基于产权明晰度的股权激励对企业投资效率影响的研究

发布时间：2018-03-05 10:05

  本文选题：产权明晰度　切入点：股权激励　出处：《西北大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：投资贡献不仅基于量的增长,更注重效率的提升,而从2009年开始我国上市公司投资的效率在逐年下滑。上市公司降低代理成本的一种长效机制是人力资本的股权激励,其发挥的效果会直接影响高管层的决策。国内外大多数文献主要集中研究股权激励与企业业绩之间的关系,却忽视了股权激励对高管层的决策行为的影响。在管理层的决策活动中,投资决策是影响企业经营业绩的重要因素之一。另外,对于股东来说,产权是对企业的产权,实质是资本的权益,资本的保值、增值到底是由谁来受益,而损失谁来承担,基于产权明晰度的国有和民营的划分,则产权明晰度不同会表现在公司代理问题的不同,进而对高管层的投资决策影响也不同,同时,由于产权明晰度不同,股权激励实施的监管机构、激励的收益限制、绩效的考核指标等也不同,从而影响股权激励对高管层的投资行为。本文以2009-2015年沪深两市公告的实施股权激励计划的492家上市公司为研究对象,以产权明晰度-公司类型-代理成本-管理层激励-投资决策-企业绩效这条逻辑主线,从微观的股权激励契约的构成要素层面,研究基于产权明晰度的股权激励对企业投资效率的综合影响。研究发现,民营企业相对于国有企业的非效率投资更为显著;对于未实施股权激励来说,实施股权激励能够抑制企业的非效率投资,且在国有和民营企业中效果不同;股权激励强度的增加,股权激励与过度投资存在非线性关系,而与投资不足是线性关系;在股权激励方式的选择上,国有企业实施限制性股票对过度投资的抑制作用更为明显,而民营企业更倾向于选择股票期权。
[Abstract]:Investment contribution is not only based on the increase of quantity, but also on the improvement of efficiency. Since 2009, the investment efficiency of listed companies in China has been declining year by year. A long-term mechanism to reduce agency costs of listed companies is the equity incentive of human capital. Most of the literature at home and abroad mainly focus on the relationship between equity incentives and corporate performance. However, it ignores the influence of equity incentive on executive decision-making. In the decision-making activities of management, investment decision is one of the important factors that affect the business performance. In addition, to shareholders, property right is the property right of the enterprise. The essence is the rights and interests of capital, who benefits the preservation and appreciation of capital, and who will bear the loss, and the division of state-owned and private ownership based on the clarity of property rights, then the difference of property right clarity will be manifested in the different agency problem of the company. At the same time, because of the difference of property right clarity, the regulatory agency of equity incentive implementation, the income limitation of incentive, the evaluation index of performance are also different. In order to influence the investment behavior of stock incentive to senior executives, this paper takes 492 listed companies which were announced in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2009-2015 as the research object. Based on the logical thread of property right clarity, firm type, agency cost, management incentive, investment decision and enterprise performance, this paper analyzes the elements of the micro equity incentive contract. This paper studies the comprehensive influence of equity incentive based on the clarity of property right on the investment efficiency of enterprises. It is found that the non-efficient investment of private enterprises is more significant than that of state-owned enterprises. The implementation of equity incentive can restrain the inefficient investment of enterprises, and the effect is different between state-owned and private enterprises, with the increase of the intensity of equity incentive, there is a nonlinear relationship between equity incentive and overinvestment, but a linear relationship between equity incentive and insufficient investment. In the choice of equity incentive mode, the restraining effect of restricted stock on overinvestment is more obvious in state-owned enterprises, while private enterprises tend to choose stock option.
【学位授予单位】：西北大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F832.51
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本文编号：1569781