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强制分配股利之诉制度构建研究

发布时间:2018-05-13 11:59

  本文选题:股利 + 强制分配 ; 参考:《西南财经大学》2011年硕士论文


【摘要】:作为公司成员的股东,其最本质的特征就是希望投资于公司的资本能够以利益最大化的形式收回,而公司作为一个营利的实体,其也以赚取公司的最大利润为目标,因此,这种公司和股东的双重营利性决定了公司利润分配对股东的重要性。然而在我国的公司实践中,当控股股东滥用“资本多数决”原则,长期不分配股利时,股东的股利分配请求权必然遭受侵害,对于这种侵害,我国现行公司法提供的救济手段完全不能满足股东的需要。对有限责任公司而言,主要有《公司法》第二十条的滥权赔偿、第二十二条规定的股东大会决议无效或撤销决议、第四十条和第四十一条规定的股东会会议的召集与组织、第七十二条的股份转让、第七十五条的股份回购和第一百八十三条的解散公司等几种救济方式。第二十二条几乎没有用来救济股利分配的可能。召集股东会讨论股利分配时,大股东利用资本多数决否决该种提议,最终结果是竹篮打水一场空。股份转让很难谓之为对股东进行了充分救济,回购股份可以被公司及控股股东轻易规避,而解散公司的情形比较罕见,那么唯一的救命稻草就是寻求《公司法》第二十条的股东滥权赔偿。从法的体系来说,该条处于公司法总则篇的位置,似乎对整个公司法都有适用的余地。其实,从法律适用的角度来说,作为一项法律原则,如果还没有达到可以涵摄案件事实的那种真正意义上的法条程度,仍不能直接适用。一般说来,公司要分配股利,首先,公司要具有可用分配的利润,其次,由公司的股东会做出分配股利的决议,这两者缺一不可。当股东起诉到法院要求公司分配股利时,法院通常要求股东提供证据证明公司具有盈利和股东会已经做出了股利分配的决议,否者,法院就会以公司是否进行利润分配,是一种基于公司自治的商业判断,法院无权对公司的股利分配做出干涉为由,驳回股东的诉求。现实中公司股东会在大股东的控制下通常都会决议不分配股利,小股东不可能提供公司分配股利的决议,这样,寻求外部司法救济道的路被堵死,而公司小股东又不能寻求有效的内部救济,小股东的救济出路在哪里,是现行公司制度需要重新考虑的问题。强制分配股利之诉制度,作为由公司股东提起诉讼的一种救济措施,正好弥补了现行公司法上对公司小股东股利分配保护的不足,该制度与股份转让、回购、退股、解散公司等其他救济途径相比,其制度优势在于为股东提供了无须离开公司也能获得恰当救济的可能,其成本较之上列退出公司、解散公司等显然较低,尤其重要的是,为那些不愿离开公司的股东提供了一个寻求公平救济的机会。因此,有必要在法律上规定公司股东提起强制分配股利之诉的权利。 本文以强制分配股利之诉制度的基本理论基础和具体制度构建构为两大主线,在分析基本法学原理的基础上,充分借鉴英美法系和大陆法系的立法与司法实践经验,结合我国公司股利分配的现状,论述了在我国公司法层面构建强制分配股利之诉制度的必要性以及具体制度的构建。全文分为导论、正文和结束语,其中正文由四部分组成。 第一部分,强制分配股利之诉的法理基础。该部分从权利救济、实质正义、诚实信用以及利益平衡中需要司法介入四个方面分析了建立该制度的理论可行性。本章在全文具有基础性的地位,共分为四个层次:第一,利益平衡中的司法介入。第二,权利需要救济。第三,股利分配要体现实质正义。第四,诚实信用原则的需要。 第二部分,强制分配股利之诉的请求权基础。该部分通过与股东代表诉讼和股东直接诉讼的比较分析,得出应将将强制分配股利之诉作为一个单独的请求权存在,在形成“资本多数决”暴政时,能够为公司股东提供有效的救济,从而更好的保护股东的投资权益。因而,该部分也是本文的创新点所在。本部分主要从三个层面展开:第一个层面,强制分配股利之诉和股东代表诉讼的比较。第二个层面,强制分配股利之诉和股东直接诉讼的比较。第三个层面,强制分配股利之诉作为独立请求权的必要性和可行性。通过比较分析,强制分配股利之诉制度既不能用股东代表诉讼代替,也不能用股东直接诉讼代替,它有自身存在的独立价值,需要通过公司法进行单独规定,否者对公司股东的投资权益保护就存在法律上的救济空白。 第三部分,强制分配股利之诉的实体要件。该部分主要叙述了强制分配股利之诉制度的实体要件。通过对股东身份的认定、公司可分配利润的条件、公司拒绝分配股利构成权利滥用以及股东可以寻求的自力救济等四个方面分析明确了提起该种诉讼的实体要求。 第四部分,强制分配股利之诉的程序要件。该部分通过对原被告的身份确立、诉讼管辖、举证责任及其承担以及判决的效力及其执行四个方面的分析,明确了该制度的建立应如何从程序上同民事诉讼法的衔接。至此,全文达到从理论到具体制度的一个完整过程。 本文的创新点主要体现在:第一,本文的选题角度的创新。强制分配股利之诉作为公司股东维护自己投资回报权益的诉讼制度,尤其是在有限责任公司中显得尤为迫切。纵观我国法学界关于强制分配股利之诉制度的研究,几乎所有的研究文献都集中在是否应该在我国公司法上建立该制度,其建立的可行性何必要性何在,建立该制度会对公司的自治形成那些不利的影响等方面进行论述,到目前为止,笔者还未发现一篇就如何具体构建该制度本身的文章。本文则主要从应该如何在我国《公司法》建立具体的制度为立足点,通过分析建立该制度所需要的实体要件和具体操作运转的程序要件,使得该制度成为一个既有实体上的内容又有形式上的程序的有机统一体。第二,本文的研究内容创新。以往学者研究范围主要是通过将强制分配股利之诉放在股东直接诉讼制度中加以讨论,本文则主要是从请求权的角度来分析强制分配股利之诉制度,而不仅仅仅局限于公司法中的诉讼制度,通过将请求权融入公司诉讼中,使得该制度成为一种具有独立请求权的诉讼制度,并得出需要在我国公司法上建立该制度的结论。第三,本文的研究方法创新。以往学者在对强制分配股利之诉制度进行研究时,都只是个别案例为基础展开讨论,而本文在比较法的视角下对一系列的案例进行了系统性的研究,通过表格比较的形式,对现实中存在的案例进行抽样调查,从众多个案件中分析出小股东在股利分配问题上普遍存在被压制的现象,而现行法律却未能提供有效的救济手段,需要公司法在法律制度层面上为股东提供新的有效的救济途径。 本文的不足之处在于:强制分配股利之诉制度固然在维护公司股东权益和体现股利分配的实质正义上具有重要作用。但是也必须承认,强制分配股利之诉同时也存在着法院滥用司法裁量权干涉公司自治的风险、股东滥诉的风险以及一定的诉讼成本。因此,如何寻找司法裁量和公司自治之间的平衡点是笔者需要在以后的学习和研究中进一步深入思考的问题。
[Abstract]:As a member of the company, the most essential feature is that the capital of the company is expected to be recovered in the form of maximization of interest. As a profit - making entity, the company also aims to earn the maximum profit of the company. Therefore, the double profit of this company and the shareholders determines the importance of the company's profit distribution to the shareholders. However, in our country's company practice, when the controlling shareholder abuses the principle of "capital majority" and does not allocate dividends for a long time, the shareholders' claim for dividend distribution will inevitably be infringed. For this kind of infringement, the remedy means provided by the current company law in our country can not meet the needs of the East. Judicial > twentieth articles of indiscriminate compensation, twenty-second provisions of the shareholders meeting resolution invalid or revoked resolutions, fortieth and forty-first provisions of the convening and organization of the meeting of the shareholders, the transfer of seventy-second shares, the seventy-fifth shares repurchase and the disbanded company of 183rd, and other relief methods. The twenty-two is almost impossible to relieve the dividend distribution. When the shareholders will discuss the dividend distribution, the large shareholders use the capital majority to veto the proposal, and the final result is that the share transfer is difficult to call the full relief for the shareholders, and the share repurchase shares can be easily circumvated by the company and the controlling shareholders. The case of dismandling a company is rare, then the only life-saving straw is the right to compensate for the abuse of the shareholders of the company law twentieth. From the legal system, the article is in the position of the general rule of the company law and seems to be applicable to the whole company law. In fact, as a legal principle, if the law is suitable, if it is also a legal principle, In general, the company has to assign a dividend, first of all, the company has to have the available profit, and secondly, the shareholders of the company will make a decision to allocate dividends. These two are indispensable. When the shareholders sue to the court to ask the company to distribute the dividend. In the case of dividends, the court usually requires shareholders to provide evidence that the company has a profit and the shareholders will have made a decision on the dividend distribution. Whether the court will make a profit distribution by the company, it is a business judgment based on the autonomy of the company. The court has no right to interfere in the dividend distribution of the company, and rejects the demands of the shareholders. Under the control of the large shareholders, the shareholders of the company usually decide not to distribute dividends, and the small shareholders can not provide the resolution of the dividend distribution. In this way, the road to seek external judicial relief is blocked, and the small shareholders of the company can not seek effective internal remedies. Where is the remedy for the small shareholders, the current corporate system needs to be weighed. The system of forced distribution of dividends, as a remedy for litigation by the shareholders of the company, makes up for the deficiency of the current corporate law on the protection of the dividend distribution of the small shareholders, and the institutional advantage of the system is to provide the shareholders with the transfer of shares, repurchase, withdrawal, and disbandment of the company. It is possible to get appropriate relief without leaving the company. Its cost is obviously lower than the listed company, the disbanded company, and so on. It is especially important to provide a fair relief for the shareholders who do not want to leave the company. Therefore, it is necessary to legally stipulate the right of the shareholders to bring a forced distribution of dividends. Li.
This paper, based on the basic theoretical basis of the compulsory distribution of dividends and the construction of specific system, is two main lines. On the basis of the analysis of the basic principles of law, we fully draw on the experience of the legislative and judicial practice of the common law and civil law system, and combine the current situation of our company's dividend distribution, and discuss the construction of compulsory branch in the company law level in our country. The necessity and the construction of the system of dividend suit are divided into four parts: introduction, main body and concluding remarks.
The first part is the legal basis for the compulsory distribution of dividends. This part analyzes the theoretical feasibility of the establishment of the system from four aspects of rights relief, substantive justice, honesty and credit and the need for judicial intervention in the balance of interests. This chapter has a basic position in the full text, which is divided into four levels: first, judicial intervention in the balance of interests. Second, rights need relief. Third, dividend distribution should embody substantive justice. Fourth, the need for honesty and credit.
The second part is the basis of the claim for the forced distribution of dividends. By comparing with the shareholder's representative litigation and the shareholders' direct litigation, it is concluded that the claim to be forced to distribute dividends should be a separate claim. In the form of "capital majority" tyranny, it can provide effective relief for the shareholders of the company. The part of this part is also the innovation of this article. This part is mainly from three aspects: the first level, the comparison between the forced distribution of dividends and the shareholder representative litigation. The second level, the comparison of the compulsory distribution of dividends and the direct litigation of shareholders. The third level, the compulsory distribution of dividends. It is necessary and feasible to act as an independent claim. Through comparative analysis, the system of forced distribution of dividends can neither be replaced by the shareholder's representative litigation, nor can it be replaced by direct shareholder litigation. It has its own independent value, and it needs to be provided by the company law alone, and the protection of the investment rights and interests of the shareholders of the company exists. The legal remedies are blank.
The third part, the substantive elements of the forced distribution of dividends. This part mainly describes the substantive elements of the compulsory distribution of dividends. Through the identification of the identity of the shareholders, the conditions for the distribution of profits by the company, the abuses of the rights of the company to distribute dividends and the self relief of the shareholders to seek, the author makes a clear analysis of the four aspects. The substantive requirements of this kind of litigation.
The fourth part is the procedural elements of the compulsory distribution of dividends. Through the analysis of the identity of the original defendant, the jurisdiction of the defendant, the burden of proof and its bearing and the validity of the judgment and its implementation, it is clear how the establishment of the system should be connected with the civil procedure law in procedure. At this point, the full text has reached the theory to the instrument. A complete process of the system of body.
The innovation point of this article is mainly embodied in the following aspects: first, the innovation of the topic of this article. It is particularly urgent in the limited liability company, especially in the limited liability company, which is especially urgent in the limited liability company. The literature concentrates on whether the system should be established in the company law of our country. Why should the feasibility of the establishment of the system be set up, the establishment of the system will have a negative impact on the formation of the autonomy of the company, and so far, I have not found an article on how to build the system itself. How should we establish a specific system as a foothold in China's "company law" and establish the essential elements needed by the system and the procedural requirements for the specific operation of the system, making the system an organic unity of both the contents and the formal procedures of the system. Second, the research content of this article is innovative. The scope of the study is mainly to discuss the forced distribution of dividends in the shareholders' direct litigation system. This article mainly analyzes the system of forced distribution of dividends from the angle of the right of request, and not only is limited to the litigation system in the company law, and makes the system become a kind of system through the incorporation of the claim into the company's litigation. There is an independent claim system, and draws the conclusion that the system needs to be established in our country's company law. Third, the research method of this article is innovative. The systematic study, through the form of table comparison, makes a sampling survey of the cases in reality, and analyses the phenomenon that the small shareholders are generally suppressed on the issue of dividend distribution from many cases, but the current law does not provide effective remedy. It needs the company law to provide the new shareholders with the legal system. The effective way of relief.
The inadequacy of this paper is that the system of forced distribution of dividends has an important role in maintaining the equity of the shareholders and the substantive justice of the distribution of dividends. However, it is also necessary to admit that there are also the risks of misuse of the judicial discretion in the court to interfere with the autonomy of the public company, the risk of the abuse of shareholders and the risk of indiscriminate action. Therefore, how to find the balance between the judicial discretion and the autonomy of the company is the problem that I need to consider further in the future study and research.

【学位授予单位】:西南财经大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2011
【分类号】:D922.291.91

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