我国乡镇政府绩效考核控制、博弈中的异化及改革路径

发布时间：2018-04-18 01:42

本文选题：乡镇政府绩效考核 + 控制　；参考：《江苏社会科学》2017年03期

【摘要】：县市级政府通过量化考核、绩效排名与择优提拔这种政治锦标赛式的激励范式与政治生态控制着乡镇政府。县市级政府对乡镇政府的控制权主要表现为考核的目标设置权、绩效排名、评优相对应的政治激励权,乡镇政府应对绩效考核主要表现为四种博弈方式,分别是强控制高压力下维稳类指标的严格执行模式、强控制高压力下经济生态类指标的共谋模式、弱控制低压力下精神文明建设类指标的常规执行模式、弱控制低压力下创新类指标的灵活执行模式。通过两案例比较研究发现,强控制高压力下严格执行与共谋执行模式存在暗箱操作、非常规性侵害民众利益的行为。文章进一步揭示了乡镇政府绩效考核控制与博弈虽然让乡镇政府与上级政府在与绩效考核相挂钩的评奖评优、政治晋升的政治交易中实现了基层政权稳定,但是功利性的目标导向却给乡镇政府与县市级政府进行变通、共谋提供了空间,导致了乡镇政府绩效考核制度的价值偏离分配正义,更深层次上导致了政府与民众民主话语平台的断裂,由此提出治理现代化需求下乡镇政府绩效考核变革路径。
[Abstract]:The county and city governments control the township government through quantitative evaluation, performance ranking and promotion. This kind of political championship incentive paradigm and political ecology control the township government.The control rights of county and city governments over township governments are mainly shown as the target setting right of assessment, the performance ranking, the political incentive right corresponding to the evaluation, and the four game ways for township governments to deal with the performance appraisal.It is the strict execution mode of the stability index under the strong control of high pressure, the collusion mode of the economic ecological index under the strong control, the conventional execution mode of the spiritual civilization construction index under the weak control low pressure.The flexible execution mode of innovation index under weak control and low pressure.Through the comparative study of two cases, it is found that strict execution and collusion execution mode under strong control and high pressure exist in black box operation and unconventional behavior against the interests of the public.The article further reveals that the control and game of township government performance appraisal and game, although the township government and the higher level government in the performance appraisal linked to the award evaluation, the political transaction of political promotion to achieve grass-roots political stability.However, the utilitarian goal orientation gives the township government and the county government the space for collusion, which leads to the deviation of the value of the performance appraisal system of the township government from the distribution justice.It leads to the breakage of the democratic discourse platform between the government and the people, and puts forward the reform path of the township government performance appraisal under the demand of governance modernization.
【作者单位】：南京师范大学公共管理学院;
【基金】：国家社科基金一般项目“治理能力现代化视阈下地方政府绩效管理变革与创新研究”(项目编号:15BZZ072) 江苏省社会科学基金课题“地方政府领导班子与领导干部政绩考核创新机制研究”(项目编号:14ZZB002)阶段性成果
【分类号】：D630

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