上市银行高管薪酬与经营绩效相关性研究

发布时间：2018-03-22 14:20

本文选题：上市银行　切入点：高管薪酬　出处：《中国地质大学(北京)》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：知识经济逐渐发展成为主流,促使人力资本在企业中的重要性不断提高,作为企业经营管理者的高级管理人员是企业重要的人力资源,同时能够提升企业的核心竞争力。而委托代理问题的提出致使企业所有者通常会为了追求自身利益的最大化而采取较高的薪酬对高管人员实施激励。近年来,国内外频繁曝出银行高管千万年薪的消息使得银行高管的薪酬问题不仅被社会广泛关注,更是带动了学术界对此进行研究的热情。党的十八大报告中指出,金融市场体系不断完善的核心任务之一是必须深化对银行体系的改革,当前已经有16家商业银行已经在沪、深证券交易所完成上市,同时还有几家股份制银行在筹备上市过程中。金融改革棋至中局,高管薪酬激励体系改革势在必行。因此,研究银行业的高管薪酬与经营绩效的关系,分析在高管人员的薪酬制定时哪些因素是关键影响因素,不仅对于银行的持续发展具有理论和现实意义,而且能够为银行体系的深化改革提供重要依据。论文的研究方法主要有文献研究法、定性分析方法以及定量分析方法三种。研究样本涵盖当前我国全部16家上市银行,整理了2013年至2016年共计4年的相关数据,利用SPSS20.0软件进行实证分析。其中,相关性分析中初步得出高管薪酬与每股收益正相关,与不良贷款率负相关的结论,同时验证了各绩效指标变量之间的多重共线性问题不存在。回归分析将高管薪酬作为被解释变量,银行经营绩效作为解释变量,并通过4个指标来衡量,分别是能够代表银行盈利性水平的加权平均净资产收益率和每股收益,能够衡量银行资产安全性的不良贷款率,能够体现银行资产流动性的资本充足率,并以银行的总资产规模作为控制变量。实证结果表明,高管薪酬与加权平均净资产收益率、不良贷款率和资本充足率负相关,与每股收益显著正相关,与银行的资产规模微弱正相关,得出上市银行经营绩效能够解释高管薪酬约55%变异情况的结论。最后提出了进一步优化国有控股上市银行公司治理结构、建立完善银行经营绩效考核指标、完善与经营绩效挂钩的长期薪酬激励制度的相关建议。
[Abstract]:Knowledge economy has gradually developed into the mainstream, which promotes the importance of human capital in the enterprise. As a senior manager, senior managers are the important human resources of the enterprise. At the same time, it can enhance the core competitiveness of the enterprise. And the principal-agent problem makes the business owners usually take higher compensation to encourage the executives in order to maximize their own interests. The frequent disclosure at home and abroad of the 10 million annual salary of bank executives makes the issue of bank executives' salaries not only receive widespread attention in the society, but also stimulate the enthusiasm of the academic community to study this. The report of the 18th National Congress of the CPC pointed out that. Ren Wuzhi, the core of the continuous improvement of the financial market system, first, must deepen the reform of the banking system. At present, there are already 16 commercial banks listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. At the same time, there are also several joint-stock banks in the process of preparing for the listing. The reform of the executive compensation incentive system is imperative in the financial reform to the Central Bureau. Therefore, the relationship between the executive compensation and the operating performance of the banking industry is studied. It is not only of theoretical and practical significance to analyze which factors are the key influencing factors in the formulation of executive compensation, but also to the sustainable development of banks. And it can provide an important basis for deepening the reform of the banking system. There are three main research methods in this paper: literature research, qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis. The study sample covers all 16 listed banks in China. This paper collates the relevant data of four years from 2013 to 2016 and makes empirical analysis with SPSS20.0 software. Among them, the correlation analysis shows that executive compensation is positively correlated with earnings per share and negatively correlated with non-performing loan rate. At the same time, it is verified that there is no multiple collinearity between the performance indicators. The regression analysis takes executive compensation as the explained variable, the bank performance as the explanatory variable, and measures it by four indicators. They are the weighted average ROE and EPS which represent the profitability level of the bank, the non-performing loan ratio, which can measure the security of the bank's assets, and the capital adequacy ratio of the bank's asset liquidity. The empirical results show that executive compensation is negatively correlated with weighted average net asset return, non-performing loan ratio and capital adequacy ratio, and positively correlated with earnings per share. The conclusion that the operating performance of listed banks can explain the variation of executive compensation is about 55%. Finally, the paper puts forward to further optimize the corporate governance structure of state-owned holding listed banks. To establish and improve the performance evaluation index of banks, and improve the long-term salary incentive system linked to the performance of the relevant suggestions.
【学位授予单位】：中国地质大学(北京)
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F272.92;F830.42;F832.3

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