非对称信息条件下的房地产企业成本管理激励机制研究

发布时间：2018-01-18 23:58

本文关键词： 非对称信息成本管理激励机制房地产目标成本　出处：《华南理工大学》2013年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：受宏观调控影响，项目成本领先已成为房地产企业的核心竞争力之一，一些房地产企业提出价值创造的理念，把成本管理的重心前移，进行目标成本管理，然而，国内很多企业的“目标成本”并非由价值工程分析，而是由造价指标测算得来，实际上是“责任成本”，由于项目前期阶段非对称信息普遍存在，这种“目标成本管理”不能满足的成本管理的需要。本项研究以非对称信息条件下的房地产企业成本管理为切入点，采用博弈、数学规划及统计数值分析等方法，通过理论及实证分析发现，在非对称信息下，采用目标成本管理，会扩大代理双方的博弈，引发棘轮效应，不利资源整合及价值创造，也会造成成本得到控制而品质却下降的局面，因此，房地产成本管理需要改变以“控”代“管”的现状。首先，总结归纳了国内外成本管理及激励理论的研究结果，论述了成本管理的发展历程及相关方法，分析了我国的房地产成本管理现状，阐述了激励机制的理论分析及应用型模型。其次，在理论分析的基础上，针对项目开发的不同阶段、不同代理事务、信息对称与非对称的不同情况，提出不同的成本管理策略，并对精细化成本管理作出新解，指出精细化成本管理的误区，进而增加成本动因分析，提倡目标成本与作业成本管理相融合。然后，在非对称信息下，引入激励管理方法，以激励替代责任成本的控制，减少博弈，鼓励代理人整合资源及价值创造。最后，对当前项目成本管理流程进行了改善，提出新的管理流程，在可研策划及方案设计阶段引入激励管理，以适应项目前期成本的特点。由于传统的激励机制存在参数过多、激励力度不合理、不符合经营习惯等局限性，阻碍了其推广和应用。因此，本论文构建一种新型的应用型主动激励模型，改变传统模型的线性激励，加大激励力度，使奖罚机制渐趋科学；解决传统模型的局限性，可减少代理双方的博弈风险；能有效防止棘轮效应，使得代理人保持努力工作成为常态，从而能更好适应房地产前期非对称信息条件下的成本管理。另外，采用主动激励模型能够有效的替代斯宾塞劳动力市场模型分析模型，降低信息传递的偏离，有利房地产企业甄别出能力强又愿意为代理事务付出较高努力水平的代理人。本研究对该模型下的逆向选择及道德风险问题分别建立最优规划问题模型进行分析，并有以下发现： 1.逆向选择的问题上，模型使得高专业水平代理人和低专业水平代理人的产出水平与信息完备时比均未发生扭曲，能有效避免高专业水平代理人模仿低专业水平代理人的倾向，而且使得低专业水平代理人的产出也保持在较优水平，使得房地产企业不需抬高产出标准，因而，代理人会更愿意接受主动激励机制所构建的合同，能有效促使代理人加大人力及资源配置，使得代理人的工作效率得以改善。 2.道德风险问题上，主动激励机制可用较小的提成比例来激励代理人达到信息对称时同样的努力水平，能够引导代理人在合同初期勇敢地报出真实的产出水平，在代理事务实施时，理性的代理人会按自身的能力和资源采取真实的行为。同时本研究还指出了激励效果及风险的影响因素，这些因素包括：努力影响系数、外界不确因素、绝对风险规避度量及提成比例等，并分析了各因素之间的相互作用关系。针对施工单位可以把剩余价值全部占有，激励机制对其可能会失去作用的情况，本论文又提出一体化和长期合作的策略，作为激励机制的延伸和补充。经建立模型分析表明一体化策略将外部代理转为内部代理，可扩大激励的力度，尤其能解决激励机制对外部施工单位没最优解的问题。通过动态博弈分析表明长期合作中代理人为了将来获取更多的收益，会保持更好的声誉，保持努力工作的状态。最后，通过对广州地区23个房地产开发工程成本数据进行方差分析，发现各分项工程的系统误差比较离散，最低的项目前期工程为14.9%，最高的的机电工程是81.8%，这表明不同项目的工程成本存在较大的不确定，导致项目开发前期非对称信息普遍存在，证实传统单一的责任成本管理存在一定的弊端。同时，通过算例分析证实主动激励机制能很好地应用于房地产企业的内部及外部代理事务中，具有较好的实操性，可以取得良好的效果，能在一定程度上解决逆向选择和道德风险的问题。综合上述，现在房地产企业已把成本管理的重心移至项目开发前期，虽然把握好了成本控制的“时间”，却忽略了成本控制的“空间”，，对非对称信息的影响及成本成因考虑不足，本文分析了非对称信息条件情况下成本管理的特点，提出以激励代替控制的理念，以适应新形势下，房地地产企业成本管理的需求。宏观上，有利于优化资源配置，减少社会经济的浪费。微观上，有利于房地产企业进行价值创造，增强竞争力。
[Abstract]:The impact of macro-control, the project cost has become one of the core competitiveness of real estate enterprises, put forward the concept of value creation of some real estate enterprises, the cost management of the center of gravity forward to target cost management, however, many domestic enterprises "target cost" and not by value engineering analysis, but by the cost index to measure in fact, is the "responsibility cost", because of the widespread non symmetric information the early stages of the project, the target cost management can not meet the needs of cost management. The research of cost management based on asymmetric information under the conditions of the real estate enterprises as the starting point, using game theory, mathematical programming and numerical statistical analysis methods, through theoretical and empirical analysis found that, under asymmetric information, the target cost management, expand the game, causing negative ratchet effect, resource integration and value Creation will also cause cost control and quality decline. Therefore, real estate cost management needs to change the status of "control" instead of "control".
Firstly, it summarizes the research results of domestic and foreign cost management and incentive theory, discusses the development process of cost management and related methods, analysis of China's real estate cost management present situation, elaborated the theoretical analysis and application of the incentive mechanism model. Secondly, on the basis of theoretical analysis, at different stages of project development the different agency affairs, different conditions of symmetric and asymmetric information, put forward different methods of cost management, and make a new explanation on the fine cost management, points out the misunderstanding of the fine cost management, thus increasing the cost driver analysis, advocate the integration of target cost and activity-based cost management. Then, under asymmetric information, the introduction of the incentive management method, reduce the game to encourage alternative control, responsibility cost, encourage agents to integrate resources and value creation. Finally, the current project cost management process has been improved, The new management process is put forward, and incentive management is introduced in the planning and design stage to adapt to the characteristics of the pre project cost.
Because of the traditional incentive mechanism has too many parameters, incentives are not reasonable, does not meet the operating habits and other limitations, hindered the popularization and application. Therefore, this paper constructs a new application of active incentive model, change the traditional linear incentive model, increase incentives, the reward and punishment mechanism to solve the limitations of science gradually; the traditional model, can reduce the risk of the game of both sides; can effectively prevent the ratchet effect, makes the agent keep working hard to become the norm, which can better adapt to the real estate under asymmetric information cost management. In addition, the active incentive model can replace the Spencer labor market model and effective analysis model, reduce the transmission of information the deviation from the favorable real estate enterprises identify ability and willing to pay higher effort level as the proxy agent in the transaction. The research on the model of the The reverse selection and moral hazard problems are analyzed by establishing the optimal planning model respectively, and the following findings are found:
1. the adverse selection problem. The model makes the level of output and high professional level and low professional level agent agent than complete were not distorted, can effectively avoid the tendency of high professional level and low professional level agents imitate the agent, but also makes the low level of professional agent output is maintained at the optimum level, making the real real estate enterprises do not need to raise output standards, therefore, the agent will be more willing to accept the initiative incentive mechanism can effectively promote the construction of the contract, the agent to increase manpower and resource allocation, makes the agent work efficiency can be improved.
2. the moral hazard problem, active incentive mechanism can use a smaller percentage to motivate agents to work hard to achieve similar levels of information symmetry, can guide the agent bravely to report actual output level in the early stages of the contract, in the implementation of agency affairs, rational agents will take real actions according to their ability and resources at the same time. The study also pointed out the influence factors of the incentive effect and risk, these factors include: to influence coefficient, external uncertainty, absolute risk aversion measure and percentage, and analyzes the interaction between various factors.
According to the construction unit can transfer the value of all of its possession, the incentive mechanism may lose the function of the situation, this thesis proposed the integration and long-term cooperation strategy, as the extension and supplement of the incentive mechanism. The model analysis shows that the integration strategy of external agent to the internal agent, can enlarge the incentive strength, especially to solve the incentive mechanism of the external construction unit is not the optimal solution of the problem. Through dynamic game analysis show that the agent for the future long-term cooperation gain more income, will maintain a better reputation, keep working hard.
Finally, through variance analysis of 23 real estate development project cost data in Guangzhou, found that the system error of each sub project is discrete, the lowest pre engineering project is 14.9%, the highest of the mechanical and electrical engineering is 81.8%, which indicates the existence of the engineering cost of different projects with large uncertainties, leading to widespread non pre project development asymmetric information, confirmed the responsibility cost management of traditional single has certain drawbacks. At the same time, through the example analysis confirmed that the internal and external affairs of active agent incentive mechanism can be applied to the real estate business, good practice, good results can be achieved, can solve the adverse selection and moral hazard in some degree on the problem.
Above all, now the real estate companies have cost management to move the center of gravity before project development, although a good grasp of the cost control of the "time", but ignore the cost control of the "space" of the asymmetric information and the cost of the causes of lack of consideration, this paper analyzes the characteristics of cost management under asymmetric information condition this, instead of the control to the idea of incentive, in order to adapt to the new situation, the real estate enterprise needs to cost management. On the macro level, is conducive to optimizing the allocation of resources, reduce the waste of social economy. Microscopically, conducive to the real estate enterprises to create value, enhance competitiveness.

【学位授予单位】：华南理工大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F275.3;F299.233.4;TU723.3

【参考文献】