家族企业所有权结构、薪酬激励对企业风险承担的影响研究

发布时间：2018-06-01 22:51

本文选题：上市家族企业 + 风险承担　；参考：《杭州电子科技大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着我国经济结构的调整,家族企业粗放式的生产经营模式受到了日益严峻的挑战,企业所面临的风险日益多样化、复杂化。当家族企业经营者由于“短视”或激进的投资决策给企业带来不合理的风险承担水平时,必然会影响企业经营绩效,损害公司价值。因此,家族企业风险承担水平已成为企业持续生存的核心问题,企业只有保持合理的风险承担水平才能健康持续的发展。企业风险承担在很大程度上受家族企业所有权结构和薪酬激励的影响,不同的所有权结构、不同的薪酬激励机制都会影响管理层的风险投资决策。鉴于此,在梳理国内外相关文献,分析相关理论的基础上,以我国深圳证券交易所中小板家族企业为研究对象,对所有权结构、薪酬激励和风险承担间的影响关系展开研究。本文以上市家族企业连续三年资产收益率的波动作为衡量风险承担的指标,以现金流权、两权分离度和金字塔层级作为衡量所有权结构的指标,以前后两年前三名高管薪酬总额的对数和高管持股比例作为衡量薪酬激励的指标,首先研究家族企业所有权结构、薪酬激励分别对企业风险承担的影响,再将所有权结构和薪酬激励结合起来研究对企业风险承担的影响。最后通过新希望集团的案例分析对实证结论进行补充和解释,从而全方面、多角度地分析各因素与企业风险承担间的关系。本文通过实证分析及案例研究,得出如下结论:第一,我国多数上市家族企业所有权结构不合理,主要表现在两权分离程度较高,金字塔层级数多(所有权结构复杂),一股独大现象严重等,从而导致企业风险承担水平不理想。第二,我国上市家族企业薪酬结构不合理,股权激励流于形式化,并未对企业高管起到有效地激励作用。主要表现为货币薪酬激励仍是多数企业的主要薪酬激励方式,高层管理人员总体持股比例处于较低水平,影响高管创新积极性,从而导致不合理的企业风险承担水平。第三,薪酬激励能有效调节家族企业所有权结构和企业风险承担的关系,具体表现在货币薪酬激励能调节家族企业现金流权与企业风险承担的负相关关系,而高管持股能有效调节家族企业两权分离和金字塔层级与企业风险承担的正相关关系。
[Abstract]:With the adjustment of the economic structure of our country, the extensive production and management mode of family business has been faced with more and more severe challenges, and the risks faced by enterprises are becoming more and more diversified and complicated. When family business managers bring unreasonable risk-bearing level to enterprises because of "shortsightedness" or radical investment decisions, it will inevitably affect the business performance and damage the value of the company. Therefore, the risk bearing level of family enterprises has become the core problem of the sustainable survival of enterprises. Enterprises can develop healthily and continuously only by maintaining a reasonable risk bearing level. To a great extent, the enterprise risk undertaking is influenced by the ownership structure and salary incentive of the family firm. Different ownership structure and different salary incentive mechanism will affect the management's venture capital decision. In view of this, on the basis of combing the domestic and foreign literature and analyzing the relevant theories, this paper studies the influence of ownership structure, salary incentive and risk taking on the small and medium-sized board family enterprises of Shenzhen Stock Exchange. In this paper, the volatility of the return on assets of listed family firms for three consecutive years is taken as the index to measure the risk taking, the right of cash flow, the degree of separation of the two rights and the pyramid level are taken as the indicators to measure the ownership structure. Taking the logarithm of the total compensation of the three top executives before and after two years ago and the proportion of the executive stock holding as the index to measure the compensation incentive, this paper first studies the ownership structure of the family firm and the influence of the compensation incentive on the risk bearing of the enterprise. Then the ownership structure and salary incentive are combined to study the impact on enterprise risk-bearing. Finally, the empirical conclusions are supplemented and explained by the case study of New Hope Group, so as to analyze the relationship between the factors and the risk assumption of the enterprise from all angles. Through empirical analysis and case study, this paper draws the following conclusions: first, the ownership structure of most listed family enterprises in China is unreasonable, mainly reflected in the high degree of separation of the two rights. There are many levels of pyramids (complex ownership structure, a dominant phenomenon and so on, which leads to the level of enterprise risk assumption is not ideal. Second, the salary structure of listed family enterprises in China is unreasonable, and equity incentive is formalized, which does not play an effective role in encouraging senior executives. The main performance is that monetary compensation incentive is still the main way of salary incentive in most enterprises, and the overall shareholding ratio of senior managers is at a low level, which affects the innovation enthusiasm of senior executives and leads to unreasonable risk-bearing level of enterprises. Thirdly, the compensation incentive can effectively regulate the relationship between the ownership structure of the family firm and the risk bearing of the enterprise, which is manifested in the negative correlation between the cash flow right of the family firm and the risk bearing of the enterprise. The executive ownership can effectively regulate the separation of the two rights of the family firm and the positive correlation between the pyramid level and the risk bearing of the enterprise.
【学位授予单位】：杭州电子科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F272.92;F275;F276.5

【参考文献】