制度双元性下的高管权力与企业海外创新绩效

发布时间：2018-02-23 12:33

  本文关键词： 制度双元性 母国政治关联 东道国制度环境 高管权力 海外创新绩效　出处：《科学学与科学技术管理》2017年02期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：以沪深A股市场中我国制造业海外投资企业为样本,基于不同所有制企业的实证比较,对制度双元性下的高管权力与企业海外创新绩效之间关系进行了研究,结果表明:(1)民营企业中高管两职兼任对海外创新绩效产生了更为显著的负面影响,高管年薪的人力资本定价功能与股权比例增加的管理防御效应分别对企业海外创新绩效起到更为显著的积极和消极影响。(2)民营企业中母国政治关联在董事会监管、两职兼任与海外创新绩效之间起着更加显著的调节作用;无论何种所有制企业,东道国制度完善性在董事会监管、高管年薪与海外创新绩效之间都起着显著的调节作用。(3)国有企业中高管连任对企业海外创新绩效不利的特色影响,被母国政治关联、东道国制度环境完善性反向调节得更显著。
[Abstract]:Based on the empirical comparison of Chinese manufacturing overseas investment enterprises in Shanghai and Shenzhen A share market, this paper studies the relationship between executive power and overseas innovation performance under dual system. The results show that: (1) both senior and senior management positions in private enterprises have a more significant negative impact on overseas innovation performance. The managerial defense effect of the human capital pricing function and the increase of the share ratio of the annual executive salary has more significant positive and negative effects on the overseas innovation performance of the enterprises respectively. (2) the home state political connection in the private enterprises is supervised by the board of directors. There is a more significant regulatory role between the two positions and the performance of innovation abroad. No matter what kind of ownership enterprises, the host country system is supervised by the board of directors. Annual executive salary and overseas innovation performance play a significant role in the regulation of state-owned enterprises in the high management of the adverse characteristics of overseas innovation performance, by the home country political link, the host country system environment improved reverse regulation is more significant.
【作者单位】： 南京信息工程大学经济管理学院;南京大学商学院;
【基金】：中国博士后科学基金项目(2014M561608) 2016年江苏省决策咨询研究基地项目(16SSL082)
【分类号】：F273.1;F272.91
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本文编号：1526642