高管薪酬与企业社会责任的关系研究内部控制的调节作用

发布时间：2018-05-20 18:27

  本文选题：高管薪酬 + 内部控制　； 参考：《南京大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：伴随着国民经济的持续稳定发展,人们在充分享受丰富的物质生活之余,对生活质量、生存环境的改善提出了越来越高的要求,这越发突显出企业承担社会责任的重要性。企业承担社会责任会增大成本支出,影响短期财务绩效,出于自利的考虑,高管有动机减少企业社会责任活动。薪酬管理在人力资源管理中能够发挥积极的激励作用,能够引导高管的行为和战略决策。研究高管薪酬对企业履行社会责任的激励是将高管激励和企业战略行为结合的新的研究方向。现有文献大多集中于高管薪酬与企业经济绩效之间的关系,而仅从财务角度对薪酬管理进行考量易导致高管的短视和自利行为。将履行社会责任纳入薪酬管理的范畴,有利于更好的制定合理有效的薪酬制度,有利于企业的长远发展。高管薪酬除了包括短期货币薪酬外,还包括持股所带来的长期收益。将高管薪酬分为短期货币薪酬和长期薪酬,有利于更好的分析高管薪酬激励的作用机制。同时现有文献在研究高管薪酬对企业社会责任的影响中,忽略了内部控制在制度层面的重要监督控制作用,本文将内部控制纳入研究框架,丰富了社会责任的研究。本研究选取A股上市公司的样本数据,对本文提出的假设进行回归验证,得出结论:高管短期货币薪酬与企业社会责任显著正相关;长期薪酬与企业社会责任显著正相关;内部控制能促进高管短期货币薪酬、长期薪酬对企业社会责任的正向关系。结果表明高管的薪酬越高,不论是短期货币薪酬还是长期持股薪酬都能对企业履行社会责任产生积极的激励效果,良好的内部控制水平能够促进激励效果更好的发挥。并据此结论提出建议:完善薪酬激励制度,短期货币薪酬与长期持股相协同;完善内部控制制度,充分发挥内部控制的监督作用。
[Abstract]:With the sustained and stable development of the national economy, people in the full enjoyment of rich material life, to improve the quality of life, living environment has put forward higher and higher requirements, which more and more highlights the importance of corporate social responsibility. Corporate social responsibility will increase costs and affect short-term financial performance. For self-interest, executives have the motivation to reduce corporate social responsibility activities. Compensation management can play an active role in human resource management, and can guide the executive's behavior and strategic decision. It is a new research direction to study the incentive of executive compensation to corporate social responsibility. Most of the existing literature focuses on the relationship between executive compensation and enterprise economic performance, but only from the financial point of view to pay management is easy to lead to short-sighted and self-interest behavior of executives. To bring social responsibility into the category of salary management is beneficial to the establishment of a reasonable and effective salary system and to the long-term development of enterprises. Executive compensation includes short-term monetary compensation as well as long-term gains from equity holdings. The classification of executive compensation into short-term monetary compensation and long-term compensation is conducive to better analysis of executive compensation incentive mechanism. At the same time, in the study of the impact of executive compensation on corporate social responsibility, the existing literature ignores the important supervisory and control role of internal control at the institutional level. This paper brings the internal control into the research framework and enriches the research on social responsibility. Based on the sample data of A-share listed companies, this study verifies the hypotheses put forward in this paper, and concludes that the short-term monetary compensation of executives is significantly positively correlated with corporate social responsibility, long-term compensation is significantly positively correlated with corporate social responsibility, and long-term compensation is significantly positively correlated with corporate social responsibility. Internal controls promote a positive relationship between short-term monetary compensation and long-term compensation for corporate social responsibility. The results show that the higher the executive compensation, both short-term monetary compensation and long-term shareholding compensation can produce positive incentive effect on corporate social responsibility, and good internal control level can promote the incentive effect better. Based on this conclusion, some suggestions are put forward: perfecting the salary incentive system, coordinating the short-term monetary compensation with the long-term stock holding, perfecting the internal control system and giving full play to the supervisory role of the internal control.
【学位授予单位】：南京大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F272.92;F270;F832.51;F275
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本文编号：1915757