集体土地上征收拆迁冲突的演化博弈与仿真模拟研究

发布时间：2018-03-03 02:32

本文选题：集体土地　切入点：征收拆迁冲突　出处：《浙江财经大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：当前在新型城镇化建设深入推进的过程中,农业人口短时间内大规模转移与城镇大范围开发建设促使全国各地对土地的需求量大增。随着国有土地供给逐渐饱和,通过对集体土地的征收为新城扩建供给土地满足城镇发展需要,则成为纵深推进城镇化的一条重要现实路径。然而在此路径中,对集体土地的征收拆迁也伴随着大量的征收拆迁冲突问题,严重影响社会的和谐与稳定。为此政府不断完善相关政策,学术界也展开了大量研究。现有研究主要基于结构主义路径,并多限于静态的规范性研究以及个案分析与经验的主观性总结层面上,缺少对征收拆迁冲突自下而上的演化规律建模和定量的系统性研究,从而造成相关政策建议缺乏微观执行效果且治理绩效不佳的情况。本文首先从文献梳理和实地调研入手对集体土地征收拆迁冲突利益相关者及其博弈策略进行界定,在此基础上构建了集体土地上征收拆迁冲突二维对称与非对称演化博弈理论模型和仿真实验流程。然后根据实际情况依据已建立的理论模型和仿真流程,进行了被征地农民之间、被征地农民与村委会之间、被征地农民与地方政府之间征收拆迁冲突的演化博弈与仿真模拟研究。深入分析了各类集体土地征收拆迁冲突的博弈均衡状态与演化趋势。最后根据研究结果提出了具有针对性的政策建议。通过本文的研究,得出以下主要结论:(1)集体土地上征收拆迁村民之间的演化博弈存在混合策略,是发生“钉子户”和村民对峙现象的主要原因。(2)征地拆迁村内工作的不公平性与利己主义的蔓延破坏村内和谐征拆。即村委会成员或被征地农民通过违规手段或自身势力,不顾集体利益地提高自身在和谐状态时的征地收益比重,是造成集体土地征收拆迁村内不和谐状态的主要原因。(3)降低村委会违规操作和被征地农民不顺从的收益比重,提高相应风险和执行成本,可有效避免集体土地征收拆迁的村内冲突。(4)不论地方政府还是被征地农民,相对弱势一方发生征收拆迁官民冲突主要受高成本支出的影响,相对强势一方发生征收拆迁官民冲突的主导因素为净收益的高低。即通过对征地双方有针对性地进行成本和净收益调控,使其处于合理范围将有效解决征地拆迁的官民冲突。(5)增大被征地农民合作净收益,减小地方政府违法征地净收益增量,是集体土地上征收拆迁官民和谐的有力保证。(6)地方政府合法征地时被征地农民合作策略初始比例越高越容易趋向于征收拆迁和谐,地方政府违法征地时被征地农民策略抵制初始比例越高则越容易发生征收拆迁冲突。鉴于以上研究结论,从维护村内和谐、解决官民冲突、增强失地后保障、推进征地冲突预警四个方面提出政策建议:(1)以“公平、公正、公开”为准则,坚持村民自治与加强基层民主建设为抓手,维护集体土地征收拆迁的村内和谐。(2)以完善法规政策和制度建设为根本,改善征地补偿机制和利益表达渠道为途径,解决集体土地征收拆迁的官民冲突。(3)以“以人为本”为核心,强化集体土地征收拆迁的“软服务”为枢纽,增强失地农民社会保障力度。(4)以科学预测与应急为基础,推进“科学征地”思想,构建集体土地征收拆迁冲突的预警治理机制。
[Abstract]:In the process of the construction of the new urbanization advancing in a short period of time, the agricultural population and urban development of a wide range of mass transfer across the country to build the demand for land increased. Along with the state-owned land supply gradually saturated, through the collective land expropriation for the expansion of Metro land supply meet the urban development needs, has become a push an important practical path of urbanization. However, in this path, the collective land expropriation is accompanied by the problem of demolition conflict, seriously affect social harmony and stability. So the government constantly improve the relevant policies, the academic circles also launched a lot of research. The existing research is mainly based on structuralism and multi path. Limited to static normative research and case analysis and experience summary of subjective level, the lack of the evolution of the expropriation conflicts bottom-up modeling Study on systematic and quantitative, resulting in the lack of relevant policy recommendations and implementation effect of micro governance of poor performance. This paper from the literature review and investigation of the definition of the conflicts of stakeholders and their game strategy of collective land expropriation, on the basis of the construction of collective land expropriation conflicts of two-dimensional symmetric and non symmetric evolutionary game theory model and simulation process. Theoretical model and simulation process according to the actual situation on the basis of the established, the landless farmers, landless farmers and the village committee is between the simulation of evolution game and Simulation of demolition conflict between farmers and local government. The in-depth analysis of the equilibrium state and the evolution trend of all kinds of collective land acquisition demolition conflict. Finally, according to the research results put forward targeted policy recommendations. Through this research, the main conclusions are as follows: (1) mixed strategy on collective land expropriation between villagers' evolutionary game, is a major cause of the "nail house" and the villagers confrontation phenomenon. (2) the village land demolition work unfairness and egoism spread destruction. The village harmonious village levy demolition the members of the landless farmers or through illegal means or their own forces, regardless of the collective interests to improve their own in a harmonious state of the land income proportion is mainly caused by the disharmony in the village collective land expropriation and demolition. (3) reduce the village irregularities and landless farmers do not obey the proportion of the income increase, and the corresponding risk the execution cost, which can effectively avoid the conflict of the village collective land acquisition demolition. (4) whether the local government or the landless farmers, the relatively weak party clashes occurred mainly by the demolition The effect of high cost, relatively strong one party dominant factors of expropriation clashes as net income. The land both targeted for cost and net income regulation, which is in a reasonable range will effectively solve the conflicts between the government and the demolition of the land. (5) increase the land expropriated Peasants Cooperation net income, reduce local government illegal land expropriation net increment of income, is a strong guarantee of collective land expropriation public harmony. (6) local government land expropriated farmers cooperative strategy the higher initial ratio tend to levy demolition harmony, local government illegal land expropriation when landless farmers resist the higher proportion of the initial strategy the greater the expropriation prone to conflict. In view of the above conclusions, from the maintenance of a harmonious village, to solve the conflicts between the government, after losing enhanced security, promoting the four aspects of land conflict warning put forward policy Suggestions: (1) to "fair, fair, public" as the criterion, adhere to and strengthen the autonomy of villagers democratic construction at the grassroots level as the starting point, the maintenance of collective land acquisition demolition of the village harmonious. (2) to improve the policy and system construction as the fundamental improvement of land requisition compensation mechanism and benefit of channel as the way, clashes to solve the collective land expropriation. (3) to the "people-oriented" as the core, strengthen the collective land expropriation "soft service" as the hub, enhance social security system of landless peasants. (4) based on scientific prediction and emergency basis, promote the scientific construction of collective land expropriation "ideology, governance mechanism of land expropriation demolition conflict warning.

【学位授予单位】：浙江财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F321.1;D422.6;F224.32

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