定向增发、大股东利益补偿与公司绩效

发布时间：2018-01-27 13:56

本文关键词： 定向增发大股东利益补偿发行折价率公司绩效掏空行为支持行为　出处：《北京工商大学学报(社会科学版)》2017年04期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：定向增发中涉及的大股东利益补偿问题越来越引起政府监管者的重视,增发定价的高折价率、公允性都会直接关乎大股东的利益补偿。以2012—2015年成功定向增发的上市公司作为研究样本,以发行折价率为研究重点,探究了大股东利益补偿问题对增发上市公司财务指标的影响情况,分析了大股东参与认购定向增发股份与公司绩效的反应。研究发现,发行折价率与公司绩效并非简单的线性关系,发行折价率低于某一临界值时,二者存在负相关关系,而高于该临界值时,二者存在正相关关系。大股东参与认购定向增发股份并非简单的掏空行为与支持行为,大股东支持行为与掏空行为的选取应以大股东利益是否获得合理补偿为依据。
[Abstract]:The problem of compensation for the interests of the major shareholders involved in the directional placement has been paid more and more attention by the government regulators, and the high discount rate of the additional issue pricing. Fairness will be directly related to the interests of large shareholders compensation. 2012-2015 successful private placement of listed companies as a research sample, with the issue discount rate as the focus of the study. This paper probes into the influence of interest compensation of large shareholders on the financial indexes of listed companies, and analyzes the reaction between the participation of large shareholders in the subscription of additional shares and the performance of the company. Discount rate is not a simple linear relationship with corporate performance. When the discount rate is lower than a critical value, there is a negative correlation between them, but above the critical value. There is a positive correlation between the two. It is not a simple behavior of tunneling and supporting for the majority shareholders to participate in the subscription of the additional shares. The choice of support behavior and tunneling behavior of large shareholders should be based on whether the interests of large shareholders get reasonable compensation.
【作者单位】：新疆财经大学会计学院;北京大学光华管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71562030) 国家社会科学基金重大项目“国家治理视角下国有资本经营预算制度研究”(14ZDA027) 新疆维吾尔自治区社社会科学基金项目(2015BJY023)
【分类号】：F275;F832.51
【正文快照】： 一、问题的提出2006年以后相继出台的《上市公司证券发行管理办法》《上市公司收购管理办法》及《上市公司非公开发行股票实施细则》等合规性法律,使得定向增发有了法律层面的保护,极大地推动了定向增发的热潮。同时,定向增发中涉及的大股东利益补偿问题越来越引起政府监管者

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