地区间环境规制的策略互动研究——对环境规制非完全执行普遍性的解释

发布时间：2017-12-31 21:02

本文关键词：地区间环境规制的策略互动研究——对环境规制非完全执行普遍性的解释　出处：《中国工业经济》2016年07期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：当前中国的环境规制“非完全执行”现象是环境保护事务面临的核心问题,本文尝试从策略互动角度对其普遍性给出新的解释。中国式分权下环境规制被地方政府视为争夺流动性资源的博弈工具,导致地区间环境规制的策略互动行为,从而孕育了环境规制非完全执行的普遍现象。以此为突破口,本文借助于广义空间自回归模型实证检验了地方政府在环境规制方面的策略互动行为,并进一步探讨了影响地区间环境规制策略互动的因素。研究发现,地区间环境规制存在显著的互补型策略互动,意味着如果竞争地区降低环境规制强度,那么本地区也会相应降低环境规制强度,体现了环境规制非完全执行的传染性,从而较好地解释了环境规制非完全执行的普遍性。同时,2006年后地区间环境规制的互补型策略互动行为有所减弱,凸显了不断强化的环境绩效考核的作用。此外,财政分权与腐败强化了地区间环境规制的策略互动,而公众环保诉求则有效弱化了地区间环境规制的策略互动。
[Abstract]:At present, the phenomenon of "incomplete enforcement" of environmental regulation in China is the core problem of environmental protection affairs. This paper attempts to give a new explanation of its universality from the perspective of strategic interaction. Chinese decentralized environmental regulation is regarded by local governments as a game tool for competing for liquidity resources, which leads to the strategic interaction behavior of inter-regional environmental regulation. Therefore, it gives birth to the universal phenomenon of incomplete enforcement of environmental regulation. As a breakthrough, this paper empirically tests the strategic interaction behavior of local governments in environmental regulation with the help of generalized spatial autoregressive model. The paper also discusses the factors that influence the interaction of environmental regulation strategies among regions. The study finds that there is a significant complementary strategic interaction between regions, which means that the intensity of environmental regulation should be reduced in competitive areas. Then the region will also reduce the intensity of environmental regulation, reflecting the infectivity of incomplete enforcement of environmental regulation, thus better explain the universality of environmental regulation incomplete enforcement. At the same time. Since 2006, the complementary strategic interaction behavior of environmental regulation between regions has weakened, which highlights the role of environmental performance evaluation. Fiscal decentralization and corruption strengthen the strategic interaction of regional environmental regulation, while the public environmental protection appeal effectively weakens the strategic interaction of inter-regional environmental regulation.
【作者单位】：南京审计大学工商管理学院;
【分类号】：F205
【正文快照】： 一、问题提出当前中国经济迈入以“三期叠加”为特征的经济发展新常态,更加强调由高生态环境为代价的粗放发展模式转向绿色发展模式。从“既要金山银山,也要绿水青山”到“宁要绿水青山,不要金山银山”和“绿水青山就是金山银山”,凸显中央政府保护环境的决心以及环境保护的

【参考文献】