政治晋升、寻租与企业并购——来自市委书记升迁的证据

发布时间：2018-06-25 01:27

本文选题：地方官员 + 政治晋升　；参考：《经济学动态》2017年04期

【摘要】：以2000-2013年上市公司并购数据为样本,本文实证检验了地方官员政治晋升对企业并购的影响和经济后果。研究发现:市委书记政治晋升会加剧当地企业并购交易,地方国有企业和民营企业当年实施并完成并购交易的可能性显著增加、并购交易时间显著缩短;对于地方国有企业而言,政治晋升期间实施的并购交易长期来看会导致并购绩效的恶化,而对于民营企业,官员晋升对并购绩效的影响则经历了由正到负的过程。进一步研究发现:官员晋升推动的企业并购加速能够获得更多的政府补贴和银行贷款;政治晋升与企业并购加速的关系不受党委换届等因素的影响。本文的研究对于理解我国企业并购、拓展企业并购理论以及优化企业并购重组具有一定的参考价值。
[Abstract]:Taking the data of mergers and acquisitions of listed companies from 2000 to 2013 as a sample, this paper empirically examines the impact of political promotion of local officials on M & A and its economic consequences. It is found that the political promotion of the party secretary will aggravate the M & A transactions of local enterprises, the possibility of the local state-owned enterprises and private enterprises to implement and complete the M & A transactions in that year has increased significantly, and the time of M & A transactions has been shortened significantly; For local state-owned enterprises, M & A transactions implemented during political promotion will lead to the deterioration of M & A performance in the long run, while for private enterprises, the impact of official promotions on M & A performance has experienced a process from positive to negative. Further study shows that the government subsidy and bank loan can be obtained more and the relationship between the political promotion and the acceleration of M & A is not influenced by the change of the Party committee and so on. The research in this paper has certain reference value for understanding the M & A of our country, expanding the theory of M & A and optimizing the M & A.
【作者单位】：辽宁大学商学院、现代公司治理与成长研究中心;东北财经大学工商管理学院;南开大学中国公司治理研究院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金重点项目“现代社会治理的组织与模式研究”(71533002);国家自然科学基金青年项目“地方官员晋升、资源配置与企业扩张行为研究”(71602082) 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目“寻租、高管政治晋升与国有企业信息披露”(16YJC630148)的资助
【分类号】：D262.3;F271

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