生产安全事故侵权责任的归责原则研究

发布时间：2018-06-29 00:04

本文选题：生产安全 + 归责原则　；参考：《中国安全科学学报》2016年09期

【摘要】：为激励当事人采取适当措施,实现最佳的事故预防效果并促进社会成本的最小化,在分析我国当前民事侵权责任归责原则体系的基础上,将危险责任作为一种独立的归责原则,并在此基础上,建立过错责任与危险责任耦合的生产安全事故二元归责原则体系。同时,采用汉德公式的思想和博弈论的方法,从过错责任原则和危险责任原则2方面,分析和比较生产经营活动中当事人的安全投入和行为选择。结果表明:在过错责任的归责原则下,当预防成本小于事故成本时,对侵害人和受害人都能产生事故预防的激励;在危险责任的归责原则下,对受害人不会产生事故预防的激励,而预防成本小于事故成本时,能对侵害人产生事故预防的激励。
[Abstract]:In order to encourage the parties concerned to take appropriate measures to achieve the best accident prevention effect and to minimize the social cost, on the basis of the analysis of the current liability system of tort liability in China, the risk liability is regarded as an independent imputation principle. On this basis, the dual liability system of production safety accident is established. At the same time, by using the thought of Hande formula and the method of game theory, this paper analyzes and compares the safety investment and behavior choice of the parties involved in the production and management activities from the two aspects of fault liability principle and dangerous liability principle. The results show that under the principle of fault liability, when the cost of prevention is less than the cost of accident, both the aggressor and the victim can be encouraged to prevent the accident. When the cost of prevention is less than the cost of accident, the incentive of accident prevention can be obtained for the victim.
【作者单位】：东北大学资源与土木工程学院;
【分类号】：X915.3

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