“一股一权”及其对中国公司法的启示

发布时间：2021-10-02 02:58

　　1993年《公司法》颁布至今共修改过两回。来自于美国公司法的“股东本位”理论是公司法的理论基础,“股东本位”理论认为股东控制应该是公司权力的核心。中国《公司法》的实施有很大的问题,公司治理的三大组织：股东会、董事会、监事会相互之间的制衡关系没有形成。股份公司,尤其是上市公司的不平衡的持股结构加重了这一问题。大股东持有公司很高比例的股份,尤其是国家作为大股东高比例持股时问题更加严重。现行的公司治理以及公司投票制度使得高比例持股的股东能够侵害小股东权利、控制董事会监事会乃至整个公司。公司法可以改变其关于公司投票制度的规定来改善这一情况。政治学上的投票理论以及“股东本位”理论最近的发展并不能解释或者解决中国现在的问题。政治学的投票理论所提供的解决方案是没有操作性的,允许所有与公司投票有利害关系的人投票这一方案是不可行的。“股东本位”理论提供的解决方案对于中国的问题完全没有没有效果,阻止股东表达除公司财产最大化以外的意愿不能平衡公司内三大组织的关系。国有股份公司的问题有其政治根源,而其他私有股份公司的问题则是因为公司法本身存在漏洞。这些漏洞使得大股东可以不受控制的破坏内部治理结构。中国应该寻找... 

【文章来源】：南京大学江苏省 211工程院校 985工程院校 教育部直属院校

【文章页数】：99 页

【学位级别】：硕士

【文章目录】：
中文摘要
Abstract
1. Introduction
2. Theoretical Underpinnings of Voting and Corporate Voting
    2.1 Voting in the Political Arena
        2.1.1 Basic structure of political voting
        2.1.2 Common Voting Methods
        2.1.3 Theoretical Underpinnings of Political Voting
    2.2. Voting in the Corporate Arena
        2.2.1 Governance in corporations
        2.2.2 Theoretical Underpinnings of One Share. One Vote
        2.2.3. Latest Development on the Shareholder Primacy Norm
    2.3 Summary
3. China's Current Status and Problems
    3.1. The Governance Structure in Chinese Company Law
        3.1.1. The Shareholders' Meeting and Shareholders' Rights
        3.1.2. Directors and Board of Directors
        3.1.3. Board of Supervisors
    3.2. The Current Problems in Corporate Governance
        3.2.1. The Relationship Between Majority and Minority Shareholders
        3.2.2. The Relationship Between Shareholders and the Board of Directors
        3.2.3 The Relationship Between the Board of Directors and the Board of Supervisors
    3.3. Political Voting Theory and Shareholder Heterogeneity Cannot Explain and Solve the Problems in China
        3.3.1. Political Voting Theory and China's Problems
        3.3.2. Shareholder Heterogeneity and China's Problems
    3.4. China Needs To Focus On Completing the Current System
    3.5 Summary
4. A Comparative Analysis
    4.1. Other prevailing models in the world
        4.1.1. The German Model
        4.1.2. The Japanese Model
    4.2. The Problems of Applying Other Models in China
        4.2.1. The Unique Characteristics of the Chinese Economy
        4.2.2. Shareholder Primacy Should Not Be Replaced
    4.3. China's Way of Innovation
        4.3.1. State Owned Shares To Be Held By Wholly State Owned Companies
        4.3.2. Introducing Banks and Employees into Corporate Voting
    4.4 Summary
5. Conclusion
Bibliography
Acknowledgements


【参考文献】：
期刊论文
[1]公司概念在近代中国的起源与演进[J]. 颜冰,张静.  求是学刊. 2010(04)



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