控制权和现金流权分离的代理机理对业绩影响的实证研究

发布时间：2018-06-25 20:28

本文选题：终极控制人 + 控制权　；参考：《吉林大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：本文为了进一步揭示控制权和现金流权分离之谜,考虑最终控制人的控制权的基础规模,深入研究控制权与企业业绩之间的关系,以揭示不同情况下企业面临的多重代理问题对业绩产生的叠加作用。在此基础上本文借鉴文献中已有的超额控制权概念来代表控制权超过现金流权的程度,借鉴隧道效应和支持效应的研究结论,深入讨论超额控制权对企业业绩的影响。并通过超额控制权对资金侵占的研究,从行为层面为进一步验证超额控制权与企业业绩之间的关系。本文研究结果表明,控制权集中度较低时,经理人与股东之间的矛盾占主导,提高终极控制人控制权有利于加强对管理者的监管,从而提高企业业绩;控制权集中度较高时,控股股东与中小股东之间的矛盾凸显。最终控制人有动机且有能力侵占中小股东的利益,导致企业业绩降低;由于国有企业最终控制人受到各级政府部门的绩效考核、监督管理,并且其政治晋升路径与企业业绩挂钩,因此国有企业最终控制人侵占资产的程度较弱;超额控制权对企业业绩有倒U型关系,其中控制权基础规模越大,侵占程度越严重;此外,超额控制权与资金侵占间呈U型关系。总的来说,本文的研究基于三种不同类型的委托代理问题,明确了控制权基础规模差异影响最终控制人对企业业绩的作用机理,并检验超额控制权、资金侵占对业绩的影响。为了控制控股股东的侵占行为,保护投资者利益,我国必须完善法律保护制度,提高大股东侵占中小股东利益的成本;针对控制权基础规模的差异、最终控制人性质的差异,有侧重的运用不同监管措施与治理方法。该结论为研究中小股东利益保护机制和公司治理提供了一个全新的视角。
[Abstract]:In order to further reveal the riddle of the separation of control and cash flow right, this paper considers the basic scale of the control right of the ultimate controller, and deeply studies the relationship between the control right and the performance of the firm. In order to reveal the effect of multiple agency problems on performance in different situations. On this basis, this paper draws lessons from the concept of excess control in the literature to represent the degree of control exceeding the cash flow right, draws on the research conclusions of tunnel effect and support effect, and discusses the influence of excess control on enterprise performance in depth. The relationship between excess control and corporate performance is further verified from the behavioral level through the study of excess control rights on capital encroachment. The results show that when the concentration of control is low, the contradiction between managers and shareholders is dominant, and the improvement of ultimate control rights is conducive to strengthening the supervision of managers, thus improving the performance of enterprises; when the concentration of control is high, The contradiction between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders is prominent. The ultimate controller is motivated and able to encroach on the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders, leading to a decline in the performance of the enterprise; since the ultimate controller of the state-owned enterprise is subject to the performance appraisal of government departments at all levels, And its political promotion path is linked to the enterprise performance, so the extent of the state-owned enterprise's ultimate controller encroaching on the assets is weaker, the excess control right has the inverted U-shape relation to the enterprise's performance, and the bigger the control right base is, the more serious the encroachment degree is. In addition, there is a U-type relationship between excess control and capital encroachment. In a word, based on three different types of principal-agent problems, this paper clarifies the mechanism of the effect of controlling power base scale difference on the performance of enterprise, and tests the influence of excess control right and capital encroachment on performance. In order to control the expropriation behavior of controlling shareholders and protect the interests of investors, our country must perfect the legal protection system, increase the cost of the large shareholders encroaching on the interests of the minority shareholders, and aim at the difference of the basic scale of the control right and the difference of the nature of the controlling person. With emphasis on the use of different regulatory measures and governance methods. The conclusion provides a new perspective for the study of the protection mechanism of minority shareholders' interests and corporate governance.
【学位授予单位】：吉林大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275

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