央企类上市公司高管薪酬与公司绩效相关性研究

发布时间：2018-05-14 21:36

本文选题：中央企业 + 高管薪酬　；参考：《陕西科技大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：现代企业之间的竞争,本质上是人才的竞争。高管人员作为公司的决策中心,同时也是一种重要的人力资本,对公司的成长起着十分关键的作用,如何调动高管工作的积极性,对高管进行有效激励是值得我们探讨的问题。由于两权分离,股东不直接参与公司经营管理,而是委托高管代为经营,两者因为掌握的信息不一致,利益目标不同,从而出现了一系列代理问题,为了降低这些代理问题产生的成本,将高管与股东的利益相结合,就需要建立健全高管薪酬激励制度。央企作为国民经济的支柱,在社会主义市场经济中发挥着重要作用,同时央企还承担着一定的社会责任,其政治和经济地位的特殊性和重要性不言而喻。国有企业高管薪酬,尤其是大型央企的高管薪酬问题,一直以来受到社会的广泛关注。近几年政府连续发布了《中央管理企业负责人薪酬制度改革方案》和《关于深化国有企业改革的指导意见》,在央企高管薪酬改革的背景下,研究央企类上市公司的高管薪酬制度显得十分迫切和必要,对推动央企的改革与发展、优化上市公司治理结构具有重大意义。本文主要采用了文献研究法、定性与定量分析相结合、规范研究与实证研究相结合的方法。首先,回顾了国内外关于高管薪酬与公司绩效的相关文献,界定了中央企业、高管薪酬、公司绩效的基本概念,介绍了人力资本理论、委托代理理论和激励理论三个理论基础。接着分析了央企类上市公司高管薪酬的现状与问题,发现目前的现状为:高管货币薪酬持续增长、但内部差距较大;零持股现象普遍,高管持股比例偏低;不同地区和行业高管薪酬差异较大;同时高管薪酬还存在着激励机制不健全、信息披露制度不完善、存在政府管制和奖惩缺乏过程评价等问题。然后从理论分析的角度提出三个研究假设,以281家央企类上市公司为研究对象,选取2010-2015年数据为研究样本,剔除不符合标准的数据后共得到1686个样本,以衡量公司绩效的资产收益率和每股收益为被解释变量,以高管货币薪酬、高管持股比例、高管在职消费为解释变量,以公司规模、资产负债率、股权集中度、地区虚拟变量和行业虚拟变量为控制变量,构建多元回归模型,运用SPSS软件对样本数据进行分析。研究发现:一高管货币薪酬与公司绩效正相关关系显著。说明高管薪酬激励制度在央企上市公司初步发挥作用,高管可以通过提升公司绩效的方式来提高自身收益。二高管持股比例与公司绩效相关性不显著。主要原因可能是因为我国央企上市公司实行股权激励的时间比较晚,零持股现象普遍,高管持股比例偏低,高管薪酬结构不合理,主要是以货币等短期激励方式为主,没有建立起有效的长期股权激励机制,导致高管持股对公司绩效的作用不明显。三高管在职消费与公司绩效负相关关系显著。这说明我国央企上市公司存在在职消费过度现象,在职消费消耗的成本远远大于其带来的效益增长,对公司绩效具有负面影响,在职消费不能成为一种有效的激励方式,应该对在职消费进行适当规范。最后,根据本文研究结论,结合我国央企上市公司高管薪酬现状和存在的问题,提出了包括建立多元化薪酬激励机制,提高在职消费透明度,培育完善职业经理人市场,建立健全绩效评价体系,完善高管薪酬监督机制等相关政策建议。
[Abstract]:The competition between modern enterprises is essentially the competition of talents. As the decision center of the company, the executives are also an important human capital, which play a crucial role in the growth of the company. How to mobilize the enthusiasm of the executives and stimulate the executives effectively is a problem worthy of our discussion. Due to the separation of the two rights, the stock is a problem. The East is not directly involved in the management of the company, but is entrusted to the management of the senior executives. Because the information is inconsistent and the interest goals are different, there is a series of agency problems. In order to reduce the cost of these agency problems and combine the interests of the executives with the shareholders, it is necessary to establish and improve the executive compensation incentive system. As the pillar of the national economy, it plays an important role in the socialist market economy. At the same time, the central enterprises also bear certain social responsibilities. The particularity and importance of their political and economic status are self-evident. The salary of the executives of the state-owned enterprises, especially the large central enterprises, has been widely paid attention to by the society. Under the background of the compensation reform of the central enterprise executives, it is very urgent and necessary to study the executive compensation system of the listed companies of the central enterprises, to promote the reform and development of the central enterprises and to optimize the governance of the listed companies. This paper mainly adopts the literature research method, the combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis, and the combination of normative and empirical research. First, it reviews the relevant literature about executive compensation and corporate performance at home and abroad, defines the basic concepts of central enterprises, executive compensation, corporate performance, and introduces human resources. This theory, principal-agent theory and incentive theory based on three theoretical basis, then analyzes the status and problems of executive compensation of the central enterprise listed companies, and finds that the current situation is: executive monetary compensation continues to grow, but the internal gap is large; the zero shareholding phenomenon is common, the proportion of senior executives is low; the salaries of executives in different regions and industries are very different. At the same time, the executive compensation still exists the imperfect incentive mechanism, the imperfect information disclosure system, the government regulation and the evaluation of the lack of rewards and punishments. Then three research hypotheses are put forward from the perspective of theoretical analysis, and 281 central enterprises listed companies are taken as the research object, and 2010-2015 year data are selected as the research samples to eliminate the unqualified standards. After the data, a total of 1686 samples were obtained to measure the asset returns and earnings per share of the company as explanatory variables, with executive currency pay, executive stock ratio, and executive consumption as explanatory variables, with the company size, asset liability ratio, equity concentration, regional virtual variables and industry virtual variables as control variables. The regression model is used to analyze the sample data with SPSS software. It is found that the relationship between executive monetary compensation and company performance is positively related. It shows that the executive compensation incentive system plays a preliminary role in the listed companies of central enterprises, and the senior executives can raise their own earnings by improving the company performance. Two the proportion of executive stock ownership and the performance of the company. The main reason may be that the time of equity incentive in the listed companies of China's central enterprises is relatively late, the phenomenon of zero shareholding is common, the proportion of executive stock holding is low and the salary structure of senior executives is unreasonable, mainly by short-term incentive methods such as money, which has not established an effective long-term equity incentive mechanism, leading to executive stock ownership. The role of corporate performance is not obvious. Three the negative correlation between in-service consumption and corporate performance is significant. This shows that the overconsumption phenomenon exists in the listed companies of China's central enterprises. The cost of incumbency consumption is far greater than that of its benefit growth. It has a negative impact on the performance of the company, and the on-the-job consumption can not be an effective incentive. In the end, according to the conclusion of this paper, according to the present situation and existing problems of the executive compensation of the listed companies in China's central enterprises, this paper proposes to establish a diversified salary incentive mechanism, improve the transparency of the on-the-job consumption, cultivate and perfect the market of professional managers, establish a sound performance evaluation system and perfect the high performance evaluation system. Pay supervision mechanism and other relevant policy recommendations.

【学位授予单位】：陕西科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F272.92;F275;F276.1

【参考文献】