畜牧业上市公司高管薪酬与企业绩效相关性研究

发布时间：2018-03-25 07:56

本文选题：畜牧业上市公司　切入点：高管薪酬　出处：《东北农业大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：薪酬契约是否可以对高管形成有效的激励,从而提升企业绩效是学术界以及实务界当中比较重要的一个课题。上市公司所有权以及控制权的相互独立造成了高管薪酬激励出现了一系列的问题,企业所有者同经营者相互间形成了目标不一致、信息不对称的情况。现如今社会经济不断发展,企业所处的经营环境越来越纷繁复杂,企业所有者同经营者之间的利益冲突越发尖锐,通过合理的薪酬契约机制能够很好地调和这一矛盾。此外,高级管理人才现如今已经是提升企业竞争力的重要因素,因此,企业想要得到更好的发展就需要收纳更多的高级管理人才,同时施行科学的激励制度从而达到提升企业绩效的目的,文中主要研究薪酬契约怎样可以更加有效地激励高管,尽量避免代理矛盾的出现,最终使得企业的绩效得以提升。本文首先研究畜牧业上市企业、高管薪酬、企业绩效等一些较为核心的概念,之后通过利用委托代理理论、经营者激励理论、最优契约理论以及终极产权理论作为理论基础来研究高管薪酬是怎样对绩效产生作用的,利用相关的理论来开展课题的探究,其中就包含了高管的薪资水平同企业绩效之间的关系、高管持股比例同企业绩效之间的关系还有高管的在职消费水平同企业绩效之间的关系,最后再通过对实例的研究来进行假设的验证。本文以经过筛选的12家畜牧业上市公司来进行相关的研究,收集畜牧业上市公司2002到2016年这期间内的数据作为样本容量,运用因子分析法构建企业绩效综合模型,依照终极产权方面的差异来对畜牧业上市公司进行国有以及非国有公司的划分,通过使用多元线性回归分析的办法来对这部分的企业当中的高管薪酬同企业绩效相互关系、高管薪酬激励政策在国有以及非国有控股上市公司间的差异进行研究。研究发现:畜牧业上市公司高管货币薪酬同企业绩效存在非常明显的正向关系,并且国有控股上市公司当中这种正向的激励效果要高于非国有控股上市公司。畜牧业上市公司高管持股比例与企业绩效显著正相关,非国有控股上市公司高管持股比例所带来的企业绩效正向影响会高于国有控股上市公司。畜牧业上市公司高管在职消费对企业绩效都表现出了负向的影响关系,但是这种负向激励效果国有控股上市公司中是显著的,而在非国有控股上市公司中是不显著的。所以,需要更好地构建高管薪酬激励制度,要从各个方面来使得这一制度得到落实。适当提升高管薪酬水平和持股比例,规范高管在职消费,培养出更多具有较好专业素养的经理人,严格进行人员的选用、任用、激励、考核,使其符合市场规律。加强对国有企业的管理程度,将政治和企业的经营相互分离,限制企业高管在政治体系当中晋升的机会,将其行为控制在市场经济当中。
[Abstract]:Whether pay contracts can provide effective incentives for executives, Therefore, improving corporate performance is an important topic in academic and practical circles. The independence of ownership and control rights of listed companies has caused a series of problems in executive compensation incentive. The enterprise owners and managers have formed a situation of inconsistent objectives and asymmetric information. Nowadays, with the continuous development of social economy, the business environment in which the enterprise is operating is becoming more and more complicated. The conflict of interest between the owner and the operator is becoming more and more acute, which can be reconciled well through a reasonable salary contract mechanism. In addition, senior management talents are now an important factor to enhance the competitiveness of the enterprise. In order to get better development, enterprises need to accept more senior management talents, and carry out scientific incentive system to achieve the purpose of improving the performance of enterprises. This paper mainly studies how the compensation contract can motivate executives more effectively. This paper first studies some core concepts, such as stockbreeding listed enterprises, executive compensation, corporate performance, and so on, and then by using principal-agent theory, this paper makes use of the principal-agent theory. The executive incentive theory, the optimal contract theory and the ultimate property right theory are used as the theoretical basis to study how the executive compensation affects the performance. It includes the relationship between executive pay level and enterprise performance, the relationship between executive ownership ratio and enterprise performance, as well as the relationship between executive in-service consumption level and enterprise performance. Finally, through the case study to verify the hypothesis. In this paper, 12 listed stockbreeding companies were selected to carry out the relevant research, and collected the data from 2002 to 2016 as the sample size. Using the factor analysis method to construct the comprehensive model of enterprise performance, according to the difference of ultimate property right, to divide the listed companies of animal husbandry into state-owned companies and non-state-owned companies. By using the method of multiple linear regression analysis, the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance in this part of the enterprise is analyzed. The difference of executive compensation incentive policy between state-owned and non-state-controlled listed companies is studied. It is found that there is a very obvious positive relationship between executive monetary compensation and corporate performance in stockbreeding listed companies. Moreover, the positive incentive effect of the listed companies is higher than that of the non-state-owned holding companies. The proportion of stock ownership by senior managers in the listed companies is significantly positively correlated with the performance of the enterprises. The positive effect of the proportion of the senior executives' shareholding in non-state-owned holding listed companies will be higher than that of the state-owned holding listed companies. The in-service consumption of the senior executives of the listed stockbreeding companies has a negative impact on the performance of the enterprises. However, this negative incentive effect is significant in the state-owned holding listed companies, but not in the non-state-owned holding listed companies. Therefore, it is necessary to better build the executive compensation incentive system. It is necessary to implement this system from various aspects. We should properly raise the executive compensation level and shareholding ratio, regulate the in-service consumption of senior executives, cultivate more managers with better professional qualities, and strictly carry out the selection, appointment and encouragement of personnel. Strengthen the management of state-owned enterprises, separate politics from enterprise management, limit the opportunities for executives to advance in the political system, and control their behavior in the market economy.
【学位授予单位】：东北农业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F272.92;F302.6;F326.3

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