交易成本、激励结构与公共服务“逆向合同外包”

发布时间：2018-06-10 18:05

本文选题：逆向合同外包 + 交易成本　；参考：《东南学术》2016年05期

【摘要】：与西方国家治理逻辑不同的是,交易成本和官僚组织中的激励结构是我国公共服务"逆向合同外包"的组织基础和制度逻辑。在合同外包阶段,吸引社会私人资金进入公共服务领域、回应上级政府的偏好是地方政府选择合同外包方式的主要原因,合同外包成为下级政府争夺上级政府注意力的有效策略,地方政府行为的制度性激励来自于官僚体制的晋升激励;在逆向合同外包阶段,上级政府偏好的转移使得合同外包不再具有晋升激励,合同外包过程中出现的承包商依据高专用性资产"坐地起价"、合同设计中的"道德风险"以及承包商的"监管绑架",地方政府绩效改革后所产生的财政激励,共同促使地方政府实施公共服务逆向合同外包。交易成本和激励结构共同塑造了地方政府公共服务供给模式的选择,但激励结构起着更为基础性的作用。
[Abstract]:Different from the governance logic of western countries, transaction cost and incentive structure in bureaucracy are the organizational basis and institutional logic of "reverse contract outsourcing" in China's public service. In the stage of contract outsourcing, the main reason for local governments to choose the way of outsourcing contracts is to attract private social funds into the field of public services, and to respond to the preferences of higher levels of government. Contract outsourcing has become an effective strategy for lower government to compete for the attention of higher government. The institutional incentive of local government behavior comes from the promotion incentive of bureaucratic system. The shift of preference on the part of the superior government makes the contract outsourcing no longer have the promotion incentive, In the process of contract outsourcing, the contractor is based on the "starting price" of high-specific assets, the "moral hazard" in the contract design, the "regulatory kidnapping" of the contractor, and the financial incentives resulting from the performance reform of the local government. Jointly promote the local government to implement the public service reverse contract outsourcing. Transaction cost and incentive structure together shape the choice of local government public service supply mode, but incentive structure plays a more basic role.
【作者单位】：厦门大学法学院;华侨大学政治与公共管理学院;
【基金】：福建省社会科学规划项目“我国公用事业民营化政府规制研究”(项目编号:2010B058) 华侨大学研究生科研创新能力培育计划资助项目
【分类号】：D630

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