体外受精胚胎民事法律保护研究

发布时间：2018-04-29 20:51

本文选题：体外受精胚胎 + 法律属性　；参考：《安徽大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：体外受精胚胎作为人工辅助生殖技术的产物,是医疗技术进步的成果,能够为无数不孕不育患者带去生育的希望,却也容易引发相关法律争议。江苏宜兴冷冻胚胎案的出现,就引发了社会对体外受精胚胎的关注,虽然该案终审判决现已作出,但是有关胚胎的相关民事法律问题尚待进一步明确和解决。理论界关于体外受精胚胎的民事法律属性存在主体说、客体说和折中说三类观点。主体说下分为有限自然人说和法人说,有限自然人说建立于"生命从受精开始"的理论基础之上,其将生物学上的生命等同于法律上的生命,这与我国关于法律上的人始于出生的共识存在差异,因而于我国难有适用之地。法人说则将体外受精胚胎同法人组织类比,并拟制成为法律上的人,这就突破了一般法人的概念,也难以被世人广泛接受。客体说下则分为财产说和私生活利益说。财产说单纯强调体外受精胚胎的物质性,忽视了胚胎内含的生命潜力,可能导致胚胎的权利人随意处置胚胎或者将胚胎作为个人牟利的工具。私生活利益说则将体外受精胚胎作为相关权利人生育权所指向的对象,但存在适用范围有限的问题。无论是财产说还是私生活利益说,存在的问题都是过于强调胚胎权利人的利益,而忽视了胚胎具有发展为人的潜力这一特性。折中说,顾名思义,既主体和客体的折中观点,该说将胚胎视为人和物之间的过渡存在,在主体和客体之外为胚胎创设第三种法律地位,这实际上是对民法中人物二分架构的颠覆,因而在我国并无适用之地。目前我国立法对于体外受精胚胎的民事法律属性的认定并不清晰。一方面,民事立法尚未将胚胎纳入调整范围,另一方面,我国仅有的关于体外受精胚胎的立法仅限于前卫生部颁布的用于规范人工辅助生殖技术开展的行政法规,并不涉及胚胎法律属性界定的问题。即便是已经判结的宜兴冷冻胚胎案,一审法院和二审法院对于胚胎法律属性的认定也存在不同观点。杨立新教授曾将民法上物分为伦理物、特殊物和普通物,将体外受精胚胎归入伦理物,最能够体现胚胎的伦理特性。一方面,体外受精胚胎不符合人的标准,因为从生物学角度看,其并不具备生理功能,纯粹只是多个细胞。从法律角度分析,成为法律意义上的人必须符合已出生的条件,显然,体外受精胚胎并不具备。另一方面,体外受精胚胎具有物的属性,其具有存在于人身之外、能够满足人类某种需要以及能够为人力所控制或支配的物之特性。正因为胚胎具有潜在的人格特征,具有成长为人的潜力,因而在对其进行评价时必须将伦理道德考虑在内,并由法律对其提供特殊尊重与保护,以便将其与一般的物区别开来。体外受精胚胎归不孕夫妇共同所有,实施体外授精胚胎移植技术的医疗机构只负有保管胚胎的义务,并非胚胎的所有人。当不孕夫妇离婚时,应当按照双方共同意思确定胚胎权利归属。若双方难以形成合意,可以将双方与胚胎是否具有血缘关系作为判定标准,确定由与胚胎具有血缘关系的一方享有胚胎所有权。如是仍不能据此确定权利归属,就通过比较双方对于胚胎的具体诉求,确定胚胎归属于支持胚胎继续存活的一方,或是继续冷冻,由双方共同享有所有权。当不孕夫妇发生死亡时,胚胎作为伦理物,应将其纳入遗产范畴,由第一顺序继承人予以继承。法院在确认损毁胚胎的民事责任过程中,应当以过错原则为主、无过错原则为辅作为归责原则,对损毁胚胎的行为人要求其承担物的损害赔偿责任,并需着重加强对胚胎权利人精神损害的救济,以确保胚胎权利人受损的人格利益获得赔偿。
[Abstract]:In vitro fertilization embryo, as a product of artificial assisted reproductive technology, is the result of the progress of medical technology. It can bring hope to countless infertility patients, but it also easily leads to relevant legal disputes. The appearance of frozen embryo in Yixing, Jiangsu, has caused social attention to in vitro fertilization embryo, although the trial has been decided now. The civil legal issues related to the embryo still need to be further clarified and solved. There are three categories of civil legal attributes of IVF embryos in the theoretical circle, object and compromise. The subject is divided into limited natural person and legal person, and the limited natural person is based on the theoretical basis of "life from the beginning of fertilization." On the basis of it, it equates the biological life with the legal life, which is different from the consensus that the legal person begins with birth. Therefore, it is difficult to apply in our country. The legal person says that the in vitro fertilization embryo is analogous to the legal person organization and is made to be legal, which breaks through the concept of the general legal person and is difficult. It is widely accepted by the world. The object is divided into property theory and private life interest. Property simply emphasizes the material nature of an in vitro fertilization embryo, neglects the life potential of the embryo, which may lead to the right holder of the embryo to dispose of the embryo at will or to use the embryo as a personal profit making tool. For the object of the right to life of the related rights, but there is a limited scope of application. Whether it is property and private life, the problem is too much emphasis on the interests of the rights of the embryo, but neglects the potential of the development of the embryo as the human potential. It takes the embryo as the transition between human and object, and creates third legal status for the embryo outside the subject and the object. This is actually the subversion of the two division of the characters in the civil law, so there is no applicable place in our country. At present, the identification of the civil legal attributes of the IVF embryos in our country is not clear at present. On the one hand, In civil legislation, the embryo has not been included in the scope of the adjustment. On the other hand, the only legislation on in vitro fertilization of embryos in our country is limited to the administrative regulations issued by the former Ministry of health for the standardization of artificial assisted reproductive technology, and does not involve the definition of the legal attributes of the embryo. Even the Yixing frozen embryo case, which has been found, is a court of first instance. And the court of second trial also has different views on the identification of the legal attributes of the embryo. Professor Yang Lixin has divided the civil law into ethical objects, special objects and common objects, which put in vitro fertilized embryos into ethical objects, which can most reflect the ethical characteristics of embryos. On the one hand, in vitro fertilization embryos do not conform to human standards, because from a biological point of view, Without physiological function, it is purely a number of cells. From a legal point of view, a person in the legal sense must conform to the conditions of birth. Obviously, the in vitro fertilization embryo is not available. On the other hand, the in vitro fertilization embryo has the properties that exist outside human body to meet human needs and be able to be human. The characteristics of something controlled or controlled. Because the embryo has the potential personality characteristics and has the potential to grow as human, it must be taken into account and special respect and protection by law to distinguish it from the general physical area. A medical institution that implements in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer is only the obligation to keep embryos, not all of the embryos. When an infertile couple divorces, it is necessary to determine the rights of the embryo in accordance with the common meaning of the two parties. If both parties are difficult to form a consensual relationship, the relationship between the two and the embryos can be determined by the relationship between the two and the embryos. The party with the relationship of the embryo enjoys the ownership of the embryo. If it is still unable to determine the rights of the embryo, by comparing the specific demands of the two sides to the embryo, it is determined that the embryo belongs to the party that supports the survival of the embryo, or continues to freeze and enjoy all rights by both sides. When the infertile couple dies, the embryo is ethical In the process of recognizing the civil liability of the damaged embryo, the court should take the principle of fault as the principal and the principle of no fault as the principle of liability, to compensate for the damage liability of the person who damaged the embryo, and to strengthen the spirit of the right person of the embryo. The remedy for damages is to ensure that the rights of the embryos are compensated for the loss of their personal interests.

【学位授予单位】：安徽大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：D923

【参考文献】