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高管薪酬、风险承担与企业财务绩效的关系研究

发布时间:2018-05-06 08:41

  本文选题:高管薪酬 + 风险承担 ; 参考:《集美大学》2017年硕士论文


【摘要】:高管薪酬一直是理论界与实务界讨论的焦点问题,如何制定合理有效的高管薪酬制度,激励高管更好地为股东创造财富,实现股东价值最大化是公司治理研究的重要内容。本文对高管薪酬、风险承担与企业财务绩效三者的关系以及风险承担在高管薪酬与企业财务绩效之间起到的中介效应展开分析,旨在为促进企业长远发展、完善公司治理机制、制定合理的高管薪酬制度提供更加切实可行的指导。本文回顾了国内外学者对高管薪酬、风险承担与企业财务绩效相互作用机制的相关研究成果,总结出三者的相关概念和计量标准,对三者之间的理论关系进行分析和梳理,进而提出本文实证检验的理论假设,构建相关的实证模型。本研究选取沪、深两市A股市场符合条件的792家上市企业(国有企业454家,非国有企业338家)跨期十年的样本数据作为研究对象,使用EXCEL和STATA等数据处理和分析软件对三者之间的关系和风险承担的中介效应进行实证检验。结果表明:企业风险承担水平与高管货币薪酬激励之间呈显著正相关关系,且与国有企业相比,非国有企业高管货币薪酬激励对企业风险承担水平的影响较大;企业财务绩效与高管货币薪酬激励呈显著正相关,且在我国上市企业中,非国有企业高管货币薪酬与企业财务绩效之间的相关关系与国有企业相比较强;高管股权激励与风险承担、企业财务绩效不具有显著相关性;企业财务绩效与风险承担水平呈显著正相关;风险承担在高管货币薪酬激励与企业财务绩效之间的相互作用中起中介效应。根据研究结果,本文提出对策建议:制定政策来管理高管薪酬的发放促进企业财务绩效的提升;在设计高管薪酬制度时,应充分考虑企业的风险承担效用;建立完善的高管薪酬制度、有效的高管薪酬监管体系以及合理的企业财务绩效评价体系,提高企业高管薪酬披露的透明度;对高管实施薪酬激励以提高企业财务绩效时,应合理控制企业的风险承担水平;成立风险管理委员会、完善董事会和监事会制度来加强对风险项目决策的内部监督;优化我国公司治理机制,以提高高管薪酬、企业风险承担水平对企业财务绩效的正面促进作用,如多元化企业股权结构、扩大内部人持股范围等;加快我国国有企业改革步伐,完善国有企业高管聘任制度,推进国有企业股权结构多元化。
[Abstract]:Executive compensation has always been the focus of discussion between theoretical and practical circles. How to formulate a reasonable and effective executive compensation system, encourage executives to create wealth for shareholders better and maximize shareholder value is an important content of corporate governance research. This paper analyzes the relationship among executive compensation, risk-taking and corporate financial performance, as well as the intermediary effect of risk-taking between executive compensation and corporate financial performance, in order to promote the long-term development of enterprises and improve the corporate governance mechanism. To establish a reasonable executive compensation system to provide more practical guidance. This paper reviews the research results of the interaction mechanism of executive compensation, risk-taking and corporate financial performance, summarizes the related concepts and measurement standards, and analyzes and combs the theoretical relationship between them. Then the theoretical hypothesis of empirical test is put forward, and the relevant empirical model is constructed. This study selected 792 listed enterprises (454 state-owned enterprises and 338 non-state-owned enterprises) in the A-share market of Shanghai and Shenzhen as the objects of study. The data processing and analysis software such as EXCEL and STATA are used to test the relationship between them and the intermediary effect of risk taking. The results show that there is a significant positive correlation between the risk-bearing level and the monetary compensation incentive, and the non-state-owned enterprise has a greater impact on the risk-taking level than the state-owned enterprise. The financial performance of the enterprise is positively correlated with the monetary incentive of the executive, and the correlation between the monetary compensation of the non-state-owned enterprise and the financial performance of the state-owned enterprise is stronger than that of the state-owned enterprise in the listed enterprises of our country. There is no significant correlation between corporate financial performance and corporate financial performance, but there is a significant positive correlation between corporate financial performance and risk-taking level. Risk-taking plays an intermediary role in the interaction between monetary incentive and financial performance. According to the results of the study, this paper puts forward some suggestions: making policies to manage executive compensation to promote the financial performance of enterprises, designing executive compensation system, taking full account of the risk bearing utility of enterprises; Establish a perfect executive compensation system, an effective executive compensation regulatory system and a reasonable financial performance evaluation system to improve the transparency of executive compensation disclosure; executive compensation incentive to improve corporate financial performance, Risk management committee should be set up, the board of directors and the board of supervisors should be perfected to strengthen the internal supervision of the risk project decision, the corporate governance mechanism of our country should be optimized, and the executive compensation should be improved. The positive effect of the risk-bearing level on the financial performance of enterprises, such as diversifying the ownership structure of enterprises, expanding the scope of insider ownership, speeding up the reform of state-owned enterprises, perfecting the appointment system of senior executives in state-owned enterprises, and so on. Promote the diversification of ownership structure of state-owned enterprises.
【学位授予单位】:集美大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F272.92;F275;F832.51

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