论董事忠实义务的法律规制

发布时间：2018-03-24 00:14

本文选题：董事　切入点：忠实义务　出处：《中国海洋大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：现代以降，世界各国经济的扩张和全球经济的一体化，使得公司规模日益扩大，股东成千上万，所有权和经营权分离成为必然，这就要求出现一个代替股东管理公司的角色，于是出现了董事。董事与公司的关系决定了董事的地位，对于这个问题，学术界主要形成了以下几种不同的学说：“受托关系说”、“代理关系说”、“委任关系说”等。不管基于哪种关系说，董事都凭借自己的身份，拥有了管理公司的权利。因为董事掌握着公司大部分的商业秘密以及实际运营，所以其权利扩张的趋势日益明显，公司治理结构也随之发生了从“股东中心主义”向“董事中心主义”的转移。董事权利的日益扩张，增加了其滥用权利的机会，正是因为董事的这些滥用行为，使得公司及股东利益受损的情况屡见不鲜，这种局面使得董事忠实义务的产生其及长期存成为必然。与西方发达国家相比，我国的公司产生和发展的历史相对较短，对董事忠实义务的研究亦乏善可陈，因此在公司立法上，有关董事忠实义务的规范向度及法律规制方面相对滞后，主要表现在对董事忠实义务的责任主体不全面；信息公开和披露制度不完善；对董事离任后的义务没有规定；公司机会准则的不健全以及公司行使“归入权”的时效不明确等；在董事忠实义务的法律责任制度中，仅在《公司法》和《民法通则》中建立了董事忠实义务的民事责任，，换言之，运用行政责任与刑事责任制度对董事忠实义务进行的规制显得十分薄弱。发达国家对董事忠实义务的研究起步较早，国家法治环境也比较优越，相协调的各项制度也比较健全，在对公司资金的侵吞、利用其进行担保等方面在其民法侵权理论中基本能够涵盖。美国的公司机会准则、法国自我交易主体的全面性、日德对于公司“归入权”的明确规定等对我国来说都是可借鉴之处。事实上，英美两国对自我交易、竞业行为的法律规制经历了由严格禁止主义向相对禁止主义、严格的判例法限制到法典化的转变过程。在当下，从不管公平与否一律禁止的“压倒一切”原则逐渐向宽松的立法模式转变，以程序公平补充实体公平，这样的发展趋势表明发达国家试图通过这种方式来达到兼顾商事交易的可预测性、确定性与灵活性的目的。这表明，对董事忠实义务采用列举立法是不科学，不仅无法涵盖已有的违反董事忠实义务情形，更无法预设未来可能发生的新的违反董事忠实义务的样态，可见列举立法模式的涵涉范围极其有限，在司法审判实践中，它的适用类似于判例法，属于严格禁止主义。然而，董事忠实义务是一种道德义务，需要从原则上明确董事违反忠实义务行为的认定标准才能达到全面把握董事忠实义务的目的，即对违反董事忠实义务之信任滥用行为、攫取隐形利益行为、公司同意或免责行为以及篡夺公司机会的行为的认定标准加以明确。有鉴于此，在比较借鉴西方发达国家的研究成果和实践经验的基础上，提出了完善我国董事忠实义务制度的诸种具体措施，主要有八个方面，它们是扩大董事忠实义务的主体范围、完善信息公开和披露制度、增加离任董事的忠实义务、引入公司机会准则、明确公司“归入权”的行使时效、增设第三人的损害赔偿请求权、扩大已有罪名的责任主体、增设新的罪名等。
[Abstract]:Modern times, the integration of the world economy and the expansion of the global economy, the increasing size of the company, tens of thousands of shareholders, the separation of ownership and management rights become inevitable, which requires a management role instead of the shareholders, the board of directors. So there is a relationship between the directors and the company determines the director's position, for this the problem, the academic circles has mainly formed following several different theories: "fiduciary relationship", "agent relationship", "the appointment relationship". No matter what kind of relationship based on the said board, by virtue of their identity, have management rights. Because the director holds most of the company's business secrets and the actual operation, so the expansion of rights is becoming more and more obvious, the corporate governance structure has also shifted from "shareholders centrism" to "board centrism". The rights of the board of directors The expansion has increased the chance of abuse of rights. It is precisely because of these abuses of directors that the interests of companies and shareholders are often damaged. This situation makes directors' duty of loyalty and long-term existence inevitable.
Compared with western developed countries, our company produced and developed a relatively short history, the research on the duty of loyalty is also lackluster, so in the company law, the directors' duty of loyalty to the standard and legal regulation is lagging behind, mainly in the main responsibility of the directors duty of loyalty is not comprehensive; information and the public disclosure system is not perfect; there is no provision on the obligations of directors after the departure of the corporate opportunity doctrine; aging is not perfect and exercising "disgorgement" is not clear; the legal liability system of the duty of loyalty, only in the "company law" and "general principles of civil Law > is established in the civil liability of the directors' duty of loyalty in other words, the use of the regulation of administrative responsibility and criminal responsibility system of the director's duty of loyalty is very weak.
The developed countries of the directors' duty of loyalty of the early research, national legal environment is better, the system of coordination is relatively perfect, in the misappropriation of company funds, the use of the security aspects of tort theory in civil law. The public can cover the basic drivers criterion, comprehensive self dealing subject in France Germany, for the company "right" are clearly defined can be used for reference for our country. In fact, Britain and the United States on self dealing, legal regulation of competition experienced by strictly prohibited to relative prohibition doctrine, limited case law strictly to the transformation process of codification.
In the present, from the fair or not will be prohibited from the "overriding" principle gradually shift to loose the mode of legislation, procedural justice of entity in fairness, this trend indicates that the developed countries try to pass this kind of way to balance the commercial transaction predictability, certainty and flexibility. This shows that the loyalty of directors the legislation is not scientific obligation, not only can not cover the violation of directors' duty of loyalty, but can not preset a possible future new breach of the duty of loyalty state, visible lists the legislative mode of culvert scope is extremely limited, in the judicial practice, it is similar to the case law, is strictly prohibited ". However, the directors' duty of loyalty is a moral obligation, need to be identified in principle to define the breach of the duty of loyalty behavior standards in order to achieve a comprehensive grasp The directors' duty of loyalty to the trust of the violation of directors duty abuse, grab the invisible benefit behavior, standard company agreed to or waiver of behavior and the behavior of the corporate opportunity to be clear. In view of this, in the developed countries for reference the research results and practical experience on the basis of the proposed specific measures to improve our system of duty of loyalty, there are eight main aspects, which is to expand the scope of the main body of the directors' duty of loyalty, improve the information disclosure and disclosure system, increase the duty of loyalty outgoing directors, introducing the corporate opportunity doctrine, "aging exercise disgorgement" clearly, an additional third people claim for damages, the main responsibility of the expansion of existing charges, adding new crimes.

【学位授予单位】：中国海洋大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：D922.291.91

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