征交地双方博弈视角下的土地征收补偿制度创新研究

发布时间：2018-11-10 12:05

【摘要】：我国现行的土地征收补偿制度造成的土地资源被大量浪费、农民权益严重受损以及社会矛盾激发等一系列严重的社会问题,已经影响到了我国经济社会的长期、健康、持续、稳定发展。土地征收补偿问题成为了当前我国社会科学领域研究的热点问题之一。本文以我国土地征收补偿过程中的征地方和交地方的策略和行为为研究对象,首先简要叙述了我国土地征收补偿制度在利益主体博弈下的变迁,然后应用博弈理论对双方在土地征收补偿过程中的行为进行了理论分析和实证研究,并在博弈分析的基础上结合公共管理理论提出创新土地征收补偿制度的建议。文章分为七个部分。第一部分为绪论,说明了研究的动机,以及创新和不足之处。第二部分介绍征地补偿、博弈及制度变迁的相关理论。第三部分并对征地补偿和征地博弈研究文献进行了综述。第四部分对我国的征地补偿制度变迁和制度创新进行了阐述,并比较分析了发达国家和地区的征地补偿制度。通过以上分析,指出利益主体的博弈在推动我国征地补偿制度变迁的重要作用。第五部分应用一个简化的博弈模型对土地征收补偿过程中征地方和交地方博弈行为进行了理论分析。第六部分应用SH高速公路JC段土地征收补偿实例分析了征地方与交地方在土地征收补偿博弈过程中的行为与动机。第七部分为结论与建议部分。首先得出现有土地征收补偿制度导致了征地交易成本过高、政府公权力介入征地过程扭曲了博弈结果,造成社会福利损失的结论。最后,在新公共管理理念的指导下提出创新我国征地补偿制度的具体建议：在现有制度环境条件下规范政府在征地博弈的行为；制度环境经过改善后政府应退出征地博弈。
[Abstract]:A series of serious social problems, such as the waste of land resources caused by the current system of land expropriation and compensation, the serious damage of farmers' rights and interests and the stimulation of social contradictions, have affected the long-term, healthy and sustainable economic and social development of our country. Steady development. Land expropriation compensation has become one of the hot issues in the field of social science in China. This paper takes the strategy and behavior of land expropriation and compensation in the process of land expropriation and compensation in China as the research object. Firstly, it briefly describes the changes of the compensation system of land expropriation in China under the game of the main body of interest. Then the paper makes theoretical analysis and empirical research on the behavior of both sides in the process of land expropriation compensation by applying the game theory, and puts forward some suggestions for innovating the land expropriation compensation system based on the game analysis and the public management theory. The article is divided into seven parts. The first part is the introduction, explaining the motivation, innovation and deficiency of the research. The second part introduces the compensation for land expropriation, game and institutional changes related to the theory. The third part also summarizes the literature of compensation for land expropriation and game of land expropriation. The fourth part expounds the change and innovation of land requisition compensation system in China, and compares and analyzes the compensation system of land expropriation in developed countries and regions. Through the above analysis, this paper points out that the game of the main body of interest plays an important role in promoting the change of land requisition compensation system in China. In the fifth part, a simplified game model is used to analyze the game behavior between local and local in the process of land expropriation and compensation. The sixth part analyzes the behavior and motivation of land expropriation compensation in the process of land expropriation compensation game between local and local land expropriation by using the land expropriation and compensation examples of JC section of SH Expressway. The seventh part is the conclusion and recommendation part. First of all, the compensation system of land expropriation should lead to the high transaction cost of land expropriation, and the government's power to intervene in the process of land expropriation distorts the result of game and results in the loss of social welfare. Finally, under the guidance of the new public management concept, the author puts forward some specific suggestions for innovating the land expropriation compensation system in China: standardizing the government's game of land expropriation under the existing institutional environment, and the government should withdraw from the land expropriation game after the improvement of the institutional environment.
【学位授予单位】：福建农林大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F542;F301.2

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