论标准制定组织披露规则的完善

发布时间：2018-04-14 08:01

本文选题：专利 + 标准制定组织　；参考：《北方法学》2017年05期

【摘要】：标准的制定越来越无法绕开专利,标准的公共性与专利的私有性之间存在冲突。专利权人为了实现自身利益的最大化,在标准制定过程中往往会采取欺诈的方式故意不披露其专利,通过"暗度陈仓"的方式促使其专利被纳入标准之中。借助于标准给其专利所带来的垄断力,专利权人就能向标准实施者提出种种不合理的许可要求。标准制定组织的披露规则对于预防这一问题具有重要的价值。披露规则不是标准制定组织与专利权人之间的一种合同,而是类似于行业协会的自律性规定。标准制定组织可以借助于披露规则对专利权人提出超出合同法范围的披露义务要求。但是,披露规则所存在的非强制性、过度依赖专利权人的主动披露、不当地规定了专利检索豁免、不要求标准制定组织对所披露的信息进行实质性审查、对不披露行为应承担的不利后果规定不足等方面的问题,大大限制了披露规则的效果。
[Abstract]:The formulation of standards is more and more unable to bypass patents, and there is a conflict between the publicity of standards and the private nature of patents.In order to realize the maximization of their own interests, the patentee will deliberately not disclose his patent in the process of making the standard, and promote the patent to be included in the standard by the way of "making a secret statement".With the help of the monopoly power brought by the standard to its patent, the patentee can put forward various unreasonable licensing requirements to the standard implementers.The disclosure rules of standard-setting organizations have important value in preventing this problem.Disclosure rules are not a contract between a standard-setting organization and a patentee, but a self-regulatory rule similar to that of an industry association.The standard-setting organization may request the patentee beyond the scope of contract law by means of the disclosure rules.However, the existence of non-mandatory disclosure rules, excessive reliance on patentee's initiative disclosure, improper provision of patent retrieval exemptions, and no substantive review of the disclosed information by standard-setting organizations,The effect of disclosure rules is greatly limited by inadequate provisions on the adverse consequences of non-disclosure.
【作者单位】：中国青年政治学院;
【基金】：国家社科基金青年项目“标准必要专利反垄断规制研究”(16CFX050)的阶段性成果
【分类号】：D923.42

【相似文献】