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鼎汉技术有限公司股权激励绩效评价研究

发布时间:2018-06-16 14:32

  本文选题:股权激励 + 绩效评价 ; 参考:《湘潭大学》2017年硕士论文


【摘要】:现代企业制度的两权分离使得企业的所有者与经营者之间产生“委托-代理”问题,企业经营者为了自身目标函数可能会做出有损股东利益的行为。道德风险和逆向选择的存在使得企业建立激励和约束机制显得十分重要。股权激励将企业所有者与经营者的利益紧密结合,授予企业的激励对象一定数量的股票或期权让经营者能作为股东的身份和企业的所有者利益共享、风险共担,因而股权激励历来备受瞩目。我国创业板于2009年开始正式运行,其上市企业从2010年便开始不停地摸索股权激励,并以迅猛之势发展,民营企业成为股权激励潮流中的中坚力量。然而,许多企业在实施股权激励计划的过程中遇到了重重问题而以失败结尾;也有许多学者研究发现股权激励与企业绩效并无关联,并对股权激励的效果产生质疑。而创业板第一批上市企业北京鼎汉技术股份有限公司似乎十分倾向于股权激励,先后于2011年、2013年、2015年和2016年推出四次激励方案。那么鼎汉技术股权激励方案设计得如何?公司实施股权激励是否对其绩效有促进作用?本文重点对实施股权激励前后的财务绩效进行评价。这篇论文从股权激励相关理论入手,介绍了股权激励理论基础、相关概念以及企业绩效评价方法,进而对我国创业板上市企业股权激励情况进行统计分析。随后该论文着手对鼎汉技术股权激励的研究:首先介绍公司基本情况,然后对公司实施的股权激励方案进行介绍,并着重对公司实施股权激励前后的财务绩效进行评价。在进行绩效评价时,该篇论文首先采用财务指标分析法和杜邦分析法从纵向角度对公司实施股权激励前后的财务绩效变化进行分析,其次通过功效系数法将公司与其他同行业同主板上市公司进行比较,从横向角度对公司股权激励财务绩效进行评价。研究结果发现,公司实施股权激励前公司绩效较差,而实施股权激励后公司绩效提升。经过进一步研究得出结论:公司实施股权激励对公司绩效有一定程度的促进作用。最后,该篇论文对公司实施的股权激励方案提出建议,以期能够完善公司以后的股权激励方案,从而达到更好的激励效果。
[Abstract]:The separation of two rights in modern enterprise system leads to the problem of "principal-agent" between the owner and the operator of the enterprise, and the enterprise manager may act to the detriment of the shareholders' interests for the sake of his own objective function. The existence of moral hazard and adverse selection makes it very important for enterprises to establish incentive and restraint mechanism. Equity incentive closely combines the interests of the owner and the operator of the enterprise. The incentive object granted to the enterprise is a certain number of stock or options so that the operator can share the interests of the shareholder and the owner of the enterprise and share the risks. As a result, equity incentives have always been the focus of attention. The gem of our country began to operate formally in 2009, and its listed enterprises began to explore the stock right incentive continuously from 2010, and with the rapid development, the private enterprise becomes the backbone of the stock right incentive trend. However, many enterprises have encountered many problems in the process of implementing equity incentive plan and ended with failure. Many scholars have found that equity incentive has no relationship with enterprise performance, and has doubts about the effect of equity incentive. The first listed companies on the gem, Beijing Dinghan Technology Co., Ltd., seem to be very inclined to equity incentive, introduced four incentive schemes in 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2016. So how about the design of Tin-Han technology equity incentive scheme? Does the company implement equity incentive to promote its performance? This paper focuses on the implementation of equity incentives before and after the evaluation of financial performance. This paper starts with the theory of equity incentive, introduces the theoretical basis of equity incentive, related concepts and enterprise performance evaluation methods, and then makes a statistical analysis of equity incentive situation of listed enterprises in gem of our country. Then the paper begins with the research on the technology equity incentive of Ding Han: firstly, it introduces the basic situation of the company, then introduces the equity incentive scheme implemented by the company, and emphatically evaluates the financial performance of the company before and after the implementation of the equity incentive. In the performance evaluation, the paper firstly uses the financial index analysis method and DuPont analysis method to analyze the financial performance changes before and after the implementation of equity incentive from a vertical perspective. Secondly, it compares the company with other listed companies in the same industry and main board through the efficiency coefficient method, and evaluates the financial performance of equity incentive from the horizontal angle. The results show that the performance of the company is poor before the implementation of equity incentive, but the performance of the company is improved after the implementation of equity incentive. After further study, it is concluded that the implementation of equity incentive has a certain degree of promoting effect on corporate performance. In the end, the paper puts forward some suggestions on the stock right incentive scheme in order to perfect the stock right incentive scheme in the future, so as to achieve a better incentive effect.
【学位授予单位】:湘潭大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F426.4;F272.92;F406.7

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