证券监管的法律与市场限度

发布时间：2018-06-27 15:56

本文选题：证券监管权 + 不完备法律　；参考：《学术论坛》2006年03期

【摘要】：依照不完备法律理论,在高度不完备的法律下,如果损害行为能加以标准化,并且该行为继续下去会产生大量的外部性,此时监管才是最优的。按照该理论,我国的证券市场监管存在明显的外部性,具体表现为监管范围过宽、监管成本高且效率低下、监管约束缺位等,根源在于市场自治与政府监管的合理界限的混淆。文章结合新修订的《公司法》与《证券法》,对证券监管的法律与市场限度予以论证。
[Abstract]:According to the incomplete legal theory, under the highly incomplete law, if the damage behavior can be standardized, and if the behavior continues to produce a large number of externalities, then the supervision is the best. According to this theory, there is obvious externality in the supervision of securities market in our country, which is manifested in the wide scope of supervision, the high cost and low efficiency of supervision, the absence of regulatory constraints, and so on, which is rooted in the confusion of reasonable boundaries between market autonomy and government supervision. Combined with the newly revised Company Law and Securities Law, this paper demonstrates the legal and market limits of securities supervision.
【作者单位】：西南政法大学经济贸易法学院
【分类号】：D922.287

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