国企分类治理、政府控制与高管薪酬激励——基于中国上市公司的实证研究

发布时间：2018-06-09 22:40

本文选题：国企分类 + 政府控制　；参考：《管理评论》2017年03期

【摘要】：本文选取2006-2013年沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,实证分析了不同类别国有企业高管薪酬激励对公司绩效影响的差异。研究结果表明,在竞争类国有企业中,高管薪酬激励能够显著促进公司绩效,而公共服务类国有企业和特定功能类国有企业的高管薪酬激励效果不显著。并且,与非国有企业相比,竞争类国有企业的高管薪酬激励对公司绩效的促进作用更大。另外,本文发现,随着政府控制力的增强,竞争类国有企业高管薪酬激励效果受到抑制。因此,为了进一步提升国有企业薪酬激励机制的有效性,政府应当逐步放宽对竞争类国企的控制力度。同已有研究不同,本文突出了不同类别国有企业高管薪酬激励效果的差异。在我国国有企业进入分类改革的新阶段,具有一定的理论与现实意义。
[Abstract]:This paper selects Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as samples from 2006 to 2013, and analyzes the difference of executive compensation incentive to corporate performance in different categories of state-owned enterprises. The results show that in competitive state-owned enterprises, executive compensation incentive can significantly promote corporate performance, while public service state-owned enterprises and specific functional state-owned enterprises have no significant effect on executive compensation incentives. Compared with the non-state-owned enterprises, the executive compensation incentive of competitive state-owned enterprises plays a more important role in promoting corporate performance. In addition, it is found that with the enhancement of government control, the incentive effect of executive compensation in competitive state-owned enterprises is restrained. Therefore, in order to further improve the effectiveness of the salary incentive mechanism of state-owned enterprises, the government should gradually relax the control of competitive state-owned enterprises. Different from the previous research, this paper highlights the difference of executive compensation incentive effect in different categories of state-owned enterprises. It is of theoretical and practical significance to enter the new stage of classification reform in Chinese state-owned enterprises.
【作者单位】：北京物资学院商学院;南开大学中国公司治理研究院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71372093) 国家自然科学基金重点项目(71132001) 教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(10JJD630001)
【分类号】：F276.1;F272.92;D630

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