must be the agency cost between the two managers, on the one hand the company not only care about the interests of the company, and more about their own interests, and the shareholders are different; on the other hand, the information asymmetry, the shareholders, in general it is difficult to receive Company business information, and thus can not effectively supervise the manager's behavior, managers often use the corporate opportunity, abuse of power of manager for his own benefit. Therefore, this paper is focusing on the above issues, construction company manager legal system from two aspects of manager's incentive and restraint.
The full text is divided into three chapters, in addition to the introduction and conclusion.
The introduction is mainly related to the problems existing in company managers' practice. It points out the necessity of legal research of company managers, and constructs corporate managers' legal system from the constraints and incentives of company managers.
In the first chapter, the theoretical basis for the company manager system. Firstly, through the definition of comparative study on domestic and foreign companies' meaning is different, that the manager's use, the management company hired by the company affairs, with internal and external business management rights in litigation and litigation of commercial agency authority, for the company's signature the scope of the company. The company managers including CEO, President, general manager, deputy general manager, was awarded the right manager manager, and was awarded the right manager, other senior management personnel, such as branches of the company, mainly responsible for the management of institutions. Then analyzes the relationship between managers and shareholders, board of directors. Pointed out that the managers and the shareholders' meeting, the board of directors of the division of responsibilities. Thirdly, from the concept of manager's power, the basic theory of the three aspects of nature and has written power of the manager. It is pointed out that the manager's right refers to the company's manager's business management right inside the company, as well as the business agency right outside the lawsuit and outside the litigation. The right scope of the manager's right is stipulated in the company law of China.
In the second chapter, the development process and experience for the company manager system reference. The first section from foreign and domestic two perspectives on the development process of the system managers. Managers incentive and restraint mechanisms of section second foreign companies experience and analysis. Through the common law and civil law on managerial incentives and constraints set different experiences and comment on the proposed in the construction of the legal system of the company's manager, should focus on the following aspects: first, in consideration of our specific conditions in the relevant aspects of the relevant experience at the same time, but also to learn from foreign countries; second, the company managers should include relevant information disclosure system, shareholder supervision system, company managers company managers' incentive system and responsibility system.
The third chapter is the perfection of our system of company managers. The first section is the existence of China's current system of corporate managers and causes of the problem analysis, pointed out that China's current company managers have failed to exercise their power and abuse of power problems, and then analyzes the reasons, the problems include: the defects of agency theory; managers the related system is not perfect; the traditional drawbacks of state-owned enterprise leadership system. The second section manager appointment of a sound system, including managers as qualifications, appointment procedures two aspects. The third section of power, duty and liability, scope of power system is mainly about the manager's power, and the effect of grant managers ultra vires. The duty system mainly written manager's diligence and duty of loyalty. The main responsibility system of civil liability for the company from the company managers and the people of the third things Two aspects of responsibility are discussed. Fourth improve the supervision mechanism, including the shareholders, the board of directors and board of supervisors in three aspects. The fifth section sound corporate executive incentive mechanism, incentive mechanism of company managers including the annual salary system, stock option system and liability insurance system. The sixth section and improve the company manager system, mainly the company managers the appointment and removal of the publicity, the incentive mechanism of manager's power and the exercise of public managers publicity. Seventh sound corporate managers pointed out that the sound market mechanism, manager market mechanism, is to manager the human capital into the market, make full use of market competition mechanism and the mechanism of survival of the fittest, to promote the optimal allocation of resources to the manager. On the one hand, is conducive to the promotion of the manager's own sense of urgency, and to constantly improve their own quality, so as not to be hard. Field competition is eliminated.

【学位授予单位】:中央民族大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2010
【分类号】:D922.291.91

【参考文献】

相关期刊论文 前1条

1 王保树,钱玉林;经理法律地位之比较研究[J];法学评论;2002年02期



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