会计稳健性、代理成本与非效率投资

发布时间：2018-03-18 08:33

本文选题：会计稳健性　切入点：信息不对称　出处：《四川师范大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：会计稳健性是会计核算的重要原则,一直以来对会计实践活动有着深远影响。2006年企业新会计准则和2008年金融危机爆发,使得稳健性的计量属性得到广泛关注。会计稳健性延迟确认“好消息”,及时确认“坏消息”的要求,约束了管理层操纵公司盈余,减少管理者自利主义动机下的非理性投资行为。会计稳健性对两种非效率投资的情形(过度投资和投资不足)的作用结果、影响方向是否一致,已有研究成果并未形成一致观点。会计稳健性究竟是如何影响非效率投资行为的,是直接影响还是间接影响,现有文献未给出详细解释。本文从代理成本视角出发,大胆设想,在会计稳健性对非效率投资的作用下,代理成本是否可能发挥着中介效应。本文依据委托代理冲突的类型,将代理成本细分为股东-经理人、控股股东-中小股东以及股东-债权人三种类型。将会计稳健性、代理成本和非效率投资三者纳入同一研究框架中,找寻它们之间的内在联系。为规范信息披露、改善投资效率提供相关建议。本文选取2009-2015年A股上市企业数据,建立数学检验模型。研究会计稳健性分别对两种非效率投资行为(过度投资和投资不足)的具体影响,会计稳健性对代理成本的影响,以及代理成本在会计稳健性与非效率投资两者之中发挥的作用。实证研究结果表明:过度投资方面,会计稳健性有明显抑制作用;投资不足方面,会计稳健性则起到加剧效果。会计稳健性与股东-经理人代理成本呈现U型曲线关系,与控股股东-中小股东呈现倒U型关系,与股东-债权人代理成本也呈现倒U型关系。表明会计稳健性与企业代理成本之间存在一定的区间效应。只有在某一区间内,会计稳健性的治理效应才能得到有效发挥。进一步研究发现会计稳健性、代理成本与非效率投资三者中间存在着传导关系,代理成本在其中发挥着部分中介效应。本文运用文献阅读、理论推导和实证模型的方式集中关注会计稳健性、代理成本与非效率投资三者之间的关系。可能的贡献体现为以下三点:研究视角上本文选取代理成本的视角,并在委托代理理论的框架下,将代理成本分为三种类型,对这三类代理成本选取相应变量,建立模型进行实证检验。研究内容上本文开拓创新,在原有研究框架之中,加入代理成本,考察它们三者的内在联系,代理成本的中介效应得到证实。研究方法上本文运用KW模型测算的C-Score指数度量会计稳健性,它弥补了Basu(1997)模型无法计量某一特定企业在特定年度的稳健性程度的缺陷。
[Abstract]:Accounting conservatism is an important principle of accounting accounting, which has always had a profound influence on accounting practice. In 2006, the new accounting standards for enterprises and the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008, Accounting conservatism delay the recognition of "good news" and timely recognition of "bad news" requirements, which constrains the management to manipulate the company's earnings. Reducing the irrational investment behavior under the motivation of self-interest of managers. The effect of accounting conservatism on the two kinds of inefficient investment (overinvestment and underinvestment) results in the same direction. The existing literature has not given a detailed explanation on how accounting conservatism affects inefficient investment behavior, whether it affects directly or indirectly. This paper, from the perspective of agency cost, assumes that accounting conservatism affects the investment behavior directly or indirectly. Under the influence of accounting conservatism on inefficient investment, the agency cost can play an intermediary effect. According to the type of principal-agent conflict, the agency cost is subdivided into stockholders and managers. Three types of controlling shareholders-minority shareholders and shareholders-creditors. The accounting conservatism, agency cost and inefficient investment are brought into the same research framework to find the internal relationship between them, in order to regulate the disclosure of information, the three types of accounting conservatism, agency cost and inefficient investment are included in the same research framework. This paper selects the data of A-share listed enterprises from 2009-2015 to establish a mathematical test model to study the concrete influence of accounting conservatism on two kinds of inefficient investment behaviors (overinvestment and underinvestment). The influence of accounting conservatism on agency cost and the effect of agency cost on accounting conservatism and inefficient investment. In the aspect of insufficient investment, accounting conservatism plays a more important role. The relationship between accounting conservatism and stockholder-manager agency cost is U-shaped, and it is inversely U-shaped with controlling shareholder and minority shareholders. It shows that there is a certain interval effect between accounting conservatism and enterprise agency cost. The governance effect of accounting conservatism can be effectively brought into play. Further research shows that there is a conduction relationship among accounting conservatism, agency cost and inefficient investment. Agency cost plays a part of intermediary effect. This paper focuses on accounting conservatism by literature reading, theoretical derivation and empirical model. The possible contributions are as follows: from the perspective of the research, this paper selects the perspective of agency cost, and divides the agency cost into three types under the framework of principal-agent theory. Selecting the corresponding variables to these three kinds of agency cost, establishing the model to carry on the empirical test. In the research content, this article develops the innovation, in the original research frame, adds the agency cost, inspects their three internal relations, The intermediary effect of agency cost has been proved. In the research method, the C-Score index measured by KW model is used to measure accounting conservatism, which makes up for the defect that Basu 1997) model can not measure the degree of conservatism of a particular enterprise in a particular year.
【学位授予单位】：四川师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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