基于相对业绩比较的双标准成本控制契约研究

发布时间：2018-03-16 09:24

本文选题：成本控制　切入点：激励机制　出处：《系统工程学报》2017年01期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：在企业成本控制活动中,管理者和工人间产生了委托代理问题,并由此签订双标准成本控制契约.针对工人成本控制业绩受到的较大干扰可能导致激励契约失效的问题,在成本管理系统框架下将三维度相对业绩引入双标准成本控制契约,研究了引入相对业绩后,相关参数对契约中最优激励系数和最优调节系数的作用方式,和成本控制激励机制的改善机理.结果表明:最优激励系数与工人能力、相对业绩协方差的平方呈正相关,与工人努力成本系数、风险规避度、外界不确定因素方差和相对业绩方差呈负相关;任一维度相对业绩的调节系数仅与该维度业绩的协方差和方差相关;引入相对业绩可有效改善成本控制激励机制,而工人成本控制方面的素质、外部风险和被过滤风险因素所占总风险的地位均可影响激励机制的改善效果.
[Abstract]:In the cost control activities of enterprises, the principal-agent problem arises between managers and workers, and a double standard cost control contract is signed, which may lead to the invalidation of incentive contracts due to the large interference in the performance of workers' cost control. In the framework of the cost management system, the three-dimension relative performance is introduced into the double-standard cost control contract, and the effect of the related parameters on the optimal incentive coefficient and the optimal adjustment coefficient is studied after the introduction of the relative performance. The results show that the optimal incentive coefficient is positively correlated with the square of worker's ability and relative performance covariance, and is related to worker's effort cost coefficient and risk aversion. The variance of external uncertain factors and relative performance variance are negatively correlated; the adjustment coefficient of relative performance of any dimension is only related to the covariance and variance of performance in that dimension; the introduction of relative performance can effectively improve the incentive mechanism of cost control. The quality of workers' cost control, the position of external risk and the total risk of filtered risk can affect the improvement effect of incentive mechanism.
【作者单位】：哈尔滨工程大学经济管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71072075) 教育部博士点基金资助项目(20092304110017)
【分类号】：F275.3

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