我国公益性国有企业激励机制研究

发布时间：2018-03-02 14:28

本文选题：公益性国有企业　切入点：补贴　出处：《浙江财经大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：目前,国有企业改革受到社会各界越来越多的关注,国有企业用人机制、管理机制等在市场经济环境下暴露出的问题越来越明显,已经成为国有企业发展过程中亟需解决的重大课题,而公益性国有企业是国有企业改革中的重点和难点。公益性国有企业是指在一定时期和特定领域内,通常具有特许经营权,以社会效益为主要经营目标,向社会提供准公共产品,需要政府补贴的国有企业。但目前我国公益性国有企业经营效率低下、相关激励机制缺失,公益性国有企业发展遇到瓶颈。因此,分析公益性国有企业现状和低效率原因,构建有针对性的公益性国有企业激励机制是本文重点讨论的内容。本文主要内容分为以下几个部分:1.对公益性国有企业的理论基础和文献综述进行阐述。首先从历史角度分析国有企业的分类,并对国有企业的分类标准做了相关综述;其次是公共品理论文献综述,公益性国有企业主要是提供准公共产品和服务;最后是激励理论文献综述,阐述激励理论,研究不同学者提出的激励机制。2.分析我国公益性国有企业的特点与低效率问题。整理有关资料对公益性国有企业性质进行讨论,认为我国公益性国有企业具有两个明显的特性即社会效益第一和需要政府补贴。并通过对公益性国有企业性质和行为特征分析,解释公益性国有企业低效率的原因。3.设计我国公益性国有企业与政府之间的博弈模型。通过对公益性国有企业经理人行为和政府部门行为的分析,建立经理人和政府行为博弈模型,说明经理人在政府有效监管不足的情况下,选择偷懒行为,追求更多政府补贴以维持企业的正常发展。同时,本文构建了公益性国有企业经理人动态声誉博弈模型,分析不同行为的决定因素,从而为政府部门监管提供一定思路。4.构建我国公益性国有企业激励机制。我国公益性国有企业激励机制目标是保证社会效益第一的情况下实现经济效益。然后通过三个互相联系的机制即信息披露机制、激励性竞争机制、绩效评价机制组成我国公益性国有企业激励机制,并通过案例分析激励机制在公益性国有企业中的。本文可能的创新点有三个:(1)探讨了公益性国有企业的性质,分析公益性国有企业低效率的深层次原因;(2)设计了公益性国有企业和政府部门之间的博弈模型,论证了政府和企业之间的博弈行为,并提出构建我国公益性国有企业激励机制的需求;(3)构建了我国公益性国有企业激励机制,促使公益性国有企业努力提高经营效率。
[Abstract]:At present, the reform of state-owned enterprises has attracted more and more attention from all walks of life in the society. The problems exposed by the employment mechanism and management mechanism of state-owned enterprises in the market economy environment are becoming more and more obvious. The public welfare state-owned enterprise is the key and difficult point in the reform of the state-owned enterprise. The public welfare state-owned enterprise refers to the franchise right in a certain period of time and in a specific field, while the public welfare state-owned enterprise is the key and difficult point in the reform of the state-owned enterprise, and the public welfare state-owned enterprise is the key point in the reform of the state-owned enterprise. Taking social benefits as the main operating target, providing quasi-public goods to the society, the state-owned enterprises need government subsidy. But at present, the public welfare state-owned enterprises in our country have low operating efficiency and lack of relevant incentive mechanism. The development of public welfare state-owned enterprises has met with bottlenecks. Therefore, this paper analyzes the present situation and the reasons for inefficiency of public welfare state-owned enterprises. The main content of this paper is divided into the following parts: 1. The theoretical basis and literature review of public welfare state-owned enterprises are expounded. Historical analysis of the classification of state-owned enterprises, And the classification standards of state-owned enterprises are summarized; secondly, public goods theory literature review, public welfare state-owned enterprises are mainly to provide quasi-public goods and services; finally, incentive theory literature review, elaborated incentive theory, 2. To analyze the characteristics and inefficiency of public welfare state-owned enterprises in China. To discuss the nature of public welfare state-owned enterprises by sorting out the relevant data. The author thinks that there are two obvious characteristics of public welfare state-owned enterprises in our country, that is, social benefits first and government subsidies are needed, and through the analysis of the nature and behavior characteristics of public welfare state-owned enterprises, To explain the reasons for the inefficiency of the public welfare state-owned enterprises. 3. To design the game model between the public welfare state-owned enterprises and the government. Through the analysis of the behavior of the managers and the government departments of the public welfare state-owned enterprises, A game model of manager and government behavior is established to show that managers choose lazy behavior and pursue more government subsidies in order to maintain the normal development of enterprises under the condition of insufficient effective supervision by the government. In this paper, the dynamic reputation game model of public welfare state-owned enterprise managers is constructed, and the determinants of different behaviors are analyzed. The aim of incentive mechanism of public welfare state-owned enterprises in China is to guarantee the economic benefits under the first social benefit situation, and then to construct the incentive mechanism of the public welfare state-owned enterprises in our country, which is to guarantee the economic benefits under the condition of social benefits first, and then to establish the incentive mechanism of the public welfare state-owned enterprises. After three interconnected mechanisms, that is, the information disclosure mechanism, Incentive competition mechanism and performance evaluation mechanism constitute the incentive mechanism of public welfare state-owned enterprises. And through the case study of the incentive mechanism in the public welfare state-owned enterprises. There are three possible innovations in this paper.) the nature of the public welfare state-owned enterprises is discussed. The game model between public welfare state-owned enterprise and government department is designed, and the game behavior between government and government is proved. It also puts forward the demand of constructing the incentive mechanism of the public welfare state-owned enterprises (3)) it constructs the incentive mechanism of the public welfare state-owned enterprises in our country, and urges the public welfare state-owned enterprises to make great efforts to improve the management efficiency.
【学位授予单位】：浙江财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F276.1

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