基于全寿命周期理论供电企业采购的演化博弈分析研究

发布时间：2018-07-05 15:03

本文选题：演化博弈均衡 + 全寿命周期成本管理　；参考：《重庆大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：采购是供电企业十分重要的环节，它关系到企业的成本管理和质量管理。传统意义上的电力设备采购就是简单的商品买卖，以实现用最少的资金买到最优质的设备为采购目标。近几年，随着电力市场的发展迅猛和科学技术的不断更新与进步，市场对电力的需求持续上升，供电企业之间的竞争也随之越来越激烈，人们逐渐把电力设备采购不仅简单的看成一种商品买卖行为，而把其视为一种为企业节约成本、实现利润的增加的职能。因此，科学的采购是供电企业持续健康发展的必然要求，也是供电企业利益最大化和LCC最优的源泉。目前看来，从供电企业的发展速度、结构、质量、效益统一等方面可以看出，供电企业设备采购管理中还存在一些不足，比如采购管理系统模糊，设备招标重程序轻实质，，采购监管不足等。鉴于此，本文尝试以演化博弈论为分析工具，在全寿命周期成本（Life Cycle Cost，缩写为LCC）趋于最优的基础上采用演化博弈方法分析设备采购中供电企业、设备供应商和监管部门的行为选择，分别进行了供电企业和设备供应商的委托代理关系演化博弈模型分析和考虑监管部门的供电企业采购演化博弈模型分析。供电企业采购中的委托代理关系研究及演化博弈分析结果表明：当供电企业和设备供应商通过采取积极策略而获得的回报大于付出的成本时，供电企业和设备供应商会有更动机采取积极的行为策略，逐渐减少设备采购中的道德风险；当盈利增值的参数越大时，供电企业和设备供应商进行积极行为策略的动机越强烈，从而可以有效地消除道德风险现象；考虑监管部门的供电企业采购演化博弈模型分析研究结果表明：供电企业的规范评标比例和监管部门稽查比例受惩罚系数的影响；当监管部门稽查成功比例较大，即使稽查成本较小，但如果只严惩设备供应商，而对供电企业的惩罚力度不够时，经过多次博弈，监管部门会选择稽查行为，供电企业会选择不规范评标行为；当监管部门稽查成功比例较小，尤其是在稽查成本较大，对供电企业和设备供应商的处罚力度较小时，经过多次博弈，监管部门会放弃稽查，供电企业会选择不规范评标行为。本文通过演化博弈分析供电企业设备采购的问题，并在加强监管制度和激励制度等方面提出一些建议，希望能为供电企业设备采购的良性发展提供参考依据。
[Abstract]:Procurement is a very important link in power supply enterprises, which is related to cost management and quality management. The traditional purchasing of electric power equipment is a simple purchase and sale of goods, and the goal is to buy the best equipment with the least money. In recent years, with the rapid development of the electricity market and the continuous updating and progress of science and technology, the demand for electricity in the market continues to rise, and the competition among power supply enterprises becomes more and more fierce. People gradually regard the purchase of electric power equipment not only as a kind of commodity trading behavior, but also as a function of saving cost and realizing the increase of profit for the enterprise. Therefore, scientific procurement is an inevitable requirement for the sustainable and healthy development of power supply enterprises, and is also the source of maximum benefit and LCC optimization for power supply enterprises. At present, it can be seen from the development speed, structure, quality and benefit of power supply enterprises that there are still some shortcomings in the equipment procurement management of power supply enterprises, such as the fuzzy procurement management system, the heavy procedures of equipment bidding and the light of essence. Inadequate procurement supervision, etc. In view of this, this paper attempts to use the evolutionary game theory as an analysis tool, and on the basis of the life cycle cost (LCC) tends to be optimal, uses the evolutionary game method to analyze the power supply enterprises in equipment procurement. The behavior choice of equipment supplier and supervision department is analyzed by the evolution game model of power supply enterprise and equipment supplier's principal-agent relationship and the purchasing evolution game model of power supply enterprise considering supervision department. The research of principal-agent relationship and evolutionary game analysis in power supply enterprise procurement shows that when the power supply enterprise and equipment supplier obtain more returns than the cost by adopting positive strategy. Power supply enterprises and equipment suppliers will have more incentive to adopt positive behavior strategies and gradually reduce the moral hazard in equipment procurement. When the parameters of profit increment are larger, the motivation of power supply enterprises and equipment suppliers to carry out positive behavior strategies is stronger. Therefore, the moral hazard phenomenon can be eliminated effectively, and the analysis results of the evolutionary game model of power supply enterprise procurement considering the supervision department show that the proportion of standard bid evaluation and the proportion of supervision department of power supply enterprise are affected by the penalty coefficient. When the supervision department has a large proportion of successful inspection, even though the audit cost is small, but if only the equipment supplier is severely punished, and the punishment of the power supply enterprise is not strong enough, after many games, the supervision department will choose the audit behavior. Power supply enterprises will choose non-standard bidding evaluation behavior; when the proportion of successful inspection by the supervisory authorities is relatively small, especially when the audit costs are high and the penalties imposed on the power supply enterprises and equipment suppliers are relatively small, after many games, the regulatory authorities will give up the inspections. Power supply enterprises will choose non-standard bidding evaluation behavior. This paper analyzes the problems of equipment procurement in power supply enterprises by evolutionary game theory, and puts forward some suggestions on strengthening supervision system and incentive system, hoping to provide a reference for the benign development of equipment procurement in power supply enterprises.
【学位授予单位】：重庆大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F274;F426.61

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