我国上市公司股权激励对会计稳健性的影响研究
发布时间：2018-08-01 15:28
【摘要】：近年来,我国掀起了一股股权激励的浪潮,自2006年国家颁布了推行股权激励的有关法规起,每年推行股权激励的上市公司也在不断增加,近5年来这种增长趋势尤为明显。但是由于我国的资本市场发展较晚,在制定股权激励机制时存在一些明显的问题,导致实际执行中股权激励的最终效果大打折扣。本文从会计信息质量中的谨慎性原则角度研究推行股权激励的效果,对上市公司合理选择股权激励模式具有一定的参考意义。本文主要包括以下五章。第一章绪论讨论了本文的研究背景及意义、文献综述以及研究内容及方法。在文献综述部分分别对国内以及国外研究股权激励和会计稳健性的相关文献进行了回顾,通过对国内以及国外相关文献的整理中可以发现,很大一部分研究结论都表明推行股权激励会降低公司的会计稳健性,但是对原因的分析比较片面。本文以会计稳健性水平的变化作为衡量值,以辩证的思维剖析了推行股权激励的效果,具有一定的现实意义。本文的研究方法主要采用的是定性和定量相结合的方法。第二章理论分析部分主要阐述了对股权激励及会计稳健性这两个方面的相关理论。在描述股权激励的相关理论时,首先是明确了股权激励的概念;其次对五种现有的股权激励模式特别是使用最广泛的股票期权模式以及限制性股票模式的特点进行了阐述,并且结合特点分析对我国推行股权激励的现状进行了剖析,发现推行股权激励的大多数上市公司没有真正发挥其长期激励作用。在对会计稳健性的相关理论进行分析时,首先论述了会计稳健性的概念;其次对会计稳健性的类别进行了划分,对本文所指的会计稳健性进行了界定,认为条件稳健性更符合我国对会计稳健性的要求,选其作为研究对象;最后对计量会计稳健性的几种主要方法及其运用进行了介绍,通过分析发现应计项目-现金流量这种计量方法最符合我国的国情。最后一部分对会使用到的其他相关理论进行了描述,丰富了本文理论基础。最后根据理论分析得出本文的三个假设。第三章研究设计选取了2011年至2015年5年在A股上市的662家公司3310个数据作为观测值;在选择模型时,考虑到模型的适用性以及我国市场的具体情况,选择应计项目-现金流模型作为基本模型;为了更好地验证管理层持股比例不同的情况下推行股权激励计划会对会计稳健性产生的影响,将应计项目-现金流模型与C-Score度量法相结合,量化公司的会计稳健性水平。第四章实证部分通过描述性统计、相关性分析、多元回归分析等实证方法,得出了如下的结论:第一,在对原模型及修正后的模型的回归结果中,代表会计稳健性项目的系数是正数,且结果显著,说明我国上市公司绝大多数都遵循了会计的谨慎性原则。第二,在模型回归结果中,推行股权激励与会计稳健性水平交叉影响项目的系数为负数,说明在我国推行股权激励会在一定程度上降低企业的会计稳健性水平。第三,最后从假设三的非线性回归结果中可以看出,高管持股比例的大小与会计稳健性的程度呈现出一个比较明显的倒U型曲线,说明推行股权激励对会计稳健性的削弱作用并不是绝对的,管理者持股比例的不同会改变股权激励对会计稳健性的最终效果。第五章本文结合实证结果提供了一些建议,比如完善股权激励的管理制度,制定行之有效的绩效考核制度,完善公司的内部监管制度等。同时本文也存在一些不足,主要是对应计项目-现金流模型的考虑不够全面,对变量的选择不够丰富,在今后的研究中会更加全面地看待问题,分析问题。
[Abstract]:In recent years, China has set off a wave of equity incentive. Since the state promulgated the relevant laws and regulations to promote equity incentive in 2006, the listed companies that carry out equity incentive have also been increasing every year. This growth trend is particularly obvious in the last 5 years. However, because of the late development of the capital market in China, there is one of the existing equity incentive mechanisms. Some obvious problems lead to the discounts of the ultimate effect of equity incentive in actual implementation. This paper studies the effect of carrying out equity incentive from the perspective of prudence in the quality of accounting information, and has a certain reference significance for the rational selection of equity incentive model for listed companies. The main purpose of this paper is to include the following five chapters. The research background and significance, literature review and research contents and methods are reviewed. In the literature review, the domestic and foreign literatures on equity incentive and accounting conservatism are reviewed respectively. A large part of the research conclusions can be found in the domestic and foreign literature review. The company's accounting conservatism is reduced, but the analysis of the reasons is one-sided. This paper takes the changes in the level of accounting conservatism as a measure, and analyzes the effect of carrying out equity incentive with dialectical thinking. This method is mainly used in the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. Second chapters The analysis part mainly expounds the two aspects of equity incentive and accounting conservatism. In describing the related theory of equity incentive, the first is to clarify the concept of equity incentive; secondly, the characteristics of the five existing equity incentive modes, especially the most widely used stock options model and the characteristics of the restrictive stock model. On the basis of the analysis of the current situation of carrying out equity incentive in China, it is found that most listed companies that carry out equity incentive have not really exerted their long-term incentive effect. In the analysis of the relevant theories of accounting conservatism, the concept of accounting conservatism is first discussed; secondly, the Accounting Conservatism is also discussed. The categories are divided, and the accounting conservatism of this article is defined. It is considered that the condition conservatism is more in line with the requirements of China's accounting conservatism and chooses it as the research object. Finally, several main methods and its application of accounting conservatism are introduced, and the calculation of accrual items, cash flow, is found. The last part describes the other related theories that will be used in the last part, enriches the theoretical basis of this paper. Finally, according to the theoretical analysis, the three hypotheses are obtained. In the third chapter, 3310 data of 662 public companies listed in A shares from 2011 to 2015 are selected as the observation values; in the selection model, the model is selected. Considering the applicability of the model and the specific situation of our country's market, the accrued project - cash flow model is chosen as the basic model. In order to better verify the effect of the equity incentive plan on Accounting Conservatism under the different proportion of managerial ownership, the accrued project - cash flow model and the C-Score measure method are combined. The fourth chapter shows the following conclusions through descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, multiple regression analysis and other empirical methods. First, in the regression results of the original model and the revised model, the objective coefficient of accounting conservatism is positive, and the result is significant, indicating that China is listed on the market. Most of the companies follow the prudence principle of accounting. Second, in the regression results of the model, the coefficient of the cross effect of equity incentive and the level of accounting conservatism is negative, which shows that the implementation of equity incentive in China will reduce the level of the firm's accounting stability to a certain extent. Third, from the nonlinear return of hypothesis three. It can be seen from the results that the size of executive stock ownership and the degree of accounting conservatism show an obvious inverted U curve, which indicates that the weakening role of equity incentive to accounting conservatism is not absolute. The difference in the proportion of managers' shareholding will change the ultimate effect of equity incentive on accounting conservatism. The fifth chapter is the article. Some suggestions are provided, such as improving the management system of equity incentive, making effective performance appraisal system and improving the internal supervision system of the company. At the same time, there are some shortcomings in this paper. It will take a more comprehensive view of the problem and analyze the problem.
【学位授予单位】：长江大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F272.92
[Abstract]:In recent years, China has set off a wave of equity incentive. Since the state promulgated the relevant laws and regulations to promote equity incentive in 2006, the listed companies that carry out equity incentive have also been increasing every year. This growth trend is particularly obvious in the last 5 years. However, because of the late development of the capital market in China, there is one of the existing equity incentive mechanisms. Some obvious problems lead to the discounts of the ultimate effect of equity incentive in actual implementation. This paper studies the effect of carrying out equity incentive from the perspective of prudence in the quality of accounting information, and has a certain reference significance for the rational selection of equity incentive model for listed companies. The main purpose of this paper is to include the following five chapters. The research background and significance, literature review and research contents and methods are reviewed. In the literature review, the domestic and foreign literatures on equity incentive and accounting conservatism are reviewed respectively. A large part of the research conclusions can be found in the domestic and foreign literature review. The company's accounting conservatism is reduced, but the analysis of the reasons is one-sided. This paper takes the changes in the level of accounting conservatism as a measure, and analyzes the effect of carrying out equity incentive with dialectical thinking. This method is mainly used in the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. Second chapters The analysis part mainly expounds the two aspects of equity incentive and accounting conservatism. In describing the related theory of equity incentive, the first is to clarify the concept of equity incentive; secondly, the characteristics of the five existing equity incentive modes, especially the most widely used stock options model and the characteristics of the restrictive stock model. On the basis of the analysis of the current situation of carrying out equity incentive in China, it is found that most listed companies that carry out equity incentive have not really exerted their long-term incentive effect. In the analysis of the relevant theories of accounting conservatism, the concept of accounting conservatism is first discussed; secondly, the Accounting Conservatism is also discussed. The categories are divided, and the accounting conservatism of this article is defined. It is considered that the condition conservatism is more in line with the requirements of China's accounting conservatism and chooses it as the research object. Finally, several main methods and its application of accounting conservatism are introduced, and the calculation of accrual items, cash flow, is found. The last part describes the other related theories that will be used in the last part, enriches the theoretical basis of this paper. Finally, according to the theoretical analysis, the three hypotheses are obtained. In the third chapter, 3310 data of 662 public companies listed in A shares from 2011 to 2015 are selected as the observation values; in the selection model, the model is selected. Considering the applicability of the model and the specific situation of our country's market, the accrued project - cash flow model is chosen as the basic model. In order to better verify the effect of the equity incentive plan on Accounting Conservatism under the different proportion of managerial ownership, the accrued project - cash flow model and the C-Score measure method are combined. The fourth chapter shows the following conclusions through descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, multiple regression analysis and other empirical methods. First, in the regression results of the original model and the revised model, the objective coefficient of accounting conservatism is positive, and the result is significant, indicating that China is listed on the market. Most of the companies follow the prudence principle of accounting. Second, in the regression results of the model, the coefficient of the cross effect of equity incentive and the level of accounting conservatism is negative, which shows that the implementation of equity incentive in China will reduce the level of the firm's accounting stability to a certain extent. Third, from the nonlinear return of hypothesis three. It can be seen from the results that the size of executive stock ownership and the degree of accounting conservatism show an obvious inverted U curve, which indicates that the weakening role of equity incentive to accounting conservatism is not absolute. The difference in the proportion of managers' shareholding will change the ultimate effect of equity incentive on accounting conservatism. The fifth chapter is the article. Some suggestions are provided, such as improving the management system of equity incentive, making effective performance appraisal system and improving the internal supervision system of the company. At the same time, there are some shortcomings in this paper. It will take a more comprehensive view of the problem and analyze the problem.
【学位授予单位】：长江大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F272.92
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