论共有制度对隐名股东股权的保护

发布时间：2018-03-30 07:29

本文选题：隐名股东　切入点：股权共有　出处：《浙江师范大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：投资者借用他人名义向公司投资的行为在公司法实务中非常普遍,理论界和实务界将该种隐名投资者概称为隐名股东。隐名股东投资公司的目的是为了享有股权,这是隐名股东与其他投资者的本质区别。从公司契约理论来看,公司股权实际产生于公司权益投资者的契约行为,股权是投资者将资本投入公司所换取的对价,隐名股东作为公司股份的实际投资人,为其股权的获得提供了经济基础,作为投资对价,隐名股东将获得行使股东权利的资格。而在隐名股东尚未变更为显名股东或者公司不同意确认其股东资格的情况下,隐名股东倘若行使股东权利,只能是基于名义股东的授权,这种情况下,隐名股东却不能实现参与股权管理或处分的投资目的。隐名股东的股东权利尚未在公司法上得到肯定,对隐名股东股权的保护也一直未受到学界的重视。目前针对隐名股东股权保护的机制主要有两种：股权信托制度与股权共有制度。英美法系国家依据信托法处理隐名股东与显名股东之间的法律关系,以股权信托的方式保障隐名股东投资公司的预期收益。这种制度的引进源于信托关系法律构造与公司所有权与管理权相分离的制度设计的相似性。股权信托制度先于隐名股东现象而设立,虽然在调整隐名股东法律关系、确认隐名股东法律地位方面发挥了有效的作用,但是信托要求隐名股东无权随意干涉显名股东的股权管理实务,即无法满足隐名股东参与公司运营管理的目的。而在股权共有制度下,隐名股东通过共有人决议不仅能够实际参与到公司的运营管理,对股权的管理与处分也享有自己的表决权利。与股权信托制度相比,共有制度能够实现隐名股东投资公司的最终目的,并且成为股东实现股权的有效途径,因而是保护隐名股东股权的最佳选择。在股权共有制度对隐名股东股权保护的具体应用中,股权共有协议和股权共有人会议起到非常重要的作用,隐名股东的受益权、管理参与权、知情权都将通过共有协议和共有人会议进行确认和保护。然而过分依赖意思自治的契约体制势必造成隐名股东股权共同管理上的混乱,因此,必须加强股权共有制度的可操作性,通过合理的制度设计实现隐名股东与利益相关者之间的利益平衡。
[Abstract]:The behavior of investors investing in companies in the name of others is very common in the practice of company law. The dormant investors are generally referred to as hidden shareholders in theory and practice. This is the essential difference between dormant shareholders and other investors. From the perspective of corporate contract theory, corporate equity actually arises from the contractual behavior of investors in corporate equity, and equity is the consideration that investors exchange their capital for the company. As the actual investors of the shares of the company, the dormant shareholders provide the economic basis for the acquisition of their shares and serve as the consideration for the investment. Anonymous shareholders will be entitled to exercise their shareholder's rights. In the event that the dormant shareholder has not been changed into an explicit shareholder or the company does not agree to confirm its shareholder's qualification, if a dormant shareholder exercises his shareholder's right, it can only be based on the authorization of the nominal shareholder. In this case, hidden shareholders can not realize the investment purpose of participating in equity management or disposition. The shareholder rights of hidden shareholders have not been affirmed in the company law, and the protection of hidden shareholders' equity has not been paid much attention to by scholars. At present, there are two main mechanisms for the protection of hidden shareholders: equity trust system and shareholding common ownership system. Countries in common law system deal with the legal relationship between anonymous shareholders and explicit shareholders according to the trust law. The introduction of this system comes from the similarity between the legal structure of the trust relationship and the design of the system which separates the ownership from the management right of the company. Established before the phenomenon of anonymous shareholders, Although it has played an effective role in adjusting the legal relationship of hidden shareholders and confirming the legal status of hidden shareholders, the trust requires that hidden shareholders have no right to interfere with the equity management practice of explicit shareholders at will. In the shareholding system, the hidden shareholders can not only participate in the operation and management of the company through joint ownership resolution, but also can participate in the operation and management of the company. Compared with the equity trust system, the common ownership system can realize the ultimate goal of the hidden shareholder investment company, and become an effective way for shareholders to realize the equity right. Therefore, it is the best choice to protect the shareholding rights of hidden shareholders. In the specific application of the shareholding system to the protection of shareholding rights of hidden shareholders, the shareholding agreement and the shareholders' meeting play a very important role. The right to participate in management and the right to know will be confirmed and protected by mutual agreement and joint owners' meeting. However, the contractual system which relies too much on autonomy of will will inevitably lead to confusion in the joint management of shares of hidden shareholders. It is necessary to strengthen the operability of the shareholding system and realize the balance of interests between the dormant shareholders and the stakeholders through reasonable institutional design.
【学位授予单位】：浙江师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：D922.291.91

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