EVA考评对中央企业融资行为的影响研究

发布时间：2018-03-21 11:29

本文选题：经济增加值　切入点：融资行为　出处：《广西大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：自2010年起,我国国资委在中央企业全面推行将经济增加值(EVA)列入业绩考核指标的考核方法,并在2013年进一步增加和细化了 EVA在绩效考评体系中所占比重。这项改革标志着我国进入了以EVA为核心的管理时代,意味着我国政府在管理思想上的转变。国资委将EVA纳入考核指标,以期可以提高我国中央企业的会计信息质量,提高中央企业的绩效,提高中央企业在市场经济中的竞争力,让中央企业重现活力。而该制度推行至今已有六载,其实施效果如何、是否达到国资委推行EVA的初衷,值得我们关注。鉴于EVA绩效考评制度被国资委强制在各个央企实施后,央企负责人可能会调整企业的融资行为以优化EVA值,本文便试图从有息债务融资率、有息债务融资成本以及股权融资偏好这三个角度入手,以2007年—2015年沪深两市上市公司的公开数据为研究样本,提出以下三个假设来研究国资委在央企实施EVA绩效考评制度后对中央企业融资行为的影响:国资委实施EVA业绩评价体系,会使央企倾向于提高有息债务融资率,使央企不再抗拒高成本的债务融资,使央企不再偏好股权融资。并以国资委在2010年全面推行EVA和2013年进一步深化使用EVA为两个不同的事件发生时点,分别建立双重差分模型以验证上述假设。研究结果显示:在2007年—2013年第一段事件时间窗口中,EVA考核的推行与有息债务融资率显著负相关、与有息债务融资成本和股权融资偏好均不显著相关;在2011年—2015年这一事件时间窗口中,EVA考核的进一步深化对有息债务融资率虽无显著影响,但显著增加了央企的有息债务融资成本,并显著降低了其股权融资偏好。综上,本文提出以下建议:希望央企能够努力提高资本使用效率,确立新的价值理念;希望国资委能够健全包括非财务信息的全面绩效核算方式,考虑EVA考核指标在整个市场的推行是否会抬高市场贷款利率。
[Abstract]:Since 2010, the SASAC of our country has carried out the method of including EVA (Economic value added) as the performance assessment index in the central enterprises. In 2013, it further increased and refined the proportion of EVA in the performance appraisal system. This reform marks that China has entered the era of management with EVA as the core. The SASAC will bring EVA into the assessment index, in order to improve the quality of accounting information, improve the performance of the central enterprise, and improve the competitiveness of the central enterprise in the market economy. It is worth our attention whether the implementation effect of this system has been six years since its implementation, and whether it meets the original intention of SASAC to implement EVA. Since the EVA performance appraisal system has been enforced by SASAC in various central enterprises, The head of the central enterprise may adjust the financing behavior of the enterprise to optimize the EVA value. This paper tries to start from three angles: the financing rate of interest-bearing debt, the financing cost of interest-bearing debt and the preference of equity financing. Based on the public data of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2007 to 2015, this paper puts forward the following three hypotheses to study the influence of SASAC on the financing behavior of central enterprises after the implementation of EVA performance appraisal system in central enterprises: SASAC implements the EVA performance evaluation system. It will tend to increase the rate of interest-bearing debt financing, so that the central enterprises will no longer resist high-cost debt financing, So that central enterprises no longer prefer equity financing. And taking the full implementation of EVA by SASAC in 2010 and further deepening the use of EVA in 2013 as two different events, The results show that the implementation of EVA in the first event window from 2007 to 2013 is negatively correlated with the financing rate of interest-bearing debt. There was no significant correlation between the cost of interest-bearing debt financing and the preference for equity financing, and the further deepening of EVA assessment had no significant effect on the financing rate of interest-bearing debt, although it had no significant effect on the financing rate of interest-bearing debt in the time window from 2011 to 2015. However, it has significantly increased the cost of interest-bearing debt financing of central enterprises, and significantly reduced their preference for equity financing. In summary, this paper puts forward the following suggestions: hope that the central enterprises can strive to improve the efficiency of capital use and establish a new value concept; It is hoped that SASAC can improve the comprehensive performance accounting including non-financial information and consider whether the implementation of EVA assessment index in the whole market will raise the market loan interest rate.
【学位授予单位】：广西大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F276.1;F832.51

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