有“关系”的财务顾问能提高并购效率吗

发布时间：2018-03-11 03:30

  本文选题：关系　切入点：财务顾问　出处：《财贸经济》2017年11期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：本文以我国A股上市公司2009-2014年聘请了财务顾问的并购事件为样本,基于关系的视角,探讨具有不同关系的财务顾问对并购经济后果的影响及其作用机制。研究发现:有"关系"的财务顾问参与公司并购能显著提高并购绩效,短期平均为公司增加了1.3亿元的股东价值,长期平均为公司增加了1.8%的净资产收益率,并且"关系"越紧密,并购绩效越好;但是,有"关系"的财务顾问并没有显著提升并购成功概率。进一步的研究表明,有"关系"的财务顾问显著降低了并购溢价水平、缩短了并购持续时间。并且,上述结论主要在信息不对称程度较高的公司中成立。上述结论表明,"关系"作为公司和投行拥有的一种专用性资产,有助于降低公司与投行间的信息不对称程度,提高并购效率,支持了"交易优越假说"。本文的研究不仅拓展了"关系"与金融领域的交叉研究,丰富了关于公司并购中金融中介作用的相关文献,还为监管部门如何促进我国资本市场的并购市场化发展和提高上市公司并购效率提供了重要的政策启示。
[Abstract]:This paper takes the M & A events of Chinese A-share listed companies in 2009-2014 as a sample, based on a relational perspective. This paper probes into the influence of financial advisers with different relationships on the economic consequences of mergers and acquisitions and its mechanism. It is found that the participation of financial advisers with "relationships" in mergers and acquisitions can significantly improve the performance of mergers and acquisitions. The short-term average added 130 million yuan to the company's shareholder value, and the long-term average increased the company's return on net assets by 1.8%, and the closer the relationship, the better the M & A performance; however, Financial advisers with "relationships" did not significantly improve the chances of success. Further studies showed that financial advisers with "relationships" significantly reduced the M & A premium level and shortened the duration of M & A. These conclusions are mainly found in companies with high degree of information asymmetry. They show that "relationships", as a special asset owned by companies and investment banks, can help to reduce the degree of information asymmetry between firms and investment banks. Improving the efficiency of M & A supports the hypothesis of transaction superiority. The research in this paper not only expands the cross-study of "relationship" and financial field, but also enriches the relevant literature on the role of financial intermediation in corporate M & A. It also provides important policy enlightenment for supervision department how to promote the market development of M & A in China's capital market and improve the efficiency of M & A of listed companies.
【作者单位】： 西南大学经济管理学院;郑州航空工业管理学院;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目“业绩补偿承诺、盈余管理行为及其经济后果研究”(17YJC630063) 国家自然科学基金面上项目“预算管理程序公平:决定因素与影响后果”(71672208) 西南大学中央高校基本科研重大创新团队项目“农业现代化中农地资本化的路径优化与制度创新研究”(SWU1509384)
【分类号】：F271;F275
，

本文编号：1596398