国有企业高管薪酬制度的设计原则和可行方案

发布时间：2018-05-13 09:33

本文选题：股权激励 + 国有企业　；参考：《经济纵横》2017年03期

【摘要】：国有企业的性质与高管股权激励存在一定冲突,且股权激励本身所固有的缺陷使其在我国国有企业改革实践中没能有效激励国企高管,反而产生许多不利于国有企业经营发展的问题。西方国家的理论研究和实践表明,股权激励不仅在理论上存在诸多问题,在实践中更是导致高管腐败频发,引起"超级经理人崛起"并加剧了社会收入不平等。因此,股权激励并非国企高管长期激励制度的唯一选择,混合所有制改革也并不意味着鼓励实行国企高管股权激励。我国国有企业高管薪酬制度设计应坚持以企业经营指标作为长期激励的评价标准、兼顾国有企业的经济目标与社会目标、薪酬激励与非薪酬激励相结合等原则,结合国有企业自身特点、发挥自身优势,更多地将长期激励与企业经营绩效联系起来,合理选择高管长期激励方式。
[Abstract]:There are some conflicts between the nature of the state-owned enterprises and the executive equity incentive, and the inherent defects of the equity incentive itself make it unable to effectively motivate the state-owned enterprise executives in the practice of state-owned enterprise reform in our country. On the contrary, many problems are unfavorable to the management and development of state-owned enterprises. The theoretical research and practice in western countries show that equity incentive not only has many problems in theory, but also leads to frequent corruption of executives in practice, which causes the rise of "super managers" and exacerbates social income inequality. Therefore, equity incentive is not the only option for long-term incentive system, and mixed ownership reform does not mean to encourage the implementation of state-owned executives equity incentive. The design of executive compensation system of state-owned enterprises in China should adhere to the evaluation standard of long-term incentive based on the enterprise management index, taking into account the economic and social objectives of state-owned enterprises, the combination of salary incentive and non-salary incentive, and so on. Combining with the characteristics of state-owned enterprises, giving full play to their own advantages, more long-term incentive and enterprise performance will be linked together, reasonable choice of long-term incentives for senior executives.
【作者单位】：中国人民大学经济学院;
【分类号】：F272.92;F276.1

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