风险投资对企业实施契约控制的条款分析——基于访谈结果和对创业板的实证研究

发布时间：2017-12-31 23:15

本文关键词：风险投资对企业实施契约控制的条款分析——基于访谈结果和对创业板的实证研究　出处：《技术经济与管理研究》2016年06期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：风险投资入资时,会在投资协议中通过契约约定控制权的分配。这些契约条款包括管理参与、股权回购、对赌协议、反稀释和竞业禁止,但内容却不限于此。文章通过访谈六家风险投资企业发现这五种契约条款被使用的频率非常高,尤其是对赌协议,被使用的频率远高于创业板公开数据。文章继而采用创业板的数据获取风险投资参与董事会、风险投资与创业者对赌、分步投资以及联合投资的有关信息并通过实证分析研究其对企业经营绩效的影响。实证分析结果发现采取分步入资或者使用对赌协议对公司的净资产回报率、销售回报率以及净现金流占总资产之比三项指标有正向作用。
[Abstract]:In venture capital investment, the allocation of control is agreed in the investment agreement. These terms include management participation, share buyback, gambling agreement, anti-dilution and non-competition. However, the content is not limited to this. Through interviews with six venture capital companies, the paper finds that the use of these five contract terms is very high, especially for gambling agreements. The frequency of being used is much higher than that of the gem public data. The paper then uses the gem data to obtain venture capital to participate in the board of directors, venture capital and entrepreneurs bet. Step by step investment and joint investment information and through empirical analysis to study its impact on business performance. Empirical analysis results show that the use of investment or gambling agreements on the net assets of the company return. Return on sales and the ratio of net cash flow to total assets have positive effects.
【作者单位】：对外经济贸易大学国际商学院;
【分类号】：F275
【正文快照】： 一、概论风险投资与企业创始人之间由于存在委托代理关系,所以他们之间的利益不完全一致。这种矛盾影响了风险投资入股前的信息收集和契约设计以及入股后的监管。投资者仅仅关心现金收益,而企业家不仅关心现金收益,而且关心不易被观察和监督的私人收益,由此便导致了彼此的利益

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