混合所有制改革背景下国有企业股权制衡机制研究

发布时间：2018-07-25 10:29

【摘要】：国有企业承担着国民经济的命脉,支撑着我国重要行业和领域,却连年亏损、苦苦经营,其原因在于政府一股独大,大包大揽的治理模式已经不能适应瞬息多变的经济环境,国有股份比例过大为财政造成负担的同时阻碍了其他有实力的资本进入市场,缺乏制衡的股权结构导致企业缺乏创新和竞争力。本文利用博弈论相关知识建立模型,梳理国有大股东与管理层之间的委托代理关系,国有大股东与中小股东对管理层的监督态度差异,国有大股东与中小股东之间的利益冲突以及相对控股下几个大股东之间的利益冲突。基于合谋和监督两个维度,比较国有绝对控股和国有相对控股对企业发展的利弊和影响,证明股权集中程度低、制衡程度高的股权结构,有利于促进股东对代理人的监督,减少代理人为实现自身利益最大化而破坏企业利益的行为,同时有效制约大股东的专制行为,建立科学的决策机制,防止大股东侵害小股东利益的现象发生。本文通过实证研究以国有上市公司为样本进行分析,使用线性回归分析方法研究股权集中度、股权制衡度、国有持股比例、非公有股(民营股、外资股等)比例与企业绩效水平之间的关系。最后对我国国有企业混合所有制改革路径提供建议和对策。
[Abstract]:The state-owned enterprises bear the lifeblood of the national economy and support the important industries and fields of our country, but they continue to lose money and operate painstakingly. The reason lies in the fact that the government has a dominant and all-inclusive governance model that can no longer adapt to the changing economic environment. The excessive proportion of state-owned shares creates a financial burden and prevents other powerful capital from entering the market. The lack of checks and balances of the equity structure leads to the lack of innovation and competitiveness of enterprises. This paper establishes a model by using the relevant knowledge of game theory, combs the principal-agent relationship between the state-owned large shareholders and the management, and the differences of the supervision attitude of the state-owned large shareholders and the minority shareholders towards the management. The conflicts of interest between the major and minority shareholders and the conflicts of interest between several major shareholders under the relative control. Based on the two dimensions of collusion and supervision, this paper compares the advantages and disadvantages and effects of absolute state holding and relative state holding on the development of enterprises, and proves that the ownership structure with low concentration of ownership and high degree of checks and balances is beneficial to the supervision of agents by shareholders. In order to realize the maximization of their own interests, the agent can destroy the interests of the enterprise, at the same time, effectively restrict the autocratic behavior of the major shareholders, establish a scientific decision-making mechanism, and prevent the phenomenon that the large shareholders encroach on the interests of the minority shareholders. This paper takes the state-owned listed company as the sample to analyze, uses the linear regression analysis method to study the ownership concentration, the equity balance degree, the state-owned stock holding ratio, the non-public stock (private stock), The relationship between the proportion of foreign capital stocks and the level of enterprise performance. Finally, suggestions and countermeasures are provided for the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises in China.
【学位授予单位】：首都经济贸易大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F276.1;F271

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