经理权力与高管薪酬激励——认知、机理与研究展望

发布时间：2018-03-20 07:15

本文选题：经理权力　切入点：公司治理　出处：《技术经济与管理研究》2017年07期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：文章系统回顾经理权力理论,分析经理权力的认知与度量,指出经理权力综合评价法的研究价值;并基于经理权力视角,解释高管薪酬失控及薪酬-绩效敏感性低的原因与机理,认为最优薪酬契约本身就是代理问题的一部分,拥有权力的经理会通过俘获董事会来影响薪酬制定,薪酬契约不能解决高管激励问题;为逃避监管,经理还可以通过权力影响公司并购投资、RD投资等自由裁量性投资决策,进而提高薪酬制定的谈判力,降低薪酬-绩效敏感性。文章在既有文献梳理的基础上,对经理权力的认知、度量、薪酬效应和作用机理进行分析,并结合我国公司治理的具体情境,提出了中国情景下的经理权力研究、经理权力结构与来源、经理权力的感知测量、经理权力的作用机理和边界等新的研究议题。
[Abstract]:This paper systematically reviews the theory of manager's power, analyzes the cognition and measurement of manager's power, points out the research value of the comprehensive evaluation method of manager's power, and based on the perspective of manager's power, Explaining the reason and mechanism of executive compensation out of control and low performance-pay sensitivity, it is believed that the optimal compensation contract is part of the agency problem, and that the manager with authority will influence the pay setting by capturing the board of directors. Compensation contracts do not solve the problem of executive incentives; in order to avoid regulation, managers can also influence discretionary investment decisions such as M & A, R D investment, and thus improve the bargaining power of salary making. On the basis of literature review, this paper analyzes the cognition, measurement, compensation effect and mechanism of manager's power, and combines the specific situation of corporate governance in our country. In this paper, some new research topics, such as the study of manager's power in China, the structure and source of manager's power, the perception and measurement of manager's power, the mechanism and boundary of manager's power are put forward.
【作者单位】：山东科技大学经管学院;山东科技大学文法学院;
【基金】：教育部人文社科规划青年基金项目(12YJC790155) 第55批中国博士后科学基金面上资助项目(2014M551937) 山东省优秀中青年科学家科研奖励基金项目(BS2013SF019)
【分类号】：F272.91;F272.92

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