论公司收购中目标公司董事义务

发布时间：2018-04-22 10:33

本文选题：公司收购 + 目标公司　；参考：《华东政法大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：近年来，随着我国资本市场的不断发展壮大，公司之间的收购合并变得日益频繁。2005年以前上市公司并购交易规模在全部交易中占比不足20%，2006年至2010年平均占比为48%。2011年则攀升至67%。2012年，中国并购市场交易整体趋于活跃，China Venture投中集团统计数据显示，2012年1至11月中国并购市场宣布交易案例数量3379起，披露交易规模2660.7亿美元，较2011年全年上升18%。公司收购，不仅可以促进资源重组，保证市场优胜劣汰的竞争法则，还可以推动公司朝着集团化规模化的方向发展。然而，我们在关注公司收购所带来益处的同时，还应该时刻谨记其中存在的风险。目标公司董事对收购所采取的态度，以及提出的收购建议，将直接或间接地影响公司的决策和股东的选择。如果收购相关主体，特别是目标公司董事，不遵守法律规定的义务，公司和股东利益均面临受损的风险。如何有效地规制目标公司董事的行为已经成为学界关注的重点课题。虽然，《公司法》和《证券法》等法律对目标公司董事义务有所规定，也制定了具有参考性的条文，但其中大多数条文偏于原则性，不足以规制某些董事行为。因此，笔者认为，梳理现行立法体系，并将之予以完善实属当务之急。本文的主要内容可以分为三个部分，遵循着提出问题、分析问题和解决问题的思路。第一部分以目标公司董事义务的法理分析为切入点，第一章除了介绍当前并购市场的相关数据和并购趋势外，还阐述了董事在公司收购中所发挥的作用。在上述分析的基础上，本文进一步指出了目标公司中董事行为受到规制的必要性。第二部分以分析我国立法为切入点。现行立法中对董事义务的规定主要集中在《公司法》、《证券法》和《上市公司收购管理办法》中。本文系统地分析上述法律条文存在的不足，以及这些不足所引发了的问题。由于缺乏规制，所引起的问题主要可以分为三个方面，即董事随意提起反收购措施，损害股东利益；董事利用管理层收购，侵占公司资产；以及董事未谨慎判断收购条件，损害公司利益。第三部分从完善的角度阐述了如何构建公司收购中目标公司的董事义务。该章是本文的重点内容，主要分为两个部分论述。第一部分，重点讨论了如何细化目标公司董事的忠实义务，本文建议从两个方面予以展开，包括反收购之合法性审查，以及管理层收购中利益冲突的规范。第二部分，重点讨论了如何细化目标公司董事的勤勉义务，本文也同样建议从两个方面入手，包括尽职调查和披露收购信息，以及争取最优的被收购条件。在谈及如何完善具体的判断标准和相应规则时，，本文还借鉴了美国和中国司法实践中的经典案例。每个义务分析的过程中都以案例为切入点，直观地予以分析。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the development of China's capital market, Mergers and acquisitions between companies are becoming more frequent. Before 2005, the size of mergers and acquisitions of listed companies accounted for less than 20 percent of all transactions. The average share between 2006 and 2010 was 48.2011, which climbed to 67.2012. The overall trend of M & A deals in China has turned active, according to statistics from the China Venture capitalization group, showing 3379 deals announced in the Chinese market between January and November 2012, with $266.07 billion in disclosed transactions, up 18 percent from the full year of 2011. Corporate acquisition can not only promote the reorganization of resources, guarantee the competition law of survival of the fittest in the market, but also promote the development of the company in the direction of collectivization. However, we should always keep in mind the risks involved as we look at the benefits of corporate acquisitions. The attitude taken by the directors of the target company towards the acquisition and the takeover proposal will directly or indirectly affect the decision of the company and the choice of shareholders. If the relevant subjects, especially the directors of the target company, fail to comply with their legal obligations, the interests of both the company and the shareholders are at risk. How to effectively regulate the behavior of the directors of target companies has become the focus of academic attention. Although the company law and the securities law have some provisions on the directors' obligations of the target company, and also have some reference provisions, most of the provisions are not enough to regulate some directors' behavior because of their principled nature. Therefore, the author thinks that it is urgent to sort out the current legislative system and perfect it. The main content of this paper can be divided into three parts, following the thinking of problem raising, problem analysis and problem solving. The first part is based on the legal analysis of the directors' obligations of the target company. The first chapter not only introduces the relevant data of the current M & A market and the trend of M & A, but also expounds the role played by the directors in the corporate acquisition. On the basis of the above analysis, this paper further points out the necessity of the regulation of the director's behavior in the target company. The second part analyzes the legislation of our country as the breakthrough point. The current legislation mainly focuses on the company law, the securities law and the measures for the management of the acquisition of listed companies. This paper systematically analyzes the shortcomings of the above-mentioned legal provisions and the problems caused by these deficiencies. Due to the lack of regulation, the problems can be divided into three aspects, namely, the directors put forward anti-takeover measures at will to harm the interests of shareholders, the directors use the MBO to occupy the assets of the company, and the directors do not judge the acquisition conditions carefully. To harm the interests of the company. The third part expounds how to construct the director's obligation of the target company from the angle of perfection. This chapter is the main content of this paper, mainly divided into two parts. The first part focuses on how to refine the duty of loyalty of the directors of the target company. This paper proposes to carry out it from two aspects, including the legality review of anti-takeover and the regulation of conflict of interest in MBO. The second part focuses on how to refine the diligent duty of the directors of the target company. This paper also suggests two aspects, including due diligence and disclosure of acquisition information, and striving for the best conditions of being acquired. When talking about how to perfect the concrete judgment standard and the corresponding rules, this paper also draws lessons from the classic cases in the judicial practice of the United States and China. Each obligation analysis process takes the case as the breakthrough point, intuitively gives the analysis.
【学位授予单位】：华东政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：D922.291.91;D922.287

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