基于Moran过程的消费者众筹策略演化动态

发布时间：2018-08-22 07:23

【摘要】：考虑混合均匀的N个消费者众筹策略演化动态,每个消费者可选择参与众筹或者不参与众筹两个策略。基于Moran过程的扎根概率,计算出有限消费者群体中,参与众筹策略和不参与众筹策略成功入侵的概率。比较个体扎根的概率和中性入侵的概率大小,分别得到两策略在强选择性和弱选择性强度下占优的条件。研究发现,强选择性条件下,消费者数量小于某个数值时,不参与众筹策略演化稳定侵占整个种群,众筹融资失败。弱选择性条件下,消费者依据净收益和支出成本两因素决定是否参与众筹,净收益大于支出成本三倍,演化稳定于众筹成功,净收益小于支出成本二分之三倍,演化稳定于众筹失败。
[Abstract]:Considering the evolution of N consumers' crowdfunding strategy, each consumer can choose to participate in the crowdfunding strategy or not to participate in the crowdfunding strategy. Based on the rooted probability of Moran process, the probability of successful invasion by participating in crowdfunding strategy and not participating in crowdfunding strategy is calculated. Comparing the probability of individual rooting with the probability of neutral invasion, the conditions of dominance of the two strategies under strong selectivity and weak selectivity are obtained, respectively. It is found that when the number of consumers is less than a certain number under the condition of strong selectivity, they do not participate in the evolution of crowdfunding strategy and occupy the whole population stably, and the crowdfunding fails. Under the condition of weak selectivity, consumers decide whether to participate in crowdfunding according to the two factors of net income and expenditure cost. The net income is three times greater than the expenditure cost, and the evolution is stable to the success of crowdfunding, and the net income is 3/2 times less than the expenditure cost. Evolution has stabilized at the failure of crowdfunding.
【作者单位】：武汉大学经济与管理学院;武汉理工大学管理学院;武汉大学水利水电学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(71231007);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71501149)
【分类号】：F724.6;F832

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