劳动合同的法律经济分析

发布时间：2018-01-05 19:26

本文关键词：劳动合同的法律经济分析　出处：《中国政法大学》2007年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】： 法律经济分析是重要的法学方法论,它所展示的优势在于它提供了实证的分析方法,为制定法律、实施法律以及法律实施的效果作出预测。在国外已经有许多法律经济学学者将法律经济分析方法应用到部门法中去,实践证明这是可行的,也是有效率的。但由于法律经济学在我国研究的时间并不长,其分析方法和价值并不为人所熟知,大部分的著作只停留在介绍国外法律经济学的层面上。到目前为止只有极少数法学学者将经济分析的方法运用部门法的分析中去,具体到劳动法领域就更少了。所以本文是一次新的尝试,用法律经济分析作为法学方法论来分析正在制定的劳动合同法;目的在于为法律的制定和实施提供新的视角,同时也追求对立法有所裨益。在本文中主要应用经济学中理性人的假设和市场交易的理论(包括有限理性、信息不对称理论、激励与投机的理论),对劳动合同法的特征和效率标准进行分析;另外还运用了博弈论的最新研究成果和交易谈判理论对劳动合同关系进行法律博弈分析。具体而言,本文分为三部分:导论和三章正文。首先在导论中说明了劳动合同法律经济分析的路径即遵循从实证分析入手,再到规范分析的思路,运用经济学理论的行为预测理论来评判和预测具体劳动法律制度和法律规则的实施效果,并且分析了为什么可以将法律经济分析的方法运用于劳动合同法。接下来,在第一章回顾了劳动合同和在世界范围内的发展过程,使我们明白了劳动合同经历的不同阶段和为什么会产生这些不同类型的合同,说明了劳动合同的特征,并总结了劳动合同在当前新时代背景下的发展趋势。其次介绍了关系合同以及在现代社会中的普适性,总结出作为关系合同与劳动合同的契合。对历史回顾的目的在于对现实的思考,现实中劳动合同关系中存在的种种问题把我们的注意力吸引到经济分析领域中来。最后分析了法律经济学的研究路径和优越性。在第二章中运用效率的分析方法说明了劳动合同立法遵循的效率标准应是帕雷托改善的。劳动合同作为关系合同主要原因在于其不完全性,而不完全性来自于信息的不对称、有限理性;上述的原因导致的结果是投机主义和投机行为的存在。法律经济分析和法律博弈分析告诉我们,在制定法律时要考虑到规则对行为选择的激励和影响。法律规则目标和结果是否一致,多大程度得满足,主要通过讨价还价最终达成双方可以一致预测到的规则和结果来实现。因为这种情况下的法律规则是符合理性选择理论的、是自我实施的,是目标和实际效果的一致。劳动合同关系的不完全性、强人身性和最大诚信性和信赖性恰恰证明了将博弈论引入劳动合同立法的重要性。法律经济分析的一切努力在于分析法律制度的结构和预测法律实施的实际效果和长远影响。在第三章里,我们运用效率标准、激励和行为选择的关系以及边际效用递减原理,对劳动合同法(草案)中的具体法律规则和制度进行了法律经济分析;并得出劳动合同法立法宗旨应该倾向于保护劳动者合法权益和在设置培训费用和违约金时应考虑的法律规则的长远影响的结论。
[Abstract]:The economic analysis of law is an important method of law theory, it shows the advantage is that it provides the empirical analysis method, for the formulation of laws, law enforcement and law enforcement effect forecast. In other countries there have been many scholars of law and economics law and economic analysis method is applied to the Department of law, the practice proves that it is feasible also, there is efficiency. But because of legal economics research in China is not a long time, the analysis method and value are not well known, most of the works only on the introduction of foreign legal economics. So far, only a handful of legal scholars will be analyzed by the method of economic analysis of law department in specific to the field of labor law, even less. So this is a new attempt, as legal methodology to analyze the labor contract law is formulated for the purpose of economic analysis of law; Is to provide a new perspective for the formulation and implementation of the law, but also the pursuit of the legislation. In this paper the main application of rational assumption in economics and market transactions (including the theory of limited rationality, information asymmetry theory, incentive theory and speculation), and efficiency standards on the characteristics of the labor contract law analysis the application of game theory; in addition, the latest research results and negotiation theory on labor contract legal game analysis.
Specifically, this article is divided into three parts: introduction and three chapters.
First, in the introduction of the path of economic analysis of law of labor contract which follows from the analysis of the empirical and normative analysis to the idea of using the economics theory of behavior prediction effect theory to judge and predict the specific labor legal system and the rule of law, and analyzes why can be the method of economic analysis of law used in labor contract law.
Next, in the first chapter reviews the labor contract and within the scope of world development process, different stages enables us to understand the experience of the labor contract and why these different types of contracts, explains the characteristics of the labor contract, and summarized in the current context of a new era of development trend. Secondly introduces the relationship of labor contract in modern society, contract and universality, summed up as the relationship between the contract and labor contract agreement. Thinking of the reality of history review, problems existing in the labor contract relationship in reality to attract our attention to the economic analysis in the field. The final analysis of the research on the path of law and economics and superiority.
In the second chapter, using analysis method of efficiency shows that the labor contract legislation should follow the standard of efficiency is the Pareto improvement of the labor contract. As the main reason is the incomplete contract relationship, and asymmetric incomplete information from the limited rationality; the reason is the result of speculation and speculation there. Analysis of the legal and economic analysis of law game theory tells us that in the formulation of laws should take into account the rules of behavior choice motivation and influence. The rule of law and the results are the same, how satisfied, mainly through the two sides can reach a bargain to the consensus forecast rules and results achieved. Because the rule of law next is in line with the theory of rational choice, is self enforcing, is the goal and the actual effect of the agreement. The incomplete labor contract relationship, and the body. The most trustworthiness and trustworthiness just prove the importance of introducing game theory into labor contract legislation. All efforts of legal economic analysis lie in analyzing the structure of legal system and predicting the actual effect and long-term influence of law implementation.
In the third chapter, we use the efficiency standard, the relationship between incentive and behavior choice and the principle of diminishing marginal utility, the labor contract law (Draft) in the specific legal rules and regulations for the economic analysis of law; and the legislative purpose of the labor contract law should favor the long-term impact to preserving the legitimate rights and interests of workers and the legal rules set the cost of training and the penalty should be considered in the conclusion.

【学位授予单位】：中国政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2007
【分类号】：D912.5;D90-05

【引证文献】