公司治理、经理人动机与费用粘性关系研究

发布时间：2018-08-05 10:58

【摘要】：费用（成本）管理是企业管理的重要内容，对费用（成本）习性（cost behavior）的研究有助于企业内部经理人进行成本费用决策、外部投资者及相关机构进行企业绩效预测。费用粘性（cost stickiness）作为费用习性的一种表现，其研究根源在于对经理人以传统成本习性模型为基础所作决策是否足够准确的考虑。本文研究的出发点正是基于经理人对费用粘性的影响，如何激励经理人更多地进行积极的成本管理，，制约其消极的成本决策。经理人的费用决策关乎企业的成败兴衰，然而，经理人的动机才是其费用决策背后的真正推动力，经理人的不同动机与费用习性之间有着必然的联系，而公司治理设计的初衷正是想实现股东对经理人的监督与制衡。因此，本文针对公司治理、经理人动机与费用粘性的关系进行研究，厘清了不同经理人动机对费用习性的影响路径，为企业通过费用比率进行经理人绩效考核提供了更为全面的理论指导，对如何加强公司治理以制约经理人自利动机从而减轻代理问题，如何加强费用控制以提高公司价值具有现实指导意义。在对本研究涉及的理论基础和国内外关于费用粘性特征、成因、影响因素及其经济后果的文献进行回顾和述评的基础上，本文从对费用粘性产生的成因和影响因素进行理论分析入手，首先研究了经理人最优决策动机、盈余管理动机、自利动机三种不同动机对费用粘性的影响，研究发现，经理人最优决策动机会导致较高水平的费用粘性；具有保盈动机的样本公司，费用的对称性表现得更明显；而具有新股发行动机的公司，费用表现出反粘性的特征；经理人自利动机对费用粘性水平有积极的影响，具体而言，并购重组事件是经理人自利动机付诸实施的前提条件，充足的自由现金流和较长的经理人任期是经理人自利动机实施的必备条件，而经理人薪酬结构中变动性比例的增加会刺激经理人自利动机的实施，这些因素均对费用粘性产生显著的正向影响。其次本文考察了公司治理对经理人自利动机的制约作用，研究表明，较高的公司治理强度有利于抑制经理人的自利动机，从而降低经理人自利动机下形成的费用粘性，提高公司价值；而公司治理水平低的公司，经理人自利动机比较明显，费用粘性也相对较高。进一步，经理人在最优决策动机下形成的费用粘性将对公司价值的增长传递积极的信号；而在自利动机下形成的费用粘性，表明费用管理的低效率，将对公司价值的增长传递消极的信号。最后是本文的研究结论，并为我国企业经理人能科学合理进行成本管理决策给出了政策建议。
[Abstract]:Cost (cost) management is an important part of enterprise management. The study of (cost behavior) habit of cost (cost) is helpful for internal managers to make cost-cost decisions and external investors and related institutions for enterprise performance prediction. As a manifestation of cost habit, the study of fee stickiness (cost stickiness) is rooted in the consideration of whether the decision made by managers based on traditional cost habit model is sufficiently accurate. The starting point of this paper is based on the influence of managers on the cost stickiness, how to motivate managers to carry out more active cost management and restrict their negative cost decisions. The manager's expense decision is related to the success or failure of the enterprise. However, the manager's motivation is the real driving force behind the cost decision, and there is an inevitable relationship between the manager's different motivation and the expense habit. The original intention of corporate governance design is to realize shareholders' supervision and balance to managers. Therefore, this paper studies the relationship between corporate governance, manager motivation and expense stickiness, and clarifies the influence path of different managers' motivation on expense behavior. It provides a more comprehensive theoretical guidance for the performance appraisal of managers through the expense ratio, and it also provides a more comprehensive theoretical guidance on how to strengthen corporate governance to restrict managers' self-interest motivation and thus alleviate the agency problem. How to strengthen the cost control to improve the value of the company has practical significance. On the basis of reviewing and reviewing the theoretical basis of this study and the domestic and foreign literatures on the characteristics of fee viscosity, causes, influencing factors and its economic consequences, Based on the theoretical analysis of the causes and influencing factors of the cost stickiness, this paper first studies the influence of three different motivations on the cost stickiness: the managers' optimal decision motive, the earnings management motivation and the self-interest motive. The optimal decision motivation of managers will lead to a higher level of cost stickiness; the cost symmetry of the sample company with earnings protection motivation is more obvious, while that of the company with new stock issuing motivation shows the characteristics of anti-stickiness. Managers' self-interest motivation has a positive effect on the level of expense stickiness. Specifically, M & A is the prerequisite for the implementation of managers' self-interest motivation. Sufficient free cash flow and long tenure of manager are the necessary conditions for managers' self-interest motivation, and the increase of variable proportion in manager's salary structure will stimulate the implementation of manager's self-interest motivation. These factors have a significant positive effect on the cost viscosity. Secondly, this paper examines the restriction effect of corporate governance on managers' self-interest motivation. The research shows that higher corporate governance intensity is beneficial to restrain managers' self-interest motivation, thus reducing the expense stickiness formed by managers' self-interest motivation. Improve the value of the company, and the low level of corporate governance companies, managers more obvious self-interest motivation, relatively high cost stickiness. Furthermore, the cost stickiness formed by the manager under the optimal decision motive will send a positive signal to the growth of the company's value, while the expense stickiness formed under the self-interest motive shows the low efficiency of the expense management. Will send a negative signal to the growth of the company's value. Finally, the conclusion of this paper is given, and some policy suggestions are given for Chinese enterprise managers to make scientific and reasonable cost management decisions.
【学位授予单位】：天津大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F271;F275

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