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金融控股公司加重责任刍议

发布时间:2018-04-23 12:47

  本文选题:金融 + 控股公司 ; 参考:《华东政法大学》2011年硕士论文


【摘要】:美国公司法学者Howell Jackson在其论述中开篇提及:自20世纪70年代初,大量的实践证实“混业经营”逐渐成为一种金融业的主流经营模式1。最初以“价格发现”和“价值实现”为核心的金融需求逐渐让位于更强流动性过程中潜在的风险因素和安全性考量,也即:“信用担保”和“价值稳定”功能2。由此资金链中所蕴涵的“时间价值”和“资产的动态安全”更为各国金融日益重视。在虚拟经济较为发达的西方国家,一些学者,对那些以“混业形式”存在,对国民经济具有明显影响力和控制力的金融控股集团,在原有商法制度群之外,富于针对性的采用了一组较为特殊的治理规则。这些规则虽各有侧重,但共通之处都在于单方面强调掌握控制权一方主体所必须承担额外的一系列积极或消极的“财产性”责任,被学者们普遍称为“金融控股公司加重责任”。纵观文献,目前“加重责任”的法理讨论暂时滞留在“道德风险”的提出或“市场监管”的退化,规则层面也并没有超越民商事“有限责任否认”和“多级代理成本”的传统治理方式3。同时,对比“从公司行为角度”出发或“从公司治理角度”考虑,其具体规则概念界定方面存在“义务”与“责任”的取舍判断难点。本文通过对“加重责任”理论的概述、对商制度群较早存在的类似规则——英美法系的“刺破公司面纱”和大陆法系的“直索制度”的对比研究和对“法律关系”中“义务”、“责任”等概念的重新梳理,初步提出了有别于传统民商治理规则的“双重风险——基于金融业外部性的公共利益保护和控股公司不完全契约中的授信基础滥用(从治理角度出发)”是“加重责任”得以存在的根本基础。同时,倾向性的认为:“加重责任”应当归为含有治理意图的“责任”而非单纯的救济“责任”或公司行为限制规则性的“附随义务”。相较而言,中国金融制度体系构建起步较晚,大多借鉴西方先进的立法和司法经验,本土化程度不高,实践中明显存在适用盲点和障碍。但是,经济生活中“加重责任”存在巨大的现实需求。故文本在结合“公司治理”的现有规则的优化改进过程中,初步提出了构建一个具有统一原则指导之下的“加重责任”制度体系。其具体体现在对“混业经营”且对国民经济具有显著影响力的一类金融控股公司全过程的严格管控之中;体现在围绕特殊控股主体的一系列“非义务性”前置责任和程序性要求之中;体现在于“财产性”责任的基础上,适当引入了部分“身份性”责任的意图之中;体现在,经济法特有的“横、纵兼顾”“软、硬兼施”调整方法之中;同时,结合现有中国国情,为“加重责任”后续实证留下了相对开放性的制度设定。是为“金融控股公司加重责任刍议”。
[Abstract]:Howell Jackson, an American scholar of corporate law, mentioned at the beginning of his exposition: since the beginning of 1970s, a large number of practices have proved that "mixed operation" has gradually become a mainstream mode of operation in the financial industry. Initially, the financial demand with "price discovery" and "value realization" as the core gradually gave way to the potential risk factors and security considerations in the process of stronger liquidity, that is, "credit guarantee" and "value stability" function 2. Therefore, the "time value" and "dynamic security of assets" implied in the financial chain have been paid more and more attention. In the western countries where the virtual economy is more developed, some scholars, for those financial holding groups which exist in the form of "mixed operation" and have obvious influence and control on the national economy, are in addition to the original commercial law system group. The rich pertinence has adopted a group of relatively special governance rules. Although these rules have their own emphases, what is common is that they unilaterally emphasize that the subject of control must bear an additional set of positive or negative "property" responsibilities. By scholars generally known as "financial holding companies to increase responsibility." Throughout the literature, the current legal discussion of "aggravated liability" is temporarily stranded in the proposed "moral hazard" or the degradation of "market regulation". The rule level does not exceed the traditional governance mode of "limited liability denial" and "multilevel agency cost" in civil and commercial enterprises. At the same time, compared with "from the angle of corporate behavior" or "from the perspective of corporate governance", there are difficulties in the determination of "obligation" and "responsibility" in defining the concept of specific rules. By summarizing the theory of "aggravated liability", this paper makes a comparative study on the similar rules that existed earlier in the group of commercial systems-"piercing the corporate veil" in Anglo-American law system and "straight claim system" in civil law system, and "obligation" in "legal relationship". The rearrangement of the concepts of "responsibility", This paper puts forward that "double risk", which is different from the traditional civil and commercial governance rules, is "the public interest protection based on the externality of the financial industry and the abuse of credit basis in the incomplete contract of the holding company (from the perspective of governance)". The fundamental foundation of the existence of "heavy responsibility". At the same time, the tendentiousness holds that "aggravated liability" should be classified as "responsibility" with governance intention rather than as "liability" of relief alone or "collateral obligation" of company behavior restriction rules. In contrast, the construction of China's financial system started relatively late, most of the western advanced legislative and judicial experience, the degree of localization is not high, there are obvious blind spots and obstacles in practice. However, in the economic life, "aggravation responsibility" has the huge realistic demand. Therefore, in the process of optimizing and improving the existing rules of "corporate governance", the text puts forward a system of "aggravated responsibility" under the guidance of unified principles. It is embodied in the strict control of the whole process of a kind of financial holding company with "mixed operation" and significant influence on the national economy. Embodied in a series of "non-obligatory" pre-liability and procedural requirements around the special holding subject, the intention of introducing part of "identity" responsibility is appropriately introduced on the basis of "property" responsibility. The special adjustment method of "horizontal and vertical consideration" of economic law "soft, hard and hard"; at the same time, combined with the current situation of China, it leaves a relatively open system for the follow-up demonstration of "aggravated responsibility". Is for "financial holding company aggravation responsibility ruminant discussion".
【学位授予单位】:华东政法大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2011
【分类号】:D912.29

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