论董事义务

发布时间：2018-06-03 15:02

本文选题：公司 + 董事　；参考：《吉林大学》2004年硕士论文

【摘要】：现代公司法上的一个重要特征就是企业所有与企业经营的分离，并由此导致了股东大会中心主义向董事会中心主义的变迁。在这种历史现实面前，一般股东是不可能直接参与公司的具体经营和管理的，而董事会的经营权限则日益膨胀。权利与义务如影同行。在扩张权利的同时，若不强化与其相对应的义务，则权利难免有被滥用之虞。因此在鼓励公司经营者充分施展其才干，以创造更多的公司盈利和股东投资回报的同时，适度强化经营者特别是董事对于公司和股东所负担的法律义务，避免和减少经营者的滥用权力行为，实属理之当然。世界诸国的公司法无不对董事义务作出规定，我国也不例外。但应当承认，我国《公司法》关于董事的义务和责任的规定是不完善的。本文从分析董事义务确立的基础也就是公司与董事的关系入手，通过介绍大陆法系、英美法系国家董事义务制度的内容，对我国公司立法中董事义务的规定进行评析并对我国董事义务制度的完善提出相应的立法建议。本论文共分为三个部分。第一章论述了董事义务确立的基础。在法律上如何确立董事的义务取决于董事与公司的关系。基于不同的董事与公司之间的关系，董事的义务也不尽相同。首先，介绍了英美法系关于董事与公司的法律关系的学说，即信托关系说和代理关系说并分别进行了评析。其次，介绍了大陆法系关于董事与公司的法律关系的学说，即委任关系说，，并进行了评析。还对英美法系的代理关系说与大陆法系传统的委任关系说进行了比较，得出两者对于董事与公司关系的认识从本质上说并非对立而 WP=46 是十分接近的观点。最后，通过比较分析，得出委任关系与信托关系实质上是统一的，不能将现代公司法上的公司与董事关系严格地还原为信托、代理或委任等传统私法上的法律关系。我国董事义务确立的基础即公司与董事之间的法律关系由我国的经济基础决定，构成一种公司法上的董事权力责任关系和权利义务关系。第二章为董事义务制度的内容。首先归纳出董事义务制度的一般内容。董事对公司主要负有两大义务，即注意义务和忠实义务。注意义务产生的根源是公司与董事间的委任关系，其实质是一种管理义务。其含义是：董事须以一个合理的谨慎的人在相似的情形下所应表现的谨慎、勤勉和技能履行其职责，否则依据法律和章程就要承担相应的责任。对其评判要兼顾主客观两方面。主观上，董事应依诚信原则竭力处理公司事务；客观上，董事应尽到与其具有相同知识、经验的人所应履行的注意程度。对注意程度的判断，各国一般采用客观性标准。所谓忠实义务，即董事必须竭尽忠诚地为公司工作并诚实地履行职责。其理论基础是董事与公司间的信托关系。其在实质上要求董事经营和管理公司的业务，毫无保留地代表全体股东为公司最大利益努力工作，当其自身利益与公司整体利益发生冲突时，后者优先。注意义务与忠实义务的关系是相互联系、相互区别。经过比较分析，笔者得出结论，两者均属信义义务，其结合利于促使董事为公司利益最大化努力工作。其次，结合美国董事义务制度的内容介绍了独立董事制度中董事应有的义务内容。目的在于为我国独立董事制度义务内容的确立提供借鉴。第三章为我国董事义务制度的评析及其完善。首先介绍了我国董事义务制度的特点和我国现行立法中董事义务规定的不足之处。我国董事义务制度的特点是强调公司机关设置上相互制 WP=47 衡，对董事必须履行的积极义务和不得从事的利益冲突交易之规定倾向于原则规定而缺少具体范围限定和操作程序规定。我国《公司法》的规定与公司法乃至整个民商法体系中对董事责任与义务应然的要求相比，还远不够成熟、完善。就注意义务来说，我国《公司法》未对董事的注意义务加以规定，造成立法上的漏洞；就忠实义务来说，规定了忠实义务的内涵与外延，规定了违反忠实义务的法律责任。其他法律的规定则较零散，制定机关也不统一。从积极性规定看董事忠实义务，我国没有明确完善的忠实义务规定，这加大了公司、股东监督董事的难度。从消极性规定看董事忠实义务，其不足之处在于：第一，忠实义务的范围比较窄；第二，对违反自我交易制度的法律后果缺乏规定；第三，其他缺陷。其次，笔者分别从完善董事的注意义务和忠实义务两个方面对完善我国董事义务制度提出建议。关于完善董事注意义务的立法建议，有三种途径：一是在修订《民法典》时，明确董事与公司存在委任关系和信托关系；二是修改《公司法》，概括性地确立董事的注意义务，并明确判断的标准；三是制定法规要求各公司在其章程中明确董事对公司所应负的具体注意义务及判断的标准。关于完善董事忠实义务的立法建议，从四个方面加以论述：第一，应完善董事竞业禁止义务制度；第二，应完善董事自我交易制度；第三，应完善董事滥用公司财产禁止制度；第四，应完善股东诉权制度。最后，笔者对当前《公司法》修改草案进行了简要评析，并建议草案的起草者和设计者能够进一步修改草案相关内容，使草案中关于董事义务制度的规定更加科学化和完善化。
[Abstract]:It is an important feature of modern company law to separate all the enterprises from the business , and thus lead to the change of the central principle of the shareholders ' meeting to the center of the board of directors . In the face of this historical reality , the general shareholders are not directly involved in the specific operation and management of the company , and the business authority of the board of directors is not perfect .

The first chapter discusses the foundation of the establishment of the director ' s obligation . How to establish the director ' s obligation in law depends on the relationship between the director and the company . According to the relationship between the director and the company , the director ' s obligation is different .

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Finally , through comparative analysis , it is concluded that the relationship between the appointment and the trust is uniform , and the relationship between the company and the director in the modern company law can not be reduced to the legal relation on the traditional private law such as trust , agency or appointment . The legal relationship between the company and the director is determined by the economic foundation of our country , and constitutes a relationship between the power responsibility and the rights and obligations of the directors in the Company Law .

The second chapter is the content of the director ' s obligation system . First , the general contents of the director ' s obligation system are summarized . The director has two major obligations to the company , namely , pay attention to the obligation and the loyalty obligation .
On the basis of comparative analysis , the author concludes that both belong to the trust relationship between the director and the company . The theory foundation is the trust relation between the director and the company . The theory foundation is the trust relation between the director and the company . The theory foundation is the trust relation between the director and the company . The theory foundation is the trust relation between the director and the company .

The third chapter is the analysis and perfection of the system of director ' s duty in our country . Firstly , it introduces the characteristics of our director ' s obligation system and the deficiency of the director ' s obligation in our country ' s current legislation .

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It is not enough mature and perfect for the directors ' duty and obligation in the company law and the whole civil and commercial law system .
In terms of the faithful obligations , the connotation and extension of the faithful obligations are stipulated , which lays down the legal responsibility for the breach of the faithful obligation . The provisions of other laws are scattered , and the establishment of the organs is not unified . From the initiative regulation the director ' s duty is not established , and the difficulty of the company and shareholders to supervise the directors is strengthened . The deficiency of the directors ' duty to the directors from the provisions of the negative polarity is that the scope of the first and faithful obligations is narrower ;
Second , the lack of provisions on the legal consequences of a breach of the self - trading system ;
Thirdly , the author puts forward some suggestions on improving the director ' s duty system from two aspects of perfecting director ' s duty of attention and duty of loyalty .
The second is to amend the Company Law Firm to establish the notice obligation of the directors in general , and to make clear the standard of judgment ;
The third is to set up the laws and regulations to require the companies to make clear the specific attention obligation and the judgment standard of the directors to the company in their articles of association . The legislative suggestions on improving the loyalty of directors are discussed from four aspects : First , the system of director ' s competitive prohibition obligation should be perfected ;
Secondly , we should perfect the self - trading system of directors ;
Third , we should improve the company ' s property prohibition system .
Fourthly , we should perfect the system of shareholder ' s right of recourse . Finally , the author makes a brief comment on the draft amendment of the Company Law , and suggests that the drafter and the designer of the draft can further revise the relevant content of the draft , so as to make the regulation of the director ' s obligation system more scientific and perfect .
【学位授予单位】：吉林大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2004
【分类号】：D912.29

【引证文献】