上市公司反收购策略法律规制研究

发布时间：2018-06-06 23:59

本文选题：上市公司 + 反收购　；参考：《西南财经大学》2010年硕士论文

【摘要】：2006年中国证监会正式颁布了《上市公司收购管理办法》,该《管理办法》对我国上市公司收购制度做出了一系列较大的调整,其中在“董事诚信义务、适度限制反收购”方面所作了部分修改,尤为令人瞩目。该《管理办法》对反收购行为做出一些原则性的规定,要求被收购的目标公司董事会就收购行为所做出的决策和措施,应当从维护本公司及其股东的合法权益的角度考量,不得为自身利益滥用公司赋予的职权,对收购方案设置不适当的障碍或损害公司利益向收购人提供财务资助、透露公司机密等。这些规定对上市公司收购与反收购行为起到了一定的指引作用,但在具体的反收购法律实务中仍存在一些制度构建上的空白。本文试图通过对反收购立法、反收购策略的对比研究,进一步提出完善上市公司反收购的法律规制建议。本文共分为三章,各章的主要内容如下：第一章主要是对上市公司的收购和反收购进行了必要的界定,并对我国关于反收购行为的立法规制现状及相关制度构建的分析,得出目前急需加强反收购法律行为规制的必要性。同时,对我国常见上市公司反收购策略的类型进行比较细致的表述,并对各个反收购策略进行合法性的理论分析,最终对我国目标公司反收购策略选择进行利弊、效应以及法律缺陷综合分析,为目标公司选择反收购策略提供实务探讨。第二章主要通过对英美国家反收购策略选择权归属模式的比较,为我国当前的公司法人治理和市场经济发展阶段,在目标公司内部如何确定反收购策略的选择提供参考。因为,目标公司针对收购方案选择不同的反收购策略将对目标公司的未来发展和收购计划的最终成败起到至关重要的影响。决策者与收购方、目标公司、其他股东的利益支撑点很难处于共赢的局面。根据各国公司收购及反收购的立法实践,上市公司反收购行为法律规制中的核心就是反收购策略为的决定权归属问题。虽然公司管理层决定模式具有极大的优越性,但是由于我国相应的董事义务立法还不够完善,所以我国暂时还不适宜采取公司管理层决定模式,而应当把反收购的决定权赋予目标公司股东。第三章主要内容是对于上市公司反收购的法律构建。在对反收购策略的选择权的归属进行确定后,为了防止决策者在选择反收购策略的过程中为了自身利益危害公司和中小股东的合法权益,应当对目标公司的控股股东、董事在公司收购与反收购的博弈过程中的义务加以明确地细化。通过对《公司法》、《证券法》等相关法律、法规的进一步完善,明细我国公司反收购中控股股东和董事的受信义务、强化相关信息披露制度,从而维护公司的健康运转和市场的有序发展。
[Abstract]:In 2006, China Securities Regulatory Commission formally promulgated the "Management measures on takeover of listed companies", which made a series of major adjustments to the acquisition system of listed companies in China, among which "Directors' good faith obligation," Moderate restrictions on anti-takeover, "made part of the modification, particularly impressive." The "management measures" make some principled provisions on the anti-takeover act, and require the board of directors of the target company to take decisions and measures on the acquisition from the perspective of safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the company and its shareholders. It is not allowed to abuse the power given by the company for its own interests, to set up inappropriate obstacles to the acquisition plan or to harm the interests of the company by providing financial aid to the acquirers, revealing the company's secrets, and so on. These regulations play a guiding role in the acquisition and anti-takeover of listed companies, but there are still some gaps in the system construction in the specific practice of anti-takeover law. Through the comparative study of anti-takeover legislation and anti-takeover strategy, this paper puts forward some suggestions on how to perfect the legal regulation of anti-takeover of listed companies. This paper is divided into three chapters, the main contents of each chapter are as follows: The first chapter mainly defines the acquisition and anti-takeover of listed companies, and analyzes the current situation of legislative regulation of anti-takeover in China and the construction of related systems. At present, it is necessary to strengthen the regulation of anti-takeover law. At the same time, the types of anti-takeover strategies of common listed companies in China are described in detail, and the legitimacy of each anti-takeover strategy is analyzed theoretically. Finally, the advantages and disadvantages of anti-takeover strategy selection of target companies in China are discussed. The comprehensive analysis of the effect and the legal defect provides practical discussion for the target company to choose the anti-takeover strategy. The second chapter mainly compares the ownership mode of anti-takeover strategy in Anglo-American countries, and provides a reference for how to determine the choice of anti-takeover strategy in the target company in the current corporate governance and market economy development stage of our country. Because the target companies choose different anti-takeover strategies for the acquisition plan will play a crucial role in the future development of the target company and the ultimate success or failure of the acquisition plan. The interests of policy makers and acquirers, target companies, and other shareholders are hardly in a win-win situation. According to the legislative practice of corporate takeover and anti-takeover in various countries, the core of the legal regulation of anti-takeover behavior of listed companies is the ownership of the decision-making power of anti-takeover strategy. Although the decision mode of company management has great superiority, because the corresponding legislation of director's obligation in our country is not perfect enough, it is not suitable for our country to adopt the mode of management decision for the time being. Instead, the decision on anti-takeover should be vested in the shareholders of the target company. The third chapter is about the legal construction of anti-takeover of listed companies. In order to prevent the decision-makers from harming the legitimate rights and interests of the company and the minority shareholders in the process of choosing the anti-takeover strategy, the controlling shareholders of the target company should be treated. Directors' obligations in the game of corporate takeover and anti-takeover are clearly refined. Through the further improvement of the relevant laws and regulations, such as Company Law, Securities Law, and so on, the credit obligations of the controlling shareholders and directors in the anti-takeover of Chinese companies are detailed, and the relevant information disclosure system is strengthened. In order to maintain the healthy operation of the company and the orderly development of the market.
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：D922.291.91;D922.287

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