多元化经营对企业绩效的影响——高管持股的调节作用

发布时间：2018-04-28 07:42

本文选题：多元化经营 + 高管持股　；参考：《经济问题》2017年04期

【摘要】：根据委托代理理论,利用554家中国上市公司2011-2015年的相关数据,检验了多元化经营的不同类型及程度对上市公司绩效的影响,探讨了高管持股水平对二者关系的调节作用。研究发现,行业多元化程度与上市公司绩效间存在负相关关系;而产品多元化程度与上市公司绩效间存在倒"U"型关系。研究进一步发现,高管持股水平对行业多元化程度与绩效关系的调节效应不显著;而在一定区间内,高管持股水平对产品多元化程度与绩效关系具有积极的调节作用;超越某一阈值,高管持股水平对产品多元化程度与绩效关系产生消极的调节效应。
[Abstract]:According to the principal-agent theory, using the relevant data of 554 Chinese listed companies from 2011 to 2015, this paper examines the influence of different types and degrees of diversification on the performance of listed companies, and discusses the regulating effect of the level of executive ownership on the relationship between the two. It is found that there is a negative correlation between the degree of industry diversification and the performance of listed companies, while there is a negative "U" relationship between the degree of product diversification and the performance of listed companies. The study further found that the regulatory effect of the level of executive ownership on the relationship between industry diversification and performance is not significant, while in a certain range, the level of executive ownership has a positive regulatory effect on the relationship between product diversification and performance. Beyond a certain threshold, the level of executive ownership has a negative regulatory effect on the relationship between product diversification and performance.
【作者单位】：山东财经大学MBA学院;山东财经大学工商管理学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金重点项目“多主体协同的农产品质量安全保障机制研究”(15AGL014) 山东省重点研发计划“智慧农业趋势下农产品质量安全预警若干关键问题研究及系统实现”(2016GSF120013) 泰山学者工程专项经费资助项目
【分类号】：F275

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